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Abstract
With a projected annual value of £1bn, the UK energy performance contractingmarket has the potential to unlock a large number of energy efficiency projectsby reducing risk of investing in energy efficiency upgrades in industry applica-tions and in buildings. However, market development to date has been slow andlittle analysis has been undertaken to understand the characteristics of suc-cessful projects. A better understanding of the impact of project scale, scopeand risk allocation on outcomes for building owners and their contracting part-ners, known as Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), would enable investmentprogrammes to be targeted more effectively.This study uses probabilistic energy modelling of hypothetical case stud-ies in the UK schools sector to assess the scale of possible energy savingsfrom a range of retrofit measures. Samples from these distributions of energysavings are used as inputs to an economic model which allows the impact ofdifferent approaches to measurement and verification of the energy savings tobe explored, along with the impact of energy price assumptions, project scaleand scope and different guarantee mechanisms.The case study projects are based on hypothetical school buildings andcombine 3 different scales of project with 2 different groups of retrofit measures.Despite evidence from previous work that transaction costs are criticalto financial outcomes of projects there is an absence of data on the scale oftransaction costs in the current literature. This study uses semi-structured in-terviews with building owners and ESCOs to elicit transaction cost informationfor the case study projects which form another set of inputs to the economic
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model.Global sensitivity analysis is used to screen for non-influential parametersin the energy model (modified Morris method), enabling a significant reductionin computational burden. Global sensitivity analysis is also used with theeconomic model to rank inputs in order of their influence on financial outcomesfor clients and ESCOs, providing insight into the areas of uncertainty whichhave the largest impact.The results of this study suggest that
• not all of these projects are well-suited to this form of procurement. Inparticular, cases with a small number of energy conservation measuresperform less well than those with a more diverse set of measures
• more effective monitoring methods are needed, but crucially, these mustbe focused on the collection of data which facilitates the allocation ofresponsibilities between the parties.
• steps to increase market competition must take an holistic view of trans-action costs to avoid reducing market testing of costs in competition whichwill result in increasing policing and enforcement costs
• bundling smaller projects together cannot reduce risks for the ESCOunless there is a mechanism for balancing returns between individualprojects.
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Chapter 1
Introductory Material
1.1 Motivation for this thesis
The UK government’s Climate Change Act passed into law in 2008 [5]. TheClimate Change Act was the first example of a country introducing a long-term, legally binding framework to reduce carbon emissions in response to thegrowing threat of climate change. The act underlined the important role ofefficient use of energy resources in reducing UK carbon emissions. However,despite continuing acknowledgement that energy efficiency is “fundamental todecarbonising the UK, maintaining secure energy supplies, and increasing theproductivity of [...] businesses” [6] investment in energy efficiency projects inthe UK has been very limited to date and the energy intensity of non-domesticbuildings has been static since 2007 according to a 2015 Committee on Cli-mate Change report [7]. The UK is by no means unique in this respect withsimilar concerns reported in a wide range of jurisdictions [8, 9, 10, 11]. Thislack of investment in energy efficiency has been termed the “energy efficiencyparadox”: technologically orientated analysts see a divergence from the opti-mal diffusion rate of energy-efficient technology as evidence of market barriersand thus argue for policies to promote investment and overcome these barriers[12]. O’Malley et al. [13] defined barriers to energy efficiency as “postulatedmechanisms that inhibit investment in technologies that are both energy effi-cient and economically efficient”. However, other researchers have argued that
1.1. Motivation for this thesis 19
energy markets are generally efficient and that lower than expected levels ofinvestment are explained by the economic rationality of consumers, particularlywith reference to prospect theory which suggests that uncertain long-term re-turns from the investment would be weighted unfavourably in comparison withcertain sunk costs [14]. This is likely to be compounded by consumer scepticismof economic predictions since studies of technological potential are generallyundertaken by authors with some bias and tend to underestimate costs andoverestimate benefits [15].
Many advocates have proposed a form of contract where the installer ofan energy efficiency measure guarantees the level of resulting energy savings,suggesting that this approach would unlock investment in energy efficiencymeasures by de-risking the savings associated with them. This type of ar-rangement, termed an Energy Performance Contract (EPC), has been activelypursued in the United States since the late 1970’s [16] and was mandated bythe European Parliament in 2006 [17].
By 2010, the UK EPC market was estimated to be worth $530m per an-num [18], and later studies suggest that the market has continued to grow [19],particularly in public sector facilities such as schools and hospitals where typ-ical projects have involved installation of a range of energy efficiency measuresincluding lighting upgrades and heating controls [20]. Installation of CombinedHeat and Power plants has been a key feature of EPC project in the health sec-tor [19]. However, the UK Committee on Climate Change’s concerns about theslow pace of uptake of energy efficiency improvements [7] were published nearlya decade after the EU directive, so it seems clear that while EPCs have beengathering some momentum in the UK, they have not had the transformationaleffect that was hoped for. Nonetheless, EPCs are a significant procurementroute in the UK. The Greater London Authority’s RE:FIT programme has seenover £100 million of capital investment delivered in energy efficiency over 7years for over 200 public sector clients [21]. It is clear that clients are routinelydeveloping projects for procurement, and making potentially critical decisions
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about their composition despite a lack of evidence in the literature for the im-pact those procurement choices may have on project outcomes. As the result,the aim of this study is to explore some of those procurement choices to under-stand their impact. By understanding better which projects are more likely tobe successful, future procurement can be better targeted.
1.2 Structure of this thesis
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 begins by establishing a defini-tion for Energy Performance Contracts which is used as the basis for a reviewof the existing literature on EPCs. It is clear from the literature that transactioncosts and uncertainties around energy price and energy savings are critical tothe success of energy performance contracts. This review also highlighted theneed for an underpinning theoretical framework.Sorrell [22] proposed Transaction Cost Economics as a theoretical frame-work for understanding EPCs. Chapter 3 discusses the appropriateness of thisframework and how it can be extended to incorporate uncertainty. Based onthis, four research hypotheses are derived from Sorrell’s [23] work which formthe basis of the work undertaken in this study.Chapter 4 sets out the context in which the research hypotheses are ex-plored, the modelling strategy is introduced and the data collection approachfor the first of the two principal elements of the analysis, transaction costs, isdetailed.The second principal element of analysis is production cost savings; inthis context, energy cost savings. Chapter 5 begins by identifying the projectdimensions which must be defined in order to test the research hypotheses andexplains the approach to using Building Energy Simulation (BES) modellingto determine energy savings. A key focus of this chapter is the treatment ofuncertainty in BES models and the use of parameter screening to reduce modeldimensionality.Chapter 6 begins by presenting the transaction cost data collected through
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interviews with a range of Clients and Energy Service Companies (ESCOs). Thechallenges and limitations of the data are discussed and evidence for the impactof market competitiveness on financial returns is considered.Chapter 7 explores the impact of different approaches to measurement andverification (M&V) of energy savings. The different balances of risk transferunder each option are discussed. The BES results for alternative M&V ap-proaches for two different sets of Energy Conservation Measures (ECMs) arepresented and a global sensitivity analysis is undertaken to identify the impactof M&V strategy on financial outcomes for Clients and ESCOs.Chapter 8 draws the transaction cost results of Chapter 6 and the produc-tion cost results of Chapter 7 together to explore the impact of project scale(number of buildings) and project scope (number of ECMs installed in eachbuilding) on financial outcomes for Clients and ESCOs.Chapter 9 concludes this thesis by summarising the results of Chapters6, 7 and 8 and setting out the implications for procurement decisions that arehighlighted by these results. The limitations of this study are discussed andsuggestions are made for further work.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Overview
This chapter begins by considering the origins of energy performance contract-ing (EPC) and defining which activities are encompassed by the term. Thisdefinition is used as the basis for a review of the existing literature on EPCswhich resulted in a large number of articles for review. The most highly citedof these articles (measured by total number of citations) are reviewed to de-velop an understanding of the aspects of EPCs which have received the bulkof research attention to date. A key theme in the literature reviewed was theexploration of barriers to development of EPCs around the world. A number ofcommon suggested barriers were identified. Understanding two of these pro-posed barriers: risk/uncertainty and transaction costs required a finer grainedapproach to the subject than was generally available in the most highly citedarticles which largely took a theoretical or explanatory approach to the sub-ject. To address this, the scope of the literature review was expanded to includeany literature dedicated to these two elements of EPCs and less highly citedpapers were included in the search. Gaps in the literature were identified as aresult, in particular, as identified by Sorrell [22], the need for an underpinningtheoretical framework. The proposed theoretical framework is the subject of thefollowing chapter.
2.2. Defining Energy Performance Contracting 232.2 Defining Energy Performance Contracting
Whether EPC should be viewed as heralding the shift from the industrialisedeconomy to a performance based economy as suggested by Steinberger [24] ormore prosaically as a mechanism for unlocking energy efficiency investments,it has received considerable attention as part of a suite of solutions to deliversignificant and rapid reductions in carbon dioxide emissions to address climatechange goals [25, 26, 27]. EPC has its modern origins in the US as a re-sponse to the oil shocks of the 1970s [28]. Goldman et al. undertook the firstcomprehensive survey of Energy Service Company (ESCO) activities in the USin 2002 noting that ESCOs were “increasingly moving away from performancecontracting". As a result, the term ESCO covers an expanding range of activi-ties and it is necessary to clarify the scope of activities which is of interest forthis study. Duplessis et al. [29] illustrated this expansion as shown in figure2.2.1
Figure 2.2.1: Expanding scope of ESCO activities
In line with Duplessis et al. [29], the definition of Energy PerformanceContract used in this study is taken from EU directive 2006/32/EC: “A contrac-tual arrangement between the beneficiary and the provider (...) of an energyimprovement measure, where investments in that measure are paid for in re-lation to a contractually agreed level of energy efficiency improvement."[17,article 3j].
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An initial scoping review of the literature was supplemented with a sys-tematic review based on citation counts to ensure that there were no gaps inthe material surveyed. Literature relating to Energy Performance Contractingwas identified from the Scopus database for journal articles published between2005 and 2017, using the following search terms:
• “energy performance contract"
• “energy services company"
• “energy services companies"
The terms ‘ESCO’ and ‘EPC’ were not used in the search as these abbreviationswere found to be used in various unrelated fields. A total of 377 papers wereidentified and the 100 most cited (by total number of citations) were selectedfor inclusion in the review. Paper abstracts were then reviewed to ensure thatonly papers which referred to Energy Performance Contracting as defined abovewere included. This resulted in 67 papers for review. More detailed review ofthe full text of the remaining 67 articles and book chapters identified a further15 references which did not directly relate to energy performance contractingand these were also removed. Four references were excluded; of these two itemswere excluded as only the abstract was in English, access was not availableto one item and one item had been withdrawn. This resulted in a total of 48references for review.
2.3 Energy Performance Contract markets
Much of the literature surveyed seeks to present the current state of energyperformance contracting and ESCO activities, and identify the actual and po-tential scale of markets around the world. These efforts are complicated bythe broad scope of ESCO activities, which adds to the difficulty of determiningthe market size. Goldman et al.’s [28] original market review in the US cal-culated market size by determining the turnover of ESCOs for whom energy
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performance contracting was at the core of their business. Revenues for non-respondent ESCOs were estimated using a delphi process. This procedure wasrepeated in 2008 and in 2013 by which time the US market was estimated tohave grown from $2bn in 2002 to $6bn in 2013. Data for the size of other mar-kets is more difficult to determine. Marino et al.[18] estimated the UK ESCOmarket at $530m in 2010 based on expert interviews. Nolden and Sorrell [19]report that the market had grown considerably by 2014 but do not provide afigure for the market size. The Japanese performance contracting market wasworth $250m in 2005 [30] and Yuan et al. [31] report the Chinese market sizeas $16bn in 2014 although Kostka and Shin [32] caution that “many companiesregistered as ESCOs are simply taking advantage of finance and tax breaksdesigned to promote the development of the industry and are not engaged inEPCs” suggesting that this figure may be an over-estimate. Despite the dif-ficulties of assessing market size it is clear that the global market for energyperformance contracts is substantial and that most commentators agree thatthere is considerable potential for additional growth.
2.3.1 Barriers to market developmentAlthough the market for Energy Performance Contracts is large and growing andenergy performance contracts offer some demonstrable benefits, many commen-tators have identified barriers which may prevent it reaching its full potential[33, 34, 35, 18, 36, for example]. Reasons for this apparent lag and/or proposalsfor supporting market growth are explicitly addressed in a large proportion ofthe literature; in all 24 unique accounts were found and a number of recurringthemes were identified:
1. Awareness and incentives to investFor an Energy Performance Contract to be a possibility there must firstbe a desire to improve energy efficiency and an awareness of the potentialsolution offered by an EPC. Hansen [33] suggests there is a global lackof awareness, a view borne out by the range of commentators sharingit. Commenting on the EU ESCO market, Bertoldi et al. [34] report a
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lack of awareness or understanding on the part of potential clients insome member states of the importance of energy efficiency or of howEPCs could be used to increase it. This finding is mirrored in analysesof the Swedish market by Soroye and Nilsson [37] and in Pätäri andSinkonen’s [38] and Suhonen and Okkonen’s [39] analyses of the Finnishmarket. Similar concerns are raised by Jensen et al. [40] reporting onESCOs in Danish municipalities and Aasen et al. [41] in a recent reviewin Norway. However, such a concern is not restricted to the northerneuropean market with Kostka and Shin [32] noting the low sophisticationof clients as a concern in China. This is echoed by Painuly’s [42] report onlessons learned from pilot projects in India, Brazil and China and Okayet al.’s [43, 27] review of and update on the emerging Turkish market.Nolden and Sorrell [19] note that even in jurisdictions where awarenessof the need for energy efficiency might be expected to be high, energyefficiency investments must compete for scarce capital resources.
2. Cultural barriersThe need to adapt to local market and cultural norms is discussed bymany authors [44, 37, 25, 45, 46]. Yuan et al. [31] note that even withina single country, in this case China, there is a need to take account ofregional differences. Some cultural barriers are particularly challengingto market development: for example the absence of a risk capital marketand experience in Turkey [43] or a moral objection to a third party profitingfrom public sector actions in some Nordic countries [38, 39, 40].
3. Government supportDevelopment of Energy Performance Contract markets relies on govern-ment action in three key guises: Firstly for the establishment of theappropriate legal and regulatory framework which allows energy perfor-mance contracts to be undertaken [47, 33, 37]. The need for legislativechange to financial markets in Turkey to allow access to risk capital isa good example of this [43]. Secondly, governments can influence mar-
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ket activity through the availability of subsidies for energy efficiencyinvestments [45] or tax incentives [48]. Thirdly, governments also have animportant role to play as clients, leading by example [34].
4. Access to financeAccess to finance is cited by many authors as a potential barrier to marketdevelopment [34, 18, 49, 50, 43, 51] although the importance of this barrierappears to vary depending on the market in question. Nolden and Sorrell[19] note that “Few of [their] interviewees identified financing as a majorobstacle" when considering the UK market.
5. Transaction costsHigh transaction costs are identified by a wide range of authors as abarrier to market expansion in locations as diverse as China, Finland,India and Denmark [32, 39, 42, 40]. These findings echo Sorrell’s [22]earlier conclusions that transaction costs would be a determining factorin deciding governance structures for procuring energy efficiency projects.However, in all cases these are theoretical or qualitative conclusions andnone of the studies reviewed presented a quantitative analysis of theeconomics of energy performance contracts.
6. UncertaintyRisk and uncertainty are highlighted by a large number of authors as bar-riers to market development. Backlung and Eidenskog [51] and Suhonenand Okkonen [39], Marino et al. [18], Mills et al. [35] and Vine [47] allexpressly discuss the potential for actual savings and hence financial re-turns to vary from the expected values. Standardisation of contracts andmeasurement and verification procedures is seen as a key strategy foraddressing these risks [47, 34, 52, 48]. A separate aspect of uncertaintyrelates to the long-term nature of the contracts, with Nolden and Sorrell[19], Pätäri and Sinkonen [38] and Jensen et al.[40] all highlighting thepotential unwillingness of clients to enter into long term contracts which
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might either restrict their ability to respond to future business demandsor realise much lower than anticipated returns due to changes in estatesstrategies.
By using ranking according to number of citations, the literature surveyed haspotentially been biased towards theoretical and descriptive articles with anemphasis on attempts to “understand the model” [38] and discussion of theoret-ical dimensions of energy performance contracts. This focus seems appropriatefor the first four barriers identified which are expected to be features of themarket context in which an EPC project is undertaken. For the final two how-ever, a significant degree of heterogeneity might be expected within a marketand so the original literature search was extended to explore the dimensionsof ‘transaction costs’ and ‘risk/uncertainty’ in more detail. This was done byrelaxing the ranking requirement and including either of the terms “transactioncosts” or “ risk” in the original search. The addition of the term “transactioncosts” resulted in the identification of an additional four studies. Including theterm “risk” resulted in the addition of 31 articles. Relaxing the ranking criterionmeant that less heavily cited studies were included. In many cases the lackof citations is likely to be due to the relative recentness of the articles, theoldest of which dated from 2014. In some cases; however, the level of citationsmay result from lack of access to the article and it was necessary to exclude afurther 9 articles due to a lack of access. Review of the abstracts resulted in theidentification of a further 3 articles which did not relate to energy performancecontracting as defined in section 2.2 above. A previous study by Fennell et al.[2] which formed a pilot study for the current work has been excluded from thisreview.
2.3.2 Risks and uncertainties in Energy Performance ContractsThe pool of references developed from the combination of the original andthe extended literature searches can be thematically divided into four maincategories: studies which use expert opinion to identify risks [53, 54], casestudies which include discussion of risks in particular contexts [55, 56, 57,
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58, 59, 60], consideration of risk allocation as a result of sharing mechanismstypically modelled using game theory approaches [61, 62, 63, 64, 65], anddiscussions of the implications of measurement and verification strategy [66, 67].The risk identification studies [53, 54] analysed described two key sourcesof risk and uncertainty which were also explicitly identified in a number of casestudy examples: the variability of energy savings, and the uncertainty aroundenergy prices. Mills et al. [35] suggested a list of possible causes for theseuncertainties:
• “Inadequate time or methodology to establish an accurate volumetric con-sumption baseline
• Inability to monitor behavioural changes that could result in greater con-sumption of energy when new equipment is installed
• Inability to monitor and mitigate actions that could decrease asset effi-ciency, such as poor maintenance
• Volatility in future energy rates, currency exchange rates, interest rates,etc.”
They concluded that “Quantitative risk analysis is essential to correctly valueenergy-efficiency projects in the context of investment decision-making” [35,p. 198].Game theory has been used to explore optimum design of risk sharingmechanisms between clients and ESCOs by a number of authors [61, 62, 63,64, 65, 68, 69]. Most of these studies can be considered to be exploratoryapplications of game theory, since they are based on a bi-partite interactionbetween a client and a single ESCO rather than a competitive bidding situationwhich would be more likely in practice.
2.3.2.1 EPC risks in contextWhile a number of the case studies identified did not explicitly evaluate risksand provided more general explorations of particular projects [55, 59, 60, 70,
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71, 72, 73, for example], others provided a more detailed consideration of howrisk and uncertainty can be approached as set out in table 2.3.1.
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Table 2.3.1: Treatment of risk and uncertainty
Paper ApproachDeng et al.[56] Uncertainty is explicitly considered in developing a model fordetermining expected energy savings under uncertainty usingstochastic processes to model energy prices and savings to de-termine the optimum level of guarantee that should be offered bythe ESCO. Data from real projects at the University of Marylandare used to demonstrate the model.Limitations:Variation in possible energy savings is treated in broad termswith values for the percentage volatility of energy prices ofσ = 1%, σ = 10% and σ = 25% used to estimate the potential vari-ation in energy savings from the estimated value. The stochasticprocess used to calculate energy savings results in a volatile pro-file for energy savings over the life of the project and the potentialfor significant spikes in energy consumption figures in later years.This is at odds with the picture presented by other authors, e.g.Berghorn and Syall [54] who find that “the most important riskswere found to occur during the earliest project phases” and stan-dard industry practices reported by Shonder and Avina [66] whoreport that variation in energy consumption in later years of theproject is more likely to be caused by changes in the client’senergy consumption patterns and that ESCOs were seeking torestrict measurement and verification of energy savings to a one-time test at completion of installation to address this. The studytreats energy savings and penalties as the only contributions tocost and does not include installation or transaction costs in theanalysis.
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous pagePaper ApproachHeo et al.[74] Uncertainty about existing building condition is explicitly con-sidered. The approach uses parameter screening followed bybayesian calibration of a normative energy model to create acomputationally light-weight model which could be used to as-sess different energy conservation measures. The model is testedon a university building in Cambridge, UK.Limitations:The ranking is based on a fixed price for gas and a simple paybackcalculation which ignores the other key source of uncertaintyidentified in section 2.3.2.
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous pagePaper ApproachLee et al.[57] Probabilistic analysis of a chiller replacement project for a com-mercial building in Hong Kong, building on elements of Heo etal.’s approach and extending the consideration of uncertainty toinclude variations in weather and system degradation over time.Limitations:The methods used are relatively computationally intensive with10,000 model runs required for pre and post-retrofit conditions.Model dimensionality could be reduced by application of the pa-rameter screening step proposed by Heo et al. to create a re-duced model. The approach to generating variations in weatherfiles is also subjective, for example, wind speed appears not to betreated as a variable parameter although it might be expected tohave some impact on chiller operation due to the effect of wind-speed on infiltration. In common with Heo et al.’s work [74], whilethe methods proposed represent a significantly greater degree ofrigour in the treatment of uncertainty, the underlying analysisis not EPC specific and is not dependent on the contractual ar-rangements for the energy efficiency investment in question.Bustos etal. [58] Energy model is coupled with a business model to consider thecase of a roof-top solar photo voltaic system in Santiago, Chile. Intheir approach, the net present values of client and ESCO returnsare considered separately to determine the optimum sizing ofthe system and sensitivity analysis is used to identify the mostinfluential parameters.Limitations:Details of the procedures used are ill-defined.
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous pagePaper ApproachWang et al.[63] The lack of rigorous quantification methods for investment deci-sions is criticised as likely to lead to a lack of understanding oftheir volatilities. It is highlighted that this is likely to lead toconservative contract clauses as the ESCO seeks to avoid pay-outs due to savings shortfalls. The study is based on a gametheoretic model of normative decision making where client andESCO expected utilities are adjusted by their risk tolerance. Afull probabilistic simulation of energy savings is undertaken.Limitations:This approach does not take account of the implications of op-portunism and rent seeking behaviour proposed in transactioncost economics [75], the sunk costs incurred by client in under-taking a procurement process would leave the client vulnerableto hold-up costs and could be expected to counter their naturalrisk tolerance levels. How risk tolerances would be manifestedin real procurement situations is unclear, particularly for the UKcontext where procurement decisions are open to challenge andsubject to scrutiny, meaning evaluation criteria would normallybe set out in advance.
Bannai etal. [30] Data from 4 industrial co-generation projects was used to explorethe use of fuel derivatives to hedge against fuel price uncertainty.Limitations:It is not clear if this can be generalised beyond co-generation orwhat transaction cost implications might be.Concluded
Some suggestions for best practice for the treatment of risk and uncertaintycan be drawn from table 2.3.1:
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• probabilistic simulation of energy savings using building energy simula-tion is important and the computational load can be reduced through theapplication of parameter screening
• probabilistic simulation of energy price volatility is also required
• variability of the performance of energy conservation measures over timeshould be considered, although the technique proposed in Deng et al. isnot appropriate
• variation in weather over time should also be considered, although asnoted by Kalamees et al. [76] a number of climatic variables affect heatingand cooling consumption.
2.3.2.2 The significance of measurement and verification in riskallocationMany commentators identify standardised Measurement & Verification (M&V)processes as a key market enabler (or, its absence as a key market barrier).Only two references were found which take a slightly different view, with Jensenet al. [40] placing a higher emphasis on trust in the context of Danish mu-nicipalities and Sarkar and Singh [77] cautioning against over-complex M&Varrangements as a potential market barrier in developing countries. In contrast,a variety of US based studies quoted in Kats et al. [78] provide evidence ofgreater savings in projects with robust M&V arrangements.The most commonly used approach for measuring and verifying savings isthe International Performance Measurement and Verification Protocol (IPMVP)which grew out the US EPC industry standards, [79] with ten Donkelaar et al.[80] reporting its use in just under 50% of 100 European projects surveyed.However, as Ginestet and Marchio [81] point out: “[t]he general principles ofthe method quoted in the IPMVP documents [...] remain imprecise, they onlylead to the parameters identification but do not allow the immediate realisationof calculations.”
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Shonder and Avina [66] highlight the potential for different measurementand verification approaches to result in different risk allocations for clients andESCOs and different values for measured savings as a result. This difference inmeasured energy savings between the different IPMVP options is also reportedby Ginestet and Marchio [81] and Wang et al. [63].
2.3.3 Transaction costs in energy performance contracts
Although transaction costs were identified as important barriers to market de-velopment, they receive relatively little attention in the literature. Polzin etal. [82, p. 135] draw on Sorrell [22] to define transaction costs in the energyperformance contract context as costs which are “incurred within organisationsthrough managing and monitoring personnel, procuring inputs and capital in-vestment, and ‘the costs associated with organising (‘governing’) the provisionof [...] streams and/or services’ [22]. When the same streams and/or services aresourced from an external provider, transaction costs are associated with sourceselection, contract management and performance monitoring, dispute resolutionand opportunistic behaviour.” Polzin et al. was the only study reviewed thusfar in this chapter to explicitly consider transaction costs. Although “invest-ment" or “implementation" costs were mentioned in several of the case studies[55, 58, 59, 60], it is not clear that they include any additional costs beyondthose of installation. This is significant since as Pätäri et al. [83, p. 1452]note, in practice transaction costs can have a fundamental impact on the fi-nancial viability of projects, highlighting that “[t]he main argument against toosmall projects was that the administrative and other transaction costs will notbe offset by the benefits”. This conclusion is echoed by Schubert et al. [84,p. 175] who similarly note that “a specific problem in the context of environ-mental finance and associated transaction costs is investments of the smallestscale [...]. In such cases, it is likely that the costs of negotiating the financingterms exceed the gains from the project. Such transaction costs can, again,only be lowered through a bundling of smallest-scale projects”.In common with Polzin et al.‘s [82] use of a transaction cost economics
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(TCE) framework to analyse German municipal street-lighting projects, Yang etal. [85] use TCE to explore energy management services in Taiwan. Both studiesuse an indirect approach [75] to assess the impact of project characteristics ontransaction costs and hence the viability of the proposed project.
2.4 Summary
The size of the market and the existence of concerns about its rate of devel-opment suggest that the Energy Performance Contract market deserves furtherexploration. However, much of the existing literature is largely descriptive, fo-cused on the current state of markets worldwide, and as highlighted by Sorrell[22], lacks an underpinning framework which would provide clear directions forresearch. Nonetheless, it is clear from this literature that transaction costsand uncertainties around energy price and energy savings are critical to thesuccess of energy performance contracting projects and hence markets. How-ever, despite this importance, no studies were found which combine a rigorousassessment of project and price uncertainties and which take into account thepotentially very significant role of transaction costs.To address the methodological shortcomings he identified in the field, Sor-rell proposed Transaction Cost Economics as an appropriate framework foranalysis. The following chapter explores this framework in more detail andconsiders how it could be applied to energy performance contracting projectsand extended to encompass the uncertainties inherent in these projects.
Chapter 3
Theoretical Framework
3.1 Overview
Sorrell [22] first set out the need for an underpinning framework to guide re-search into energy performance contracts. While the literature surveyed inChapter 2 gave a broad overview of the subject, the focus on market level phe-nomena resulted in a relative lack of explanatory work at the level of individualprojects. Although little work has been done at an individual project level, largecapital sums are being invested through EPCs [21] and clients are routinelydefining projects for procurement without a strong evidence base for the im-pact of those decisions. Decisions about project scale, scope and risk transferare made for each project without the benefit of a strong evidence base forguidance.
Sorrell [22] highlighted the benefits of using a clear theoretical frameworkto underpin exploration of EPCs, arguing that a more systematic approachwould be likely to uncover greater insights. The purpose of the theoreticalframework in this study is to allow a theoretical survey of the topic to highlightareas for exploration rather than to provide an analytical framework. Sorrellproposed Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) as a suitable framework to under-pin this work. This chapter begins with a consideration of alternative modelswhich could be used to explore EPCs and after confirming that TCE is the mostappropriate model provides a brief description of the framework and how it can
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be applied in the context of energy performance contracts. The most appropri-ate form of analysis is considered and the nature of uncertainty is considered.This chapter concludes by setting out the research hypotheses which emergefrom the TCE approach and which form the basis of the work undertaken in thisstudy.
3.2 Alternative approaches to exploring contractualrelationships
Tadelis and Williamson [86, p. 159] frame the move away from the neo-classicalfocus on the laws of supply and demand as a shift in perspective from the“lens of choice” to the “lens of contract”. The shift from consideration of marketexchange where price is the key consideration to one of market structure isimportant in the context of continuing exchange relationships and particularlyrelevant in the context of energy efficiency. Energy use has traditionally beenapproached from a supply perspective with many decades worth of governmentpolicy focused on supply arrangements [87]. The demand-side perspective hasemerged more recently and focuses on the services provided as a result ofenergy use (e.g. lighting, heating etc.) as illustrated by Hannon et al. [88]drawing on the work of Sorrell [22] and shown in figure 3.2.1. The delivery ofenergy services is framed as a spectrum, ranging from a traditional approachon the left of the diagram, where the building owner purchases energy from autility provider and owns the equipment to convert the supplied energy into therequired service, for example, lighting or heat. At the other end of the spectrum,a building owner might purchase an energy service from a provider who ownsthe conversion equipment (lighting infrastructure, heating infrastructure etc.)
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Figure 3.2.1: Energy supply or energy demand
As illustrated in figure 3.2.1 conversion of an energy supply into an en-ergy service can be viewed as a transaction which can be delivered throughalternative governance structures which can be framed as the ‘make’ or ‘buy’options:
• an in-house arrangement in which a building owner enters into a supplycontract with a utility provider and retains responsibility for the con-version of the supplied energy into the desired services (e.g. heating,lighting etc.) using their own equipment (e.g. boilers, lamps etc.) - the‘make’ option.
• an outsourced arrangement in which a building owner enters into a con-tract for the provision of the final energy service with a specialist providerwho may have ownership of the conversion equipment (e.g. boilers, lampsetc.) - the ‘buy’ option.
Ronald Coase first proposed that the transaction should be treated as
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the critical unit of analysis, receiving a Noble prize for economics for his earlywork on the subject [89]. Coase [90] called for a "comparative systems approach"which explicitly attempts to ascertain the economic consequences of alternativeways of organising the allocation of resources [91]. In this approach, a trans-action is defined as occurring “when a good or service is transferred across atechnologically separable interface" [92].
Three alternative models have been proposed as frameworks for under-standing transactions: Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), Property RightsTheory (PRT) and Principal-Agent Theory (PAT). Each of these frameworksaims to address a key shortcoming of the neo-classical approach, in which“[t]he firm is treated as a perfectly efficient ‘black box’, inside which everythingoperates perfectly smoothly and everybody does what they are told” [93], PAT[94] recognises the potential for conflicts of interests between parties within anorganisation or between organisations and has been used to explore optimalincentive structures for many different problem settings. However, PAT doesnot consider the bounds of the firm and is thus silent on the ‘make or buy’question at the heart of this study.
Transaction Cost Economics was developed from Coase‘s original ideas byWilliams [95, 96] and is based on the concept that no contract can be completesince not all circumstances and behaviours can be foreseen when it is written,not all actions can be observed and verified, and even if this were all possibleit would be prohibitively expensive to write a contract so all encompassing.In the absence of complete contracts, contracting incurs costs, and parties toa contract can be subject to hold-up problems when circumstances arise thatcan be exploited by one party or another. Asset specificity is a key issuein TCE since if assets have equal value in alternative uses, the potential foropportunism and haggling is reduced.
Hart criticised TCE for failing to explain why haggling and hold-up costsare reduced within a firm [93] and developed Property Rights Theory as analternative model. PRT is also concerned with how the non-contractible issues
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are resolved. Ownership of assets is the key to this according to PRT: “own-ership is a source of power when contracts are incomplete” [97]. The modelprovides a tool for understanding the structure of markets and addressing the‘make or buy’ question concluding that “a party with an important investmentor important human capital should have ownership rights” [97].Although it has been suggested that PRT allows a more refined approachto understanding how asset specificity drives the choice of governance structurethan TCE [98], PRT is based on two assumptions that do not fit well with thecurrent study:
• symmetry of information [99]. This is unlikely to be valid; since the ESCOis responsible for designing and installing ECMs it seems clear that theESCO will have more information about ECM performance and likelyenergy savings than the client, and conversely, the client will have infor-mation about the way the building is used which will not be available tothe ESCO.
• the costs of contracting do not differ between the in-house and the out-sourced solution [99]. In the UK context where a competitive procurementis necessary for a public sector client to comply with their fiduciary re-sponsibilities, it is difficult to support this assumption. Although Hartargued in later work that there was no reason why competition could notoccur internally to the client organisation [100], this competitive marketdoes not currently exist.
Since these assumptions are believed to be invalid in the UK public sectorcontext, the TCE framework which does not rely on these assumptions waspreferred to the PRT framework for this study. The validity of this choice isexamined in Chapter 6.
3.3 The Transaction cost economics framework
The transaction cost approach is based on two behavioural assumptions:
3.3. The Transaction cost economics framework 43
1. bounded rationality - individuals intend to be rational but experiencelimits in formulating and solving complex problems and in processinginformation. Given bounded rationality it is impossible to deal with com-plexity in all contractually relevant respects which means that incompletecontracting is inevitable
2. opportunism - behaviour by a party to a transaction designed to changethe agreed terms of a transaction to be more in its favour [101]
Originally used to understand the organisational and market structures,as Williamson [96, p. ix] states, “Any problem that can be formulated, directly,or indirectly, as a contracting problem can be investigated to advantage intransaction cost terms.” Shelanski and Klein [102] note that the aim of TCEis to “explain contracting arrangements observed in practice. Where possible,TCE tries to explain these phenomena on efficiency grounds.” TCE has typicallybeen used to consider questions of the most efficient form of organisation for aparticular economic relationship, e.g. make or buy decisions, through analysisof historic data (typically using a case study approach) and Reindfleisch andHeide’s [103] review of empirical studies of the TCE framework found broadsupport for the claims of TCE.Williamson [95] identifies the critical dimensions for describing transac-tions as “(1) uncertainty, (2) the frequency with which transactions recur, and(3) the degree to which durable, transaction-specific investments are requiredto realise least cost supply".
1. uncertainty affects transaction costs due to the need to draft complexcontracts to deal with many different scenarios
2. the frequency of recurrence of the transaction means that asset specificcontracts or agreements can be reused reducing the overall transactioncost
3. asset specificity determines sunk costs which cannot be recovered if the
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contract is terminated and lead to a safeguarding problem whereby ex-tensive protections are required in the contract to protect the investment.
This original formulation of the dimensions of transactions and thus driversfor transaction costs has been challenged by many authors and in their reviewof 54 key articles relating to the application of TCE, Reindfleisch and Heide[103] note that frequency with which transactions recur was not generally heldto be an important determinant of transaction costs. In addition, they notethat various authors identified multiple dimensions of uncertainty, these areconsidered in more detail in section 3.5.
3.4 Applying TCE to Energy Performance Contracts
Having justified the selection of Transaction Cost Economics as an underpinningtheoretical framework in sections 3.2 and 3.3, it is necessary to clarify how thatframework will be applied in this study. While a typical TCE approach seeks tocompare the choice of governance structures to determine the most appropriatefor a particular context, the aim of this study is to explore procurement decisionsmade in practice in relation to the scoping of projects. Accordingly, the role ofTCE in this study is confined to highlighting characteristics which are expectedto influence project viability in order to explore how implementation of thosecharacteristics affects financial results in a practical procurement situation.Sorrell [22] explicitly applied a TCE framework to analysis of Energy Per-formance Contracts based on the assumption that “a client’s primary motive forentering into an energy [performance] contract is to reduce the total cost ofsupplying the relevant useful energy streams and final energy services.” Henoted that an energy performance contract would be expected to increase trans-action costs but reduce production costs and thus defined 2 conditions whichare necessary for an energy performance contract to be more efficient than anin-house arrangement:Net savings from the energy performance contract must be greater than
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the payment to the ESCO.
PAY ≤ (P INCL−PEPCCL )+ (T INCL −TEPCCL ) (3.1)
The payment to the ESCO must be greater than the costs incurred by theESCO. PAY ≥ (PEPCESCO +TEPCESCO) (3.2)
Implicit in these two conditions is the third, that the total production costsaving must be greater than the total transaction cost increase:
P INCL− (PEPCESCO +PEPCCL )≥ (TEPCCL +TEPCESCO)−T INCL (3.3)
where:
PAY = Total payment to the ESCO
P INCL = Client’s production costs for the in-house arrangementPEPCCL = Client’s production costs for the Energy Performance ContractT INCL = Client’s transaction costs for the in-house arrangementTEPCCL = Client’s transaction costs for the Energy Performance ContractPEPCESCO = ESCO’s production costs for the Energy Performance ContractTEPCESCO = ESCO’s transaction costs for the Energy Performance Contract
Transaction costs include “the staff, consulting and legal costs associated withsearching for a supplier, negotiating and writing the contract, monitoring con-tract performance, enforcing compliance, negotiating changes to the contractwhen unforeseen circumstances arise and resolving disputes." [22].
For the purposes of this study, installation costs are included in transactioncosts since they are a one-off cost while production costs are limited to the costof energy supply.
Equations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 compare two possible procurement options, a
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business-as-usual approach with no investment and investment energy effi-ciency measures through an EPC. However, an intermediate option also exists,investment in the energy efficiency measures without the use of an EPC. WhileUK procurement guidance requires the consideration of alternative procurementoptions, the explicit consideration of a formal model for direct procurement bythe public sector is limited to PFI/PPP projects [104]. This is not a requirementfor EPC projects in which the investment in the energy efficiency measures isprovided directly by the client as in the cases considered in this study, as de-tailed in section 4.5.3. Client interviews, reported in section 6 suggested thatinvestment in the energy efficiency measures outside of an EPC would havetaken place in a different format, with a different group of potential suppliers,and a direct financial comparison did not form part of the evaluation of procure-ment options undertaken in practice. The scale of additional data collectionrequirements necessary to evaluate the potential for procurement outside anEPC framework was beyond the scope of this study as a result. Nonetheless,the financial benefits of the EPC risk transfer are evaluated in section 8.7.3allowing the maximum economic premium worth paying for the transferred riskto be assessed.Accordingly, Sorrell proposed 6 new hypotheses for the drivers of trans-action costs in Energy Performance Contracting projects:
1. Technical potential for production cost savings for energy services in-cluded in the contract - the greater the potential production cost savingsthe more likely it is that they will off-set increased transaction costs.Sorrell defines the scope of a contract as a measure of the number of dif-ferent useful energy streams which are included within it and highlightsthe importance of the breadth of the scope to the technical potential forproduction cost savings.
2. Aggregate production costs for all energy services within the client or-ganisation (operationalised as size of client) - Sorrell notes that smallclients who have limited in-house expertise may find that although large
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savings are possible, they are outweighed by transaction costs and pos-tulates that a size threshold will exist below which clients are too smallfor an Energy Performance Contract to be viable.
3. The specificity of the assets required to provide the energy services in-cluded in the contract - asset specificity is held to influence transactioncosts as a result of the need for complex contractual arrangements toprotect the ESCO’s investment in an asset which has low value in analternative use. Sorrell highlights 3 forms of asset specificity relevant forenergy performance contracts:
Site specificity - the degree to which equipment necessary for thecontract has alternative value in another location. However, this assumesthat the ESCO has financed the purchase of the asset and retains owner-ship of it. Under the Mayor of London’s RE:FIT framework, for example,the client would typically finance the purchase of any assets and paythe ESCO on completion of the installation [105]. In such a scenario,site specificity would be unlikely to be a particular driver for transactioncosts.
Physical asset specificity - the design and engineering work under-taken by the ESCO. Sorrell notes that in some procurement models thisis mitigated by an obligation on the client to pay for detailed design andengineering work if the project does not proceed.
Human asset specificity - the extent to which specialist knowledgeis needed is closely linked to the types of technologies needed. Sorrellargues that ESCOs will necessarily be highly skilled in a range of generictechnologies which can be applied to a variety of clients and if specificskills need to be acquired for performance of a contract the ESCO willbe exposed to greater risk.Although asset specificity is typically considered to be a key pillar ofTCE, in the case of Energy Performance contracts it is expected that it
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will vary primarily between different market sectors. For example, assetspecificity will be similar amongst schools but differ between schools andhospitals. As a result this hypothesis is considered useful in testingthe likelihood of viability of an Energy Performance Contracting projectbetween sectors but not within a specific market sector.
4. Task complexity as measured by the difficulty of specifying and monitoringcontractual terms and conditions - the easier it is to monitor and verifyperformance the lower the transaction costs both in terms of monitoringcosts but also costs which arise as a result of disputed performance.
5. Market competitiveness - in a more competitive market, the potential foropportunism is lower, ESCOs who price bids significantly above marginalcosts will not win tenders and so market competitiveness is expected tobe linked to lower transaction costs
6. Form of institutional framework - some institutional frameworks may bemore or less well suited to undertaking performance contracts. A keyaspect of this is the decision-making hierarchy. Complex structures withmany layers of intermediate decision makers or a lack of clarity about whois responsible for decision-making will inevitably result in higher trans-action costs. Client organisation governance structures will be closelylinked to industry sector, particularly for public sector clients where gov-ernance arrangements are dictated by the legal powers delegated to theorganisation. As a result, this driver would be likely to affect the viabilityof different sectors but not to explain viability within a particular sector.
3.5 Measuring transaction costs
The TCE framework offers two alternatives for analysis as set out in Chang andIve [75], namely a direct measurement approach (DMA) or indirect measure-ment approach (IMA). “For IMA, data is required on measurable transactionattributes and on relative frequencies with which governance structures are
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used, for transactions with different attributes. For DMA, data is required onmeasurable transaction attributes, the relative sums of all transaction costs fortransactions with similar attributes under different governance structures, andthe absolute values of the comparatively significant elements of total TCs.” TheIMA approach is based on the assumption that the most commonly occurringgovernance structure is the optimal structure while the DMA does not rely onthis assumption. However, it relies on the ability to accurately measure trans-action costs and there is an additional problem of obtaining enough data forstatistically valid assumptions to be made. As Winch [106] notes, “Obtaininggood quality data on the ‘costs of doing business’ is difficult, in that firms donot routinely collect these data, resulting in transaction costs being the ‘hiddenfactory’.”
However, while determining the costs of behavioural uncertainty is typi-cally very difficult, in an Energy Performance Contract this is a more straight-forward matter, since a reduction in quality can be assumed to result in in-creased energy consumption which can easily be priced. Equally, additionalcosts required that might be incurred in addressing opportunism can be de-fined as the need for investment in additional energy conservation measuresto address a potential shortfall in performance. For these reasons, the EnergyPerformance Contracting Market is considered to be well suited to the use ofa DMA approach. Nonetheless, not all aspects of transaction costs can beso easily determined, Reindfleich and Heide [103] define two types of trans-action costs as shown in table 3.5.1: direct costs and opportunity costs. Di-rect elements (costs of crafting safeguards; communication, negotiation and co-ordination costs; screening and selection costs; measurement costs) are clearlycapable of being measured. However, although the sources of opportunity costsare clear (e.g. there may be no incentive for the ESCO to invest in ECMs whichwould result in savings above the agreed level resulting in a failure to investin productive assets), quantification of opportunity costs would be a specula-tive exercise and consequently these costs are excluded from the quantitative
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Table 3.5.1: Sources and types of transaction costs
Asset specificity Environmentaluncertainty BehaviouraluncertaintyA. Source oftransaction costsNature of gover-nance problem safeguarding adaptation performance eval-uation
B. Type of trans-action costsDirect costs costs of craftingsafeguards communication,negotiation andco-ordinationcosts
screening and se-lection costs (exante)
measurementcosts (ex post)
Opportunity costs failure to invest inproductive assets mal-adaption,failure to adapt failure to identifyappropriate part-ners (ex ante)productivity lossesthrough effort ad-justments (ex post)
analysis in this study. Chapter 6 considers the evidence from the interviewsfor the existence and likely scale of these costs.
In this study an attempt is made to address the concerns raised by Changand Ive [75] concerning the difficulty of collecting data for a statistically validassessment of transaction costs through the use of statistical modelling. If theprobability distribution of the elements of transaction costs can be sampled fromtheir input distributions then multiple versions of the model can be calculatedto derive a probability distribution for the model output [107].
In order to apply a direct measurement approach equations 3.1 and 3.2must be summed over the period of the analysis, which may not be the sameas the contract duration:
n∑
i=1 PAY ≤
n∑
i=1
(P INCL−PEPCCL )+ n∑i=1
(T INCL −TEPCCL ) (3.4)
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n∑
i=1 PAY ≥
n∑
i=1
(PEPCESCO +TEPCESCO) (3.5)
where n is the number of periods over which the analysis is undertaken.
3.6 Research Hypotheses
The research hypotheses for this study take as their starting point, those setout by Sorrell, as detailed in section 3.4 above. Viability of a project is de-fined as satisfying the conditions set out in equations 3.4 and 3.5, namely thatproduction cost savings at least off-set transaction cost increases for the clientand the ESCO’s income at least off-set costs.As discussed in section 3.4, two of these hypotheses, the impact of assetspecificity and that of institutional form, are likely to be closely related tomarket sector. Consequently, testing these hypotheses would require a multi-sectorial analysis. The resource constraints of the current study preclude suchan analysis and the study has been focused on the four hypotheses whichshould be capable of being explored within a single market sector.The remaining 4 hypotheses are closely linked to the key procurementdecisions of project scale, scope and level of risk transfer, highlighting potentialmechanisms for the impact of each and thus form the basis of this study.
• Hypothesis 1Lower transaction costs will result from a more competitive market.As a result increasing market competitiveness should drive down trans-action costs and increase the likelihood of project success.
• Hypothesis 2The easier it is to measure and verify changes in energy consumption themore likely a project is to be viable.The fundamental difference between an EPC and a traditional procure-ment is the existence of the performance guarantee which transfers therisk of achieving the energy savings after installation from the client tothe ESCO. However, the extent to which risk is transferred will be de-
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termined by the ease of measuring energy savings since the risk is onlytransferred if performance (or lack of) can be proven.
• Hypothesis 3An EPC project is more likely to be viable when the range of energyconservation measures included is large
• Hypothesis 4Increasing the size of a project by increasing the number of facilitiesincluded in it increases the likelihood of viability.
These hypotheses are used to guide the exploration of the key researchquestion:
How do project scale, scope and risk transfer influence financial returnsfor clients and ESCOs?
The market sector chosen for this analysis is the UK schools sector. Chap-ter 4 sets out this context and details the methods that will be used for thisanalysis.
Chapter 4
Methods and Data Sources
4.1 Overview
Chapter 2 highlighted a lack of research which would inform the procurementdecisions which clients are routinely making in practice, shaping projects whichare then put out to tendered and delivered. Chapter 3 identified four researchhypotheses drawing on the work of Sorrell [22] which provide some insight intohow critical project dimensions of scale, scope and risk transfer might impacton project outcomes. This chapter sets out the methods which are used toexplore these hypotheses in an attempt to provide insights which will be of usein structuring future procurements. This chapter also considers the need for arigorous assessment of uncertainty (as highlighted by the literature review incontained in chapter 2). The context in which the hypotheses will be exploredis explained.
4.2 Research methods
The four research hypotheses derived in chapter 3 offer explanations for howchoice of project scale, scope and risk transfer might be expected to affectproject outcomes.
• Hypothesis 1A more competitive market will result in lower bid costs and thus a higherlikelihood of project success.
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• Hypothesis 2The more accurately measurement and verification procedures measureactual changes in energy consumption the greater the likelihood of projectsuccess.
• Hypothesis 3Technical potential for production cost savings - an EPC project is morelikely to be viable when the range of energy conservation measures in-cluded is large.
• Hypothesis 4Aggregate production costs - increasing the size of a project by increasingthe number of facilities included in it increases the likelihood of viability.
Two principal approaches to exploring the research question were consid-ered:
• Market data analysis - this approach would involve identifying potentialsuccess factors from the literature from which measurable variables can beconstructed. Market participants would then be surveyed to determinevalues for variables which could then be used to conduct a regressionanalysis to determine the importance of each variable.
• Modelling of individual projects - this approach is based on simulationof a variety of projects to assess the importance of the identified factorsfor project success.
These two approaches have benefits and shortcomings, in particular, theidentification phase of the market data analysis approach allows for a widerrange of potential success factors to be explored and potential confounding vari-ables to be identified. However, the key weakness of this approach lies in thedifficulty of measuring project success: a completed project is not necessarilya successful one, particularly not for both parties. Obtaining data on whether
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or not projects have been successful depends on that data being available andthere are strong incentives for individuals and organisations to minimise theeffects or appearances of unsuccessful projects.In a modelling approach, simulation results provide a measure of successfor each configuration explored. However, the model is constrained by its def-inition and the selected input data meaning only the predetermining factorscan be explored. This can be addressed through a systematic exploration ofpotential input factors as in the market data analysis approach. However, suchan exploration is resource-intensive and beyond the scope of the current study.Consequently, the exploration focused on a sub-set of factors identified in theTCE literature reviewed in chapter 2. Namely, those factors which be variedat an operational level. While there are undoubtedly a range of other factorswhich potentially affect the success of an EPC project, such as the level of ex-perience of the client, political support and management structures, these arebeyond the scope of operational decision making. Instead, this study focuseson three critical dimensions of projects: their scale, scope and the level of risktransfer. As seen in chapter 3, these are closely related to the prediction of theTCE literature. The existence of other potential factors is likely to affect costsassociated with a project and the approach taken in this study is to attempt tocollect data from a representative range of market participants in order that therange of input data covers these possibilities and to use stochastic sampling toselect from the input data.
4.2.1 Modelling Approach
The conditions for viability of a project were defined in equations 3.4 and 3.5:
n∑
i=1 PAY ≤
n∑
i=1 (P INCL−PEPCCL )+
n∑
i=1 (T INCL −TEPCCL ) (3.4)
n∑
i=1 PAY ≥
n∑
i=1 (PEPCESCO +TEPCESCO) (3.5)These two equations define a bi-partite cash-flow model similar to that pro-
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posed by Zhao [108], driven by the fact that a project will only proceed if bothparties to it are comfortable with their expected returns. However, althoughstandard accounting techniques have the benefit of being easily understood byindustry practitioners, they also have significant shortcomings. Jackson [109]reports on the near-universal use of simple payback as a risk-screening toolfor organisations making investment decisions, with a short payback indicatinga low-risk investment. Heo et al. [110] make the important observation thatone unintended consequence of the energy savings guarantee will be that “ES-COs are less likely to recommend high-impact, high-cost technologies, unlessthe probability of energy savings can be quantified appropriately and associ-ated risks expressed such that comparison between competing technologies isexplicit." Together with Zhao [108], they point to the inadequacy of standard,deterministic energy modelling to achieve this.Review of the literature presented in chapter 2 identified the followingelements of good practice to be incorporated in the analysis in this regard:
• probabilistic simulation of energy savings using building energy simula-tion, combined with parameter screening to reduce computational load
• probabilistic simulation of energy price volatility
• variability of the performance of energy conservation measures over timeshould be considered
• variation in weather over time should also be considered
A statistical modelling approach relies on the quantification of uncertaintyencompassed by the probability distributions of the input factors. As a resultit is necessary to first define what is meant by uncertainty. Knight [111] drawsa distinction between uncertainty which is measurable, and theoretically atleast, knowable, and risk, which is not. Stirling [112] describes risk as “ possi-ble effects of actions, which are assessed as unwelcome by the vast majority ofhuman beings.” In the context of this study, risks can be thought of as failures
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- for example, energy conservation measures which are faulty, failures of work-manship, time over-runs caused by delays in reaching agreement on contractterms. Although the occurrence and outcome of a risk event are uncertain andin many industries, for example - the nuclear industry - considerable time andeffort is expended in eliciting the likelihood of occurrence and the probableimpact [112, p. 15], these risks are capable of being avoided or mitigated andaddressed through contractual remedies. Nonetheless project outcomes are stillnot perfectly known because uncertainty still remains.
Uncertainty falls into two principal categories [113]: aleatory uncertainty(which results from inherent randomness in the parameter) and epistemic uncer-tainty (which results from a lack of knowledge). These categories of uncertaintyare sometimes referred to respectively, as first and second order uncertainties[114]. Epistemic uncertainty is particularly important in a time-constrainedcommercial context where it is not financially viable to undertake the level ofinvestigation necessary to increase knowledge, e.g. determining the thicknessof an interstitial insulation layer, even if it is technically possible. The ex-istence of building occupants who interact with the building and its systemsmeans that aleatory uncertainties are also significant. A modelling study whichcombines these elements should result in the rigorous approach to uncertaintyquantification advocated by Wang et al. [63]. This is particularly important inthe context of the “open systems" [115] of the natural world where it is neces-sary to reject the idea of only one optimal model being the most reliable fora particular situation. In an open system, many different model structures andparameter sets may give simulations that cannot be falsified from the availableobservational data.
The need to understand the impact of uncertainty in model inputs on theoutput response drove the selection of probabilistic modelling as the basis ofthis study. Stochastic sampling from the probability distributions of individualmodel inputs allows uncertainty to be propagated through a model in order tocreate a distribution of model outputs from which inferences can be made using
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the the NPV-at-risk approach proposed by Ye and Tiong [116].
It would be overstating the case to suggest that probabilistic modelling canovercome all of the shortcomings of a deterministic approach and in particular,it is still subject to Lemons et al.’s criticism that “not recognising the ‘valueladen’ nature of the framing assumptions used in modelling", results in studiesappearing “more factual and value-neutral than warranted" [117]. This appliesparticularly in the initial, often unrecognised phase of deciding which parame-ters are likely to be influential (and thus merit the time-consuming process ofcollecting data on likely distributions) and which can be assumed to be fixed.
4.3 Overview of model inputs
Developing input data for the DSCF model requires the collection of verydifferent types of data, each with different methodological requirements. Thedifferent types of data and the mix of methods required to collect them aresummarised here to provide context for subsequent sections which discuss theindividual data sources in more detail. Figure 4.3.1 below illustrates how themodel inputs are generated and fed through into the Discounted Cash Flow(DSCF) model. Uncertain inputs are modelled as probability distributions fromwhich input values are sampled to generate an output probability distribution.
Many of the data collection choices were driven by the commercially sen-sitive nature of the information being sought. In particular, since divulging de-tails of real projects could have serious consequences for respondents this wasconsidered unethical. Using hypothetical projects allowed respondents greaterfreedom to respond but also allowed more straight-forward comparison betweenprojects. However, using hypothetical projects has the consequence of placinga greater burden on the respondent, since all data must be created, rather thansimply reported. In addition to creating an onerous response requirement, thisalso raises significant issues of validity. Consequently, it was decided to focusthe interview-based data collection on those aspects for which no other datasource existed, namely, transaction costs, and to use alternative data sources
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for other elements of data. However, although this approach reduced the inter-view data collection to a manageable level, it introduces additional risks. Mostsignificant of these is the potential for overlap and gaps between the differentcosts. The potential for double counting is greater than the likelihood of ele-ments being missed altogether. Attempts were made to reduce this risk throughcareful sequencing of the data collection process in order that the hypotheti-cal projects were fully defined before being priced and the interview responsessought. Consistent definitions of the categories of costs sought were providedto respondents but it is still possible that some elements of cost included inthe installation costs may have been included in the transaction cost estimatesprovided. This would have had the effect of inflating transaction costs. Howeverthe effect would be consistent across all project responses which would meanthat comparisons between projects of different scales and scopes would still bevalid.
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Figure 4.3.1: Data structure
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Table 4.3.1: Overview of model inputs
Data Collection ReportedClient transaction costs semi-structured inter-views Section 6.2.2Internal costs of developing project,running competition and selectionprocess, contract negotiations, man-aging contractExternal support costs including le-gal fees, survey costs, M&V costsESCO transaction costs semi-structured inter-views Section 6.2.1Costs incurred at risk to win contractincluding design and survey costsFinancial, legal and administrativecosts required to reach contract sig-natureOn-going project management costsGross MarginInstallation costs Provided by QuantitySurveyor Appendix FFinancing costs literature review and in-terview results Table 4.5.1Energy savings 2 building archetypesmodelled in energy plus Chapter 5
Only direct costs associated with the EPC are included, including the per-centage of overheads attributable to the project. Since no specific tax incentiveprogramme exist in relation to the ECMs considered these are not included.
4.4 Development of the modelling framework
The focus of the remainder of this chapter is on the development of a stochasticbi-partite DSCF model and transaction cost inputs. The development of energysaving inputs is addressed separately in the following chapter. Refsgaard andHenrisksen [1] propose a framework to deal with concerns about the validityof a modelling approach by making explicit the steps in model developmentand considering the framing decisions and their implications as part of themodelling process. Their guidelines are illustrated in figure 4.4.1 below. These
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guidelines have been used as a framework for developing the DSCF modelbased on equations 3.4 and 3.5.
Figure 4.4.1: Refsgaard and Henriksen’s modelling framework [1]
The real situation which is being modelled is described in section 4.5. Theprocess of analysis of that reality, as represented by the form of contract used,to develop a conceptual model of the situation, and subsequent confirmationof the model is described in sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.3. The model code whichresults from the translation of the conceptual model into a computer model isavailable at the location detailed in Appendix A. Code verification was under-taken through a process of sequential testing of code segments with test dataconstructed to produce expected outputs, together with testing with extremevalues. The model set-up is detailed in section 5.2. Finally, the model is run toproduce the required simulations of reality. Since the underlying case studieswhich are being simulated are hypothetical, the final step of model validationcannot be explicitly undertaken since there is no calibration data with which
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the model outputs can be compared. This has necessitated a focus on the va-lidity of the underlying model inputs which has been described for transactioncosts in section 5.2, and for production costs in section 5.3.5.
4.5 Context
The UK EPC market has recently been well summarised by Nolden and Sor-rell [19] who identified two defining characteristics - firstly, that the marketis dominated by the public sector, with business risk being a key barrier todevelopment of the industrial sector, and split-incentives acting as a significantbrake on the commercial office sector. Secondly, the rate of growth of the publicsector market has been partly due to the development of public procurementframeworks (PPFs). PPFs allow a group of contractors to be procured througha process which is compliant with EU regulations on competitive procurement,ahead of any projects being developed. Individual clients can then run a com-petitive process within the group of pre-selected contractors and use standardcontract terms which results in reduced transaction costs. Nolden and Sorrellidentified 5 active PPFs in 2014:
• RE:FIT originally established in London to serve local authorities andother public sector bodies and subsequently used as a template for theLocal Partnerships England-wide PPF
• Carbon and Energy Fund (CEF), focusing on the health sector
• Essentia, health care focussed
• Ecovate, healthcare focused
• P-EPC established by Peterborough City Council.
The most active of these frameworks are RE:FIT and CEF. More recently,RE:FIT Cymru has been launched to target the Welsh market and the Scot-tish government has launched the Non-Domestic Energy Efficiency Programme(NDEE). The RE:FIT model can be characterised as a guaranteed savings model
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with no sharing of excess savings, whereas the CEF is a shared savings model[43].
4.5.1 Conceptual model
The UK schools sector was selected as the subject of interest for this studysince it is a sector which has high reported potential for abatement [118] andrepresents an important element of the UK non-domestic building stock’s en-ergy consumption: the UK Government Department for Business, Energy andIndustrial Strategy (BEIS)’s 2014-2015 Building Energy Efficiency Survey re-ports that primary and secondary schools represent approximately 7% of theUK’s non-domestic building stock by floor area and are responsible for 3% ofnon-domestic electricity use and 5.3% of non-domestic fossil thermal energyuse.Further justification for the selection of primary and secondary schools as thesubject of interest for this study comes from their relatively homogeneous na-ture: the BEIS study reports that ‘Based on the floor area weighted records,premises in the education sector had broadly common characteristics, with theexception of nurseries’, namely that primary and secondary schools are typicallyowner-occupied (84% for primary schools and 79% for secondary schools) andare the sole occupier of their premises (100% for both primary and secondaryschools). 62% of primary schools and 45% of secondary schools were con-structed between 1940 and 1990. These characteristics are important becausethey mean that factors which might impact on a client’s desire to undertake anenergy efficiency investment such as site complexity or split-incentives due tobuilding tenure are not prevalent in this sector.
The RE:FIT framework [105] is the only UK PPF specifically tailored tothe local authority sector in England. Accordingly, the RE:FIT contract wasused as the basis for structuring cash-flows within the model [119].
4.5. Context 654.5.2 Model codeThe model was developed in Matlab [120] and the code is included in appendixA. The following section explains the logic of the treatment of flows withinthe model. The model time-line follows the indicative time-line set out in theRE:FIT guidance issued to local authorities [121]. This comprises five phases,as shown in figure 4.5.1, although the effects of the installed measures maywell continue after the end of the guarantee period:
Figure 4.5.1: Typical RE:FIT project time-line
1. Pre-start - during this phase only the client is active, collating data,securing approvals and producing tender documentation. This phase lasts130 days
2. Bid phase - during this phase the authority runs a mini-competitionamong the framework providers who have expressed an interest in par-ticipating in the project. This phase lasts 50 days. During the courseof the second RE:FIT framework an alternative procurement model wasintroduced - the “partner bid” model. In this model, the preferred bidder
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is selected earlier in the process and the balance of time is shifted fromthe bid to the development phase as a result.
3. Development phase - this begins with the selection of a preferred bidderwho will develop their proposals in more detail and ends when all thenecessary approvals have been secured and the call-off contract has beensigned. This phase lasts 35 days; however, a previous study indicatedthat this was the phase most likely to be subject to delay [2]. Costsincurred by the ESCO in the bid and development phases are paid bythe client as a lump sum at contract signature.
4. Installation phase - following contract signature, the ESCO proceeds withthe installation of the agreed energy conservation measures. The durationof this phase is determined by the nature of the ECMs which are due tobe installed. It is assumed that this phase lasts 130 days.
5. Guarantee period - energy savings are guaranteed for a period set out inthe contract. This is defined endogenously as the simple payback periodof the expected savings.
Energy conservation measures remain in place following the end of the guar-antee period and the client will continue to benefit from the energy savingsduring this period. The maximum length of the model is set as 25 years post-installation and the post-guarantee period is defined endogenously.Previous research indicated that neither clients nor ESCOs would haveresources exclusively allocated to a single EPC project [2] and that in theevent of a delay to a project, staff time would be spent on alternative activities.Consequently, neither ESCO nor client would expect to incur additional costsin the event of a project delay and the project timescales have been treated asfixed in the model as a result.Equations 3.4 and 3.5 are applied as follows:
• (P INCL−PEPCCL )Energy cost savings as a result of the energy conservation measures
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installed. These are treated as a positive cash-flow in the model, accruingto the bill payer. In the guaranteed savings model described above, thisis the client. Chapter 5 details the calculation of these costs.
• T INCLClient’s transaction costs for the in-house arrangement, since this is acontinuation of the existing utility procurement arrangements with noenergy conservation measures installed, the transaction costs are zero.
• (TEPCCL +TEPCESCO)Client’s transaction costs for the Energy Performance Contract. This is acombination of the client’s internal transaction costs and the costs chargedby the ESCO. ESCO transaction costs are paid as a lump sum at contractsignature. Installation costs are incurred monthly by the ESCO duringthe installation period and repaid by the client in a lump sum at the endof the installation period. A margin is added to the installation costs -this represents the ESCO’s profit on the project and is paid by the clientat the end of the installation period.
• PEPCESCOESCO’s production costs for the Energy Performance Contract. Duringthe guarantee period, differences between the expected savings and theactual savings are treated as a flow from the ESCO to the client. ESCOshortfall payments are calculated as the difference between the measuredand expected energy savings for each option multiplied by the appropriatecontract energy price. The contract energy prices are the current energyprices at the model base date uplifted by an agreed index.
This definition of transaction and production costs reflects that proposed byWhittington [122] in her transaction cost analysis of highways infrastructureprojects.In line with HM Treasury guidance [104], all cash-flows are presented inreal terms.
4.5. Context 684.5.3 Model confirmation
Refsgaard and Henriksen [1] describe the purpose of model confirmation asbeing the “determination of adequacy of the conceptual model to provide anacceptable level of agreement for the domain of intended application". TheDSCF model represents the monetary flows to and from the client and ESCO inan energy performance contract, and follows the form of the Mayor of London’sRE:FIT framework agreement [119]. The framework agreement was analysedusing the United States Office for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy’s(EERE) energy performance contract risk, reward and performance matrix [123],as set out in table 4.5.1. This matrix is a well tested list of key risks andcontractual provisions which can be applied to compare energy performancecontracts and allow the contracting parties to understand their risk allocationunder the contract. In table 4.5.1 the headings contain the list of key issuesset out by the EERE. The first column sets out the RE:FIT contract position onthe issue while the second explains the modelling treatment.
In January 2015, the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change(DECC) issued a model energy performance contract and guidance note tobe used in the RE:FIT national programme [124]. This contract was developedfrom the RE:FIT contract to allow usage by procuring organisations outsideLondon who would not have access to procurement support provided under EUELENA funds. As a result a comprehensive guidance note is included with thisversion of the contract. The DECC contract is identical to the RE:FIT contractsave for changes to reflect the procurement arrangements and some adjust-ments to thresholds, therefore, where a contractual provision is unclear in theoriginal RE:FIT document, clarification was sought from the DECC guidancenote. It is important to note that the aim of this study is to explore the range ofprobable outcomes arising from aleatory and epistemic uncertainty inherent inthe systems under consideration; the study does not seek to explore the resultsof failures and errors in the system, for example, the risk of underestimatedinstallation costs or the impacts arising from failures of individual energy con-
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servation measures which have been installed. Inclusion of such errors andfailures would increase the weighting of negative outcomes.
Table 4.5.1: Translation of RE:FIT contract into DSCF model
RE:FIT contract position Derivation and treatment in model1. Financiala. Interest rates post contract signatureThe contract does not con-tain terms for installationworks as these would beprocured by the client usingtheir standard terms [124,p. 8]. Consequently financefor works is typically pro-vided by the client
It is assumed that Salix funding is used [125] whichprovides interest-free funding for schools energyefficiency projects with a payback period of up to 8years. Where the payback period is greater than 8years, additional finance is assumed to be providedby the client at the Public Works Loan Board rateapplicable for the length of the loan required [126]
b. Construction costs post contract signatureSee (a) above The client’s preferred terms are expected to bestandard forms of contract e.g. the Joint ContractsTribunal’s (JCT) works contract which will set outthe conditions under which the contractor can claimfor additional costs from the client. Since the focusof this research is on the performance guarantee,variations in cost during the construction periodare excluded from the DSCF modelc. M&V confidence (IPMVP option selected?)
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous pageRE:FIT contract position Derivation and treatment in modelThe RE:FIT frameworkagreement requires theESCO to provide “mea-surement and verificationservices” but does not relatethese to any standards [119,p. 131], while the DECCguidance note referencesIPMVP but does not specifyan option [124, p. 18]
The International Performance Measurement andVerification protocol [79] sets out four alternativesfor measuring and verifying energy savings, theM&V options. Each option has a different mea-surement boundary as described in Fennell et al.[2]. Option D, calibrated computer simulation, isexcluded from this study as discussed in section7.3. For each energy conservation measure, ex-pected savings are calculated using a deterministicapproach. It is this figure which is used to calcu-lated the simple payback period and, in turn, setsthe length of the guarantee period. The measure-ment boundary for each energy conservation mea-sure and each M&V option is detailed in section5.2.3 below.The model is designed to evaluate one of the casestudy projects at a time, with the results for eachcombination of prices and M&V scenario beingcomputed.c. M&V confidence (Responsibility for M&V?)See above ESCO costs for the M&V phase were elicited dur-ing interviewsd. Energy Related Cost Savings
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous pageRE:FIT contract position Derivation and treatment in modelCalculation of energy sav-ings and the guaranteemechanism are contained incl. 9 of sch. 2A to theRE:FIT contract [127, p. 78]
cl. 8 of sch. 2A of the RE:FIT Framework Agree-ment [127, p. 78] sets out a warning notice regimein relation to the performance of individual retrofitmeasures to address failure of individual measures.The failure of an ECM is excluded from this study.e. responsibility for changes in energy pricesto be agreed by contractingparties [124, p. 16] The risk of varying energy prices over time is con-sidered a significant one by most market partici-pants as discussed in section 2.3.2. This variabil-ity is modelled using three alternative energy pricescenarios as discussed in section 5.5. Interviewresponses indicated that ESCOs would typicallyagree an indexation to be applied to current en-ergy prices at contract signature to avoid the risk ofpotentially large increases in future energy prices.The indexation factor was based on UK generalinflation index (RPI) but treated as a stochasticvariable to allow the impact of uncertainty in itsvalue to be considered. In the event of an energysaving shortfall, the ESCO penalty is based on theshortfall quantity multiplied by the indexed priceand not the prevailing energy price.
f. indexation mechanisms
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous pageRE:FIT contract position Derivation and treatment in modelIn contrast with the previousversion of the RE:FIT frame-work agreement, no explicitguidance is provided on in-dexation mechanisms in thecurrent framework agree-ment.
The only ongoing costs in the model are energycosts, indexation of which is addressed above andin section 5.5. Previous work [2] indicated that ason-going maintenance was often the subject of aseparate out-sourcing agreement, on-going main-tenance and life cycle costs are typically excludedfrom energy performance contracts and this ap-proach was followed in this study.Based on interview responses,the costs of M&Vservices are capitalised into the installation costs,and consequently indexation is only applied toalign costs within the model to the same basedate and to update the initial model energy pricesfor the purposes of calculating the price shortfallpayable by the ESCO. The current value of theretail price index is used for this purpose [128].g. DelaysThe RE:FIT frameworkagreement contains provi-sion for liquidated damagesin cl. 41.2 of sch. 5 [127,p. 52]. However, their inclu-sion is at the discretion ofthe parties.
It is assumed that both parties bear their own costsin the event of a delay. However, the size of theprojects means that staff will not be working exclu-sively on these projects and in the event of a delay,resources would be diverted to other projects. Asa result, project dates are not treated as variablein the DSCF model although in practice delays dooften occur.h. Major changes in facility
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous pageRE:FIT contract position Derivation and treatment in modelThe definition of the base-line level of utilities con-sumption in sch 3. of sch.5 [127, p. 73] allows for ad-justment to take account ofchanges in the scope or na-ture of the premises.
Changes are excluded from the DSCF model.
2. Operationala. Operating hours - Are operating hours measured or stipulated?Premises operating hoursare intended to be definedby the client at the start ofthe competitive process.
Operating hours of individual building systems arenot explicitly discussed in either form of contractand, in practice, the approach to determining theseis likely to be decided by the choice of M&V option.This is typically a trade-off between cost and ac-curacy. Operational hours are treated as variableinputs in the model and the input distributions foreach are defined in appendix Ba. Operating hours - What effect do changes in operating hours have?
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous pageRE:FIT contract position Derivation and treatment in modelChanges to operating hoursare not dealt with expresslyin the contract.
In practice, the official working hours for thepremises and the actual occupied hours may dif-fer significantly. In addition, operating hours forbuilding systems may vary considerably from des-ignated working hours. As a result, differences be-tween expected and actual operating hours are ad-dressed through the M&V options with responsibil-ity for costs arising from a difference between thetwo, varying depending on how the energy savingsare measured.a. Operating hours - Changes in occupancy-levels?As above, changes in oc-cupancy levels would be avariation to the Project Brief
Some diversity in occupancy levels is includedwithin the probabilistic inputs to the energy modelas detailed in appendix B, significant changes areexcluded from the DSCF modelb. Load - Measured or stipulated?Not detailed in contract Addressed through M&V optionb. Load - Who is responsible for changes?If detailed in Project Briefchanges would be a clientvariation
Changes in load are excluded from the DSCF model
c. Weather (responsibility for weather-related changes in consumption)Not detailed in contract As detailed in the IPMVP [79], changes in weatherare typically addressed through heating degreeday adjustments. It is assumed that this is thecase in the DSCF model. Section 5.3.5 discussesthe potential consequences of this.
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous pageRE:FIT contract position Derivation and treatment in modeld. User participation (behaviour change programmes?)Not detailed in contract Interviews with clients and ESCOs suggested thatbehaviour change programmes were considered inaddition to the performance guarantee and werenot included within the guaranteed savings. Con-sequently, behaviour change programmes were ex-cluded from the measures modelled3. Performancea. Equipment performanceDetermined by project-specific works agreements Equipment failure is excluded from the DSCFmodel
b. Operations - Responsibility for day-to-day operation of equipmentProject specific Service provision is excluded from the DSCF model.Costs associated with the ongoing operation ofequipment would be a client responsibility but arenot included within the DSCF model. It is pos-sible that this could result in an under-reportingof savings over the life of the project; however,these costs are difficult to quantify and often de-pend on existing contractual arrangements mean-ing they may well remain unrealised by the client.c. Preventive MaintenanceProject specific see above
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous pageRE:FIT contract position Derivation and treatment in modeld. Equipment Repair and Replacement - Responsibility for repair and replace-ment of failed equipment (including at end of life)Project specific see aboveConcluded
The conceptual model is illustrated in figure 4.5.2 and can be summarisedas follows:
• Both ESCO and Client incur costs prior to contract signature. At contractsignature ESCO transaction costs are reimbursed by the Client
• Installation of ECMs is governed by a separate JCT works contract, theESCO bears installation costs during the installation period. On com-pletion of installation the Client makes a payment to the ESCO whichcovers the installation costs plus a profit margin for the ESCO. Thesepayments are fixed in the contract
• Following installation of the ECMs the client receives energy savings.The amount of cost savings are dependent on the energy savings and theprevailing energy price
• During the guarantee period, actual energy savings (kWh) are comparedwith guaranteed energy savings (kWh). In the event of a shortfall, theESCO makes a penalty payment to the Client. The penalty payment isbased on the energy shortfall and the indexed energy price.
4.6 Determining transaction costs
4.6.1 Types of transaction costA transaction is defined as the “transfer of a good or service across a tech-nologically separable interface" [92, p. 552]. While there is a wide body of
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Figure 4.5.2: Model logic diagram based on guaranteed savings contract
literature recognising the importance of transaction costs to strategic decisionmaking in organisations e.g. [23]. Dahlman [91] sets out the principal elementsof transaction costs as:
• Pre-contracting stage – search and information costs - bid costs
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• Contracting stage — bargaining and decision costs - project developmentcosts
• Post-contracting costs – policing and enforcement costs - measurementand verification costs
Chang and Ive note that “The success of DMA is conditional on whetherthe precise estimate of these costs can be obtained empirically.” [75, p. 8].Chang and Ive follow Dahlman’s [91] assertion that transaction costs are rootedin lack of information and characterise this as a two round information problem:The first round occurs due to search and information costs to reduce the in-formation deficit and results in real resource-incurring transaction costs (TCI ),the second round occurs due to the intersection between bounded rational-ity and opportunism as parties attempt to exploit information asymmetries totheir advantage (TCII ). These two information problems result in two distinctmeasurement challenges:
• Resource-incurring transaction costs (TCI ) Although resource-incurringtransaction costs are well-understood by ESCOs (who are required toreport them explicitly in RE:FIT tender submissions), they are expected tobe considered to be commercially sensitive information. For Clients, thesecosts might be less commercially sensitive but without the commercialimperative to identify costs on individual projects, it is likely that dis-aggregation of staff costs into those incurred on individual projects willbe difficult. In order to overcome these challenges, an approach wasdeveloped using hypothetical projects which would allow respondents toprovide transaction cost data without revealing confidential information.This approach was tested in an initial feasibility study with 2 clients and2 ESCOs and found to be successful in addressing respondent concerns.[2].
• Rent-transferring transaction cost (TCII ) Chang and Ive highlight theimportance of quantifying transaction costs that arise due to behavioural
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uncertainty or opportunism - “the negative difference between the promise(on the basis of which the transaction are agreed) and the delivery orout-turn" [75, p. 11]. They refer to this as rent-transferring transactioncosts. In Whittington’s [122] ex post analysis of transaction costs forhighways projects, she was able to include data on out-turn costs as wellas predicted costs and thus quantify the costs of change orders duringthe works. While such data is not available in the context of hypothet-ical projects, it is possible to infer the out-turn prices by consideringthe mechanisms through which such costs could arise and attempting toquantify them. Whittington suggests that transaction costs arising fromunforseeable events can occur at each stage of the contracting process:Ex-ante, the ESCO has undertaken detailed surveys and developmentwork for which it will be paid on contract signature. This work representssunk costs for for the ESCO, thus presenting a hold-up opportunity forthe client who might exploit this to try to extract additional value fromthe ESCO. Some contractual protection is provided in the RE:FIT frame-work agreement [129, sch. 2 cl. 5.5] which requires the client to pay the“the reasonable and proper costs of preparation of [the] Investment GradeProposal as evidenced by the [ESCO]”. Since this is a contractual provi-sion of which bidders are aware prior to bid submission, any risk pricingassociated with this is assumed to be included in the bid costs.
Ex-post, during installation, client change orders which are not pricedin competition may be used by the ESCO to extract additional value.However, the impact of this will be closely linked to the length of theinstallation period, since the longer and more complex the installation thegreater the risk that specification changes will be required. For buildingswhich are simple in engineering terms, such as schools, this is not thecase and the number of change orders is likely to be very low. A reviewof data from 142 US projects by Shonder and Slattery [130, p. 3] supportsthis view with changes in the guaranteed energy savings post contract
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award identified in only in 10% of projects. Further protection is providedby the requirement for any changes to be priced on an open book basis[129, sch. 2 cl. 7.16]. Consequently, it is assumed that no additional costsarise post-installation as a result of change orders.
Ex-post, following installation, the key risk for the client is that savingsmay not be as high as expected. Although the savings guarantee isintended to ensure “[t]he Energy Service Company (ESCO) guaranteesthe savings as set out in the payback calculation from the completion dateof the installation of the energy conservation measures” [121, p. 14]; thisis a simplified version of the actual situation. As implied in the guidanceissued alongside the model contract issued by the Department of Energyand Climate Change (which was based on the RE:FIT programme) [124,p. 2] “If you don’t understand the M&V then you won‘t understand theenergy savings and in effect won‘t understand what you are buying” [124,p. 18]. In practice, because the guarantee can only be applied if a shortfallin savings is demonstrated, the guarantee is defined by the measurementand verification approach selected. This means that the scope of theguarantee is ultimately defined by the M&V strategy and may not be asbroad as the client anticipates. In addition, although the RE:FIT “StarterPack” issued to prospective clients advises that they “will have the optionto either ask the ESCO to pay the shortfall or to implement further ECMs,at their cost, to make up the shortfall” [121, p. 14], the mechanism whichallows the client to require the ESCO to replace an ECM only applies tospecified “Measured Assets" or “Warranted Assets" [129, sch. 2 cl. 8.2-8.3]and would again require the specific shortfall to be measured in orderto be implemented. In the absence of this, it will be the ESCO’s choicewhether to make up the shortfall or implement more ECMs, and sincethe client would typically expect to enjoy savings from the ECM beyondthe end of the contract period this may have a material impact. As aresult, by assuming that a savings shortfall which can be substantiated
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through the M&V process is paid by the ESCO, the worst case scenariofor the client can be quantified, and a full approximation of transactioncosts arising from the procurement route can be made.
4.6.2 Selection of ESCO participantsThe Greater London Assembly’s RE:FIT programme appointed 16 businesses asframework suppliers in Spring 2016 [21]. These ESCOs who are active in theonly energy performance contracting framework targeting schools were selectedas the total potential sample for this study. Analysis of company accountsindicated that the organisations covered a broad range of sizes, ranging fromfewer than 50 to more than 10,000 employees, with turnovers ranging from lessthan £5,000,000 to more than £5,000,000,000. In their 2012 survey of the USESCO industry, Larsen et al. [52, p. 806] grouped ESCOs into 4 categoriesaccording to business ownership “(1) companies that are owned by buildingequipment or controls manufacturers, (2) companies that are subsidiaries ofelectric or gas utilities, (3) companies that are owned by other types of energycompanies such as gas producers and pipelines, and (4) companies that provideengineering services and are “independent" in the sense that they are not ownedby utilities, energy companies, or equipment/controls manufacturers".
Table 4.6.1: ESCO business type and market share
Company type No. in Larsenstudy No. on RE:FITframeworkControls 4 1Energy supply 5 3Other energy supply 4 0Engineering services 25 12
Analysis of the definition of business activities on the Companies Houseregister suggested that the engineering services companies fell into 2 distinctcategories: organisations with a track record in delivering construction, engi-neering or facilities management services and smaller organisations, often morerecently formed, which are focused more closely on the provision of energy ser-vices. Since transaction costs are likely to be partly determined by industry
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sector, this suggested that transaction costs might vary significantly betweenthe organisations on the framework. The diverse nature of the organisationsinvolved in this market may indicate a diversity of cost structure resulting indifferent levels of transaction cost for different types of organisation. As a resultit was considered necessary to recruit ESCO participants from each categoryor organisation to ensure this diversity was captured. Figure 4.6.1 illustratesthe level of coverage that was achieved.
Figure 4.6.1: ESCO participants by sector
4.6.3 Selection of Client participants
Potential client participants were identified through discussions with frameworkmanagers. This resulted in a list of names of individuals who had had experi-ence of procuring energy performance contracts in schools through the RE:FITprogramme. No definitive details are available in the public domain of localauthorities who have undertaken schools energy performance contract projectsso it is difficult to be sure of the total potential sample size. Contact detailswere obtained in this way for a total of 9 client organisations who had under-
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taken schools projects through the RE:FIT programme, 2 of these contacts wereinterviewed for an earlier feasibility study [2]. However, one contact had leftthe organisation and the other’s experience of schools projects was not appli-cable to the scale of the projects under consideration in the current study, andconsequently they were excluded. The differences in scale and scope betweenthe case studies used for the feasibility study, and those used for the currentstudy meant that it was not possible to incorporate data from the feasibilitystudy within this study. It was not possible to make contact with 3 of the 9contacts provided. Interviews were undertaken with the remaining 4 clients.
4.6.3.1 Data collection approach
The purpose of engaging with market participants was to obtain 2 differenttypes of data:
• Quantitative – market participant views of likely transaction costs for the4 sample projects
• Qualitative – contextual understanding of how the RE:FIT framework isoperating in practice and participants experiential learning
Three different approaches were considered in order to obtain this infor-mation as shown in table 4.6.2.Self-administered surveys were rejected as they would only offer limitedscope to develop the contextual understanding of the framework in practice. Thecomplexity of this type of data does not lend itself well to a situation wherethere is no ability to probe answers and the risks of misinterpretation of datawere considered to be high [131]. Further, response rates to survey instrumentsare typically low and given the relatively small size of the potential sample thiswould compromise the results. Most importantly, the quantitative data soughtis commercially sensitive and it was anticipated that respondents would beunwilling to share it unless a degree of trust had been established. Problemsof language as identified by Schoenberger [131] are also important as a clear
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Table 4.6.2: Characteristics of data collection methodologies considered
Method Self-administeredsurvey
Standardised in-terview Non-standardised(open-ended)interviewResearch Design Extensive andquantitative Usually extensiveand quantitative Usually intensiveand qualitativeTheoretical ap-proach Commonly usedin positivist ap-proaches
Commonly usedin positivist ap-proaches
Commonly usedin realist andphenomenologi-cal approachesSample Representative orwhole population Representative orwhole population Selected to covera range of phe-nomena or issuesof interestInterview style n/a Minimisationof interviewerrelated error
Interactive fol-lowing issuesraised in theinterviewQuestions Factual and pre-coded questions Factual and pre-coded questionscommon
Nearly all ques-tions open-ended
understanding of what costs are included in each item is fundamental to thevalidity of the information collected.Many of these issues would also be limitations to a standardised interviewand consequently it was decided that non-standardised/open-ended interviewswould be the most appropriate technique since it was believed that the opendialogue and intellectual engagement of the participants would increase theaccuracy and validity of responses [131].Huber and Power [132] identify 4 primary reasons that interviewees mightgive inaccurate or biased information in their review of the literature surround-ing data collection from strategic-level managers:
1. They are motivated to do so
2. Their perceptual and cognitive limitations result in inadvertent errors
3. They lack crucial information about the event of interest
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4. They have been questioned with an inappropriate data elicitation proce-dure.
This issues were addressed as follows:
• The study itself may provide motivation for ESCO interviewees to provideinaccurate information. The purpose and format of the research had beenclearly explained to all participants, this had the consequence of makingit clear to participants that the researcher was in possession of simi-larly sensitive data from potential competitors. It is possible that someparticipants might have artificially adjusted their responses to questionsin order to elicit a response from the researcher which might result insome commercial information being shared. To reduce this risk it was de-cided that no interview data would be analysed until all interviews hadbeen completed, and that the final set of aggregated responses would betriangulated by testing with framework managers.
• Interviewees might make errors in the responses they give due to inadver-tently including or excluding other cost items. A specific list of definitionswas introduced to provide additional clarity about the precise informationsought.
• Involving framework managers in the identification of potential intervie-wees, and recruiting at specific events, allowed a pre-qualification of in-terviewees to take place, in order to ensure that each had the necessaryexpertise to be able to respond to the questions.
Each interview had 2 distinct segments reflecting the two different typesof information which were being sought. The first section of the interview tookthe form of an open-ended interview characterised by an interactive discus-sion which, while guided by an interview schedule was allowed to follow linesof discussion as they arose. The second part of the interview was more for-mal, akin to a standardised interview with a set list of questions with specific
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types of information sought. However, the complexity of the data sought stillnecessitated an element of probing and clarifying on the part of the researcher.The outline interview schedule was developed based on the principles setout by Healey and Rawlinson [133]:
• Initial questions were open to encourage participants to open up andto allow the breadth and depth of their experience and expertise to beexplored
• Sensitive questions about transaction costs were used last to allow moretime to build up trust and confidence
• Opportunities were taken to summarise responses back to intervieweesto test interpretation and clarify underlying meaning.
Table 4.6.3: Client interview schedule - initial questions
Question PurposeCan you tell me a bit about yourorganisation’s experience of EnergyPerformance Contracts?
Opening discussion
Did you consider alternative pro-curement approaches for this work?What led you to choose EPC?
Understand why this procurementroute was chosen? was this the onlyoption?Can you tell me a bit about howyour organisation structures itself forthese projects? What is your role?Who is in the core team? Do youbuy in any external support?
Validity of responses, verify creden-tials of interviewee, understand teamstructure, understand size of teamand use of external consultants
What methods did you use to eval-uate bidders? proposals? Did youemploy external consultants to sup-port this?
Understand how much scrutiny isapplied to proposals
What approach did you take to mea-suring and verifying energy savings?Did you employ external consultantsto support this?
Understand approach to selection ofM&V
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Table 4.6.4: ESCO interview schedule - initial questions
Question PurposeCan you tell me a bit about yourorganisation’s experience of EnergyPerformance Contracts?
Opening discussion
Can you tell me a bit about howyour organisation structures itself forthese projects? What is your role?
Validity of responses, verify creden-tials of interviewee, understand teamstructureWhich types of energy performancecontract are you actively pursuing atthe moment? Is there a reason youare not looking at the others?
Are some frameworks or types ofproject more popular than others?Should I also look at other contractmodels?Validity of modelled optionsWhat tools do you use to calculateenergy savings?(Engineering calcu-lations, building energy modelling,previous experience and databaseinformation) Does that choice varydepending on the project?
Testing the assumption that a desireto reduce transaction costs leads toless detailed assessments of energyconsumption / savings
Do you focus on particular technolo-gies, or does it vary by project? Generalisability of results and relia-bility of modelled optionsWhich risks do you think are hard-est for ESCOs to manage? Do youtake different risks on different tech-nologies? How do you account foruncertainty?
Understanding approach to risk andwhat factors affect it. Validity ofmodelled options
Appendix C and Appendix D contain the supporting material used for thesecond part of the interviews with ESCOs and clients respectively. Experiencefrom the feasibility stage interviews indicated that client representatives wereoften uncomfortable with allocating costs for particular elements of the trans-action costs since they were unused to accounting for resources in monetaryterms. As a result clients were asked to identify the number of person-hoursrequired at each stage and a mid-scale salary cost was applied to calculatecosts.There is significant evidence from behavioural economics based on thework of Kahneman and Tversky [14] for the existence of anchoring and framingeffects which would make interviewees more likely to select the particular valuesif presented with a range of options. To avoid this potential bias, interviewees
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were given a free choice for the values of different categories of transaction costsfor each project. The sequence in which the case study projects are presentedmay also give rise to anchoring biases; with each project providing an anchorfor the values of the next in the sequence. Care was taken to highlight thedifferences between projects in line with Chapman and Johnson’s [134] findingsthat doing so would reduce the effects of anchoring.
4.7 Development of other model inputs
4.7.1 Installation CostsInstallation cost data was provided by a professional quantity surveyor basedon the quantities prepared for the case study projects. Pricing was derivedfrom tender returns for recent school projects. The location of the projects wasassumed to be in London and the base date for prices was Q2 2016. The costreport can be found in appendix F.
4.7.2 Choice of discount rateIn order to ensure a consistent approach to project evaluation, the UK gov-ernment has mandated a discount rate to be used in the majority of publicsector projects, 3.5% [104]. This is the rate used to evaluate Client returns.Determination of the appropriate discount rate for ESCOs is a more subjectivematter. Lind [135] suggests that for a commercial organisation the appropriateNPV would commonly represent the return forgone on alternative opportuni-ties, which can be approximated by the gross profit margin. ESCO interviewresponses for the margin they would require for each project are shown in ta-ble 6.2.1. However, the range of values is extremely large and would have avery significant impact on the evaluation of the energy shortfall payments overthe life of the project - after 4 years a payment discounted at 25% per annumwould be worth less than half if it were discounted at 3.5%. Since the contrac-tual structure in the current study means that all profit is received within thefirst 18 months of a project and only negative payments continue for the life ofthe project, this minimises the risk associated with the project and is in stark
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contrast with the evaluation which would result from the simple payback calcu-lation. Berkovitch and Israel [136] report that techniques such as IRR, paybackperiod and profitability index are more commonly used by firms in evaluatingprojects, and that while NPV is used by the majority of firms, it is considered asecondary technique. It is likely then that when results from an NPV analysiswith a high discount rate conflict with those from a simple payback calculationwith a zero discount rate, the results of the NPV analysis would be rejected. Toaddress this conflict, and for consistency with the evaluation of client returns,the social discount rate, 3.5% was used to evaluate ESCO cash-flows.
4.7.3 Energy Saving Guarantees
Energy savings guarantees were equated to the expected energy saving. Mostof the ESCOs interviewed described more nuanced approaches to the calcula-tion of energy savings guarantees, with most suggesting that risk allowanceswould be applied to individual energy conservation measures rather than ata building level. However, they were not able to provide any details of thisapproach and in order to explore the impact of risk margins overall this wasmodelled as a single buffer in line with the practices described in the US byGoldman et al. [28] and Satchwell et al. [137].In his analysis of risk allocation in PPP projects [138], Chang highlightsthat the “The issue of concern should be the mechanism through which theloss/gain will be allocated between parties after risks eventuate. An essen-tial condition for ‘risk management responsibility’ to be trade-able is that oneparty’s promise of retaining responsibility can be enforced by a third party."Taken as a whole, the interview responses suggest that ESCOs seek to man-age their risk exposure, where possible, through amendments and caveats tothe contract.
4.8 Domain of applicability
The domain of applicability is the set of prescribed conditions for which theconceptual model has been tested. In addition to the obvious limitation of the
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model results to the context and case-study projects considered in this study,the domain of applicability is constrained by the set of assumptions which havebeen made in constructing the model. While a modelling study necessarilyentails numerous simplifications, some are more significant than others. Theprincipal modelling assumptions made in this study and their anticipated impactare as follows:
• Fixed project timetable Although Masten et al. [139, p. 9] report that“Where timely performance is critical, delay becomes a potentially ef-fective strategy for exacting price concessions” and this is considered tobe particularly true for the construction industry, this is not expected tobe a significant concern for the projects considered in this study for twoprincipal reasons:
– neither client nor ESCO staff are typically engaged solely on theproject, meaning that in the event of a delay staff resources aretransferred to other projects and the impact of a delay is primarilyexperienced a change in the timing of costs rather than an increasein costs.
– the installation of the ECMs is not a business critical activity, re-ducing the potential for hold-ups.
• Fixed rate of return used for Net Present Value calculations Returnsfor both Client and ESCO will be very sensitive to changes in the rate ofreturn. This subject is discussed further in section 4.7.2.
• Exclusion of maintenance and lifecycle replacement costs Life cyclereplacement costs have been excluded from this study on the groundsthat the existing systems would also require replacement during the lifeof the projects studied. An earlier study [2], found that clients typicallyexclude lifecycle costs for project analyses.
• Limits of stochastic approach Although uncertain input parameters areselected in a stochastic manner in both energy models and the DSCF
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model, they are not varied over time. This simplification has differentconsequences for different types of parameter:
– Characteristic parameters - parameters such as building fabric orsystems characteristics are uncertain, but constant over the shortterm. Over longer time frames, these characteristics may degradeas a facility ages. Hoffman et al. highlight the lack of up to dateinformation on degradation of savings over time [140]. and the im-plications of ignoring degradation are discussed in the context ofsensitivity analysis in section 5.4.3.3.
– Stochastic parameters - parameters such as occupancy levels or op-erational settings which are inherently variable and may vary fromyear to year. In recent years, modelling of variable occupancy pat-terns has been the focus of considerable research attention, see forexample Hong et al. [141]. However, these approaches require em-pirical data on which to base occupancy profiles, data which arenot currently available for the schools sector. In addition, such ap-proaches require considerable computational resources for a singlemodel. Such resources were beyond the scope of this study whenapplied to the full range of buildings. In this study, the relevantoutput from the energy model is the aggregate annual energy con-sumption, making the in-year variability less significant. However,the overall impact of repeating a single profile for multiple years willbe to exaggerate the effect of extreme profiles at both ends of thescale since these will be repeated for subsequent years and effectswill not be balanced by less extreme profiles in subsequent years.Skumatz et al. [142] highlight that while performance degradationis a combination of both technical degradation and a “behavioural/ operational component including the quality of use and quality ofupkeep of the equipment" very little data is available on the secondcomponent. A further consequence of repeating energy savings pro-
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files is that cash flows to Clients and ESCOs will be consistent yearon year. The impact of this will be more pronounced in shared sav-ings contracts than in the guaranteed savings mechanism modelledin this study, due to the potential in the shared savings mechanismfor savings in early years to off-set later shortfalls.
• ESCO decision to replace or pay Clause 8 of Sch 2A of the RE:FITcontract [143] allows the ESCO to opt to replace under-performing equip-ment. However, as detailed in section 4.5.3, the scope of this study coversthe range of outcomes arising aleatory and epistemic uncertainty and notfrom failures of equipment or installation. Consequently, the option toreplace is not available.
4.9 Approach to sensitivity analysis
The rationale for a probabilistic study was set out in section 4.2 and section5.4.2 discusses the procedure undertaken for screening energy model inputs forinfluential parameters. The method used for sensitivity analysis is consistentwith these sections in using a global sensitivity analysis approach which allowsall parameters to vary at once in order to map the full input space. The need fora method that allows for a non-linear model is underlined by the distributionof the energy model outputs 5.3.5.In a Sobol’ analysis, measures of importance can be calculated by consid-ering the conditional variance of the model outputs, the amount by which modeloutput variance is reduced as a result of fixing a particular input parameter.Saltelli and Annoni’s [144] recipe for a Sobol’ analysis is used where Si, thefirst order sensitivity effect for model parameter i is given by:
Si = VXi(EXi(Y |X∼i))V (Y ) (4.1)where:Xi is the ith input parameter and X∼i is the set of all parameters except XiVXi is the variance over all possible values of Xi
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Y |X∼i is the mean of Y taken over all possible values of X∼i while keeping XifixedV(Y) is the total unconditioned variance
ST i, the total sensitivity index, which includes all interactive effects isgiven by: ST i = EXi(VXi(Y |X∼i))V (Y ) (4.2)4.10 Summary
This chapter has set out how a stochastic bi-partite discounted cash-flow modelwill be used to explore the four research hypotheses established in Chapter3. The first part of the chapter detailed the model that has been developedbased on the Greater London Assembly’s RE:FIT programme. The need for anapproach which encompasses uncertainty was highlighted.The second part of the chapter focused on the method for collecting dataon transaction costs, firstly by considering the types of transaction costs thatmight occur and secondly the process of eliciting data for transaction coststhrough semi-structured interviews with market participants.The stochastic nature of this investigation entails a need to quantify andassess uncertainty in model inputs, and the approach to sensitivity analysiswas also detailed in this chapter.
Chapter 5
Determining Production Costs
5.1 Overview
Chapter 4 set out the methods to be used to test the research hypothesesdeveloped in chapter 3. Chapter 4 also sets out the context for energy per-formance contracting projects in the UK and considers the rationale for theselection of the schools sector as the focus of this study. The need to usehypothetical projects to allow collection of commercially-sensitive informationwas also highlighted in chapter 4. Using hypothetical projects has the benefitof allowing the freedom to construct cases which permit exploration of the di-mensions of scale and scope. Project scale is considered by grouping differentnumbers of individual schools into a single project. Project scope is consid-ered by applying two different sets of ECMs to each of these projects. A suiteof 6 projects of varying scale and scope is thus created. Energy savings foreach of these projects are calculated by modelling energy consumption of theunderlying building archetypes, before and after installation of the ECMs.
The production cost for each project is defined as the cost of the energyservices, since standing charges will apply both pre- and post- retrofit, these areignored and the production cost is given by the energy consumed at the appliedenergy prices. This chapter is devoted to detailing the methods used to developthe energy consumption of the archetype buildings before and after retrofit. Thischapter begins by confirming the project dimensions which must be defined in
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order to test the research hypotheses. The underlying building archetypes aredetailed and the form of the Building Energy Simulation (BES) models usedto calculate energy savings is discussed. A key focus of this chapter is on thetreatment of uncertainty in BES models and the use of parameter screening toreduce dimensionality of the BES models and thus the computational load ofcalculating energy savings.
5.2 Testing the production cost hypotheses
Previous work [2] highlighted the variability of Priced energy savings as one ofthe most significant sources of uncertainty for all projects sizes and scopes. Thisindicated the requirement for dynamic building simulation in order to capturethe effects of peak loads and changing patterns of occupation through the day.EnergyPlus [145] was selected as the appropriate simulation engine due tothe ease of incorporation of parametric analysis, along with the availability ofextensive documentation and support resources. Energyplus is widely used inresearch and industry and has been extensively tested. Designbuilder [146] wasselected as the input interface due to the availability of training and academiclicences.Testing the research hypothesis means developing specific aspects ofprojects to allow comparisons to be made:
• Hypothesis 2Task complexity - the more accurately measurement and verification pro-cedures can measure actual changes in energy consumption the morelikely a project is to be viable. This hypothesis can be tested by compar-ing outcomes for clients and ESCOs under a range of different measure-ment and verification strategies.
• Hypothesis 3Technical potential for production cost savings - an EPC project is morelikely to be viable when the range of energy conservation measures in-cluded is large. This hypothesis can be tested by considering alternative
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mixes of energy conservation measures.
• Hypothesis 4Aggregate production costs - increasing the size of a project by increasingthe number of facilities included in it increases the likelihood of viability.This hypothesis can be tested by considering different numbers of sites,grouped together to form a single project.
5.2.1 Hypothesis 2 - task complexity
The literature review contained in chapter 2 identified the prevalence of theInternational Performance Measurement and Verification Protocol (IPMVP) asan approach for measuring and verifying savings. The IPMVP grew out theUS energy performance contract industry standard [79]. Ten Donkelaar etal. [80] report its use in just under 50% of 100 European projects surveyed.However, Wang et al. [63, p. 80] draw attention to an important issue: “ina performance contract, verified savings can substantially deviate from actualsavings”. They highlight 4 categories of savings: projected, guaranteed, verifiedand actual; other authors [147, 130, for example] have typically consideredverified and actual savings to be synonymous. However, the verified savingswill be dependent on the measurement boundaries defined by the measurementand verification (M&V) strategy selected. IPMVP contains 4 distinct options formeasuring savings, each with different measurement boundaries. Since manyenergy conservation measures may affect other building systems across thesemeasurement boundaries, the total savings measured and thus guaranteed, mayvary depending on the option selected.Shonder and Slattery [130] report the following M&V strategy choicesbased on 139 projects in the USA as shown in table 5.2.1.Although some commentators, for example, Walter et al. [148] suggest thatthe increasing availability of “interval data” will provide new opportunities forM&V, such data are based on whole building energy consumption. Since the lowuptake of IPMVP option C is likely to be at least partly due to ESCO reluctance
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Table 5.2.1: Relative popularity of each IPMVP M&V option
IPMVPOption Description [66] % of project re-porting its use[130]A • Savings calculated separately for each measure• measurements taken for some variables• deemed (assumed) values used for other variables
65%
B • savings calculated separately for each item• take measurements of all variables 18%C • determine savings using utility bills 4%D • determine savings using a calibrated computermodel 13%
to accept exposure to changes in whole building energy consumption, it is notimmediately evident that increased availability of interval data will resolve thisconcern. It is likely to be some time before such risks can be quantified andESCOs become comfortable with their risk exposure, and so it is consideredimportant to consider how existing M&V options can affect returns. Option Dinvolves calibrating a simulation model to create the initial baseline. In theabsence of actual consumption data against which a model could be calibratedthis option was excluded from the study.
The modelling approach for each energy conservation measure under eachmeasurement and verification approach is set out in table 5.2.2. For each ECM,both option A and option C measurement approaches exist. However, option B,field measurements of the isolated ECM is only practically possible for someECMs.
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Table 5.2.2: Measurement and verification option modelling approaches
Energy conserva-tion measure Option A Option B Option CLighting upgrade Engineering calcula-tion based on light-ing power reductionand deemed no. runhours (2000) [149]
Lighting power con-sumption modelled inEnergyPlus
Whole buildingelectricity consump-tion reduction inEnergyPlus
Heating controls deemed saving of 8 %[150] As option A Whole building gasconsumption reduc-tion in EnergyPlusBoiler replace-ment Engineering cal-culation based onchange in boiler effi-ciency and previousgas consumption
As option A Whole building gasconsumption reduc-tion in EnergyPlus
Pipe and flangeinsulation Deemed saving of 8%[151] As option A Whole building gasconsumption reduc-tion in EnergyPlusDraught stripping Deemed saving of 4%assumed As option A Whole building gasconsumption reduc-tion in EnergyPlus
5.2.2 Hypothesis 3 - technical potential for production costsavings
Two options are considered for project scope - retrofitting with 2 energy con-servation measures (a lighting upgrade and replacement of heating controls)and with 5 energy conservation measures (lighting upgrade, replacement ofheating controls, boiler replacement, pipe and flange insulation and draught-stripping). These energy conservation measures (ECMs) were selected fromanalysis of the most prevalent energy conservation measures in the GreaterLondon Assembly’s RE:FIT programme case study projects [20] and comparisonwith the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy’s BuildingEnergy Efficiency Survey [152] confirms these as the most probable ECMs forschools energy efficiency upgrades. The grouping of the measures was testedwith framework managers who confirmed that they would consider the 2 projectoptions to be viable. Building fabric measures are not included as payback pe-
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riods for these measures typically extend beyond the 8 year threshold for Salixfunding [125]. Table 5.2.3 explains how the ECMs are modelled and revisedranges for the parameters affected by each energy conservation measure canbe found in Appendix E.
Table 5.2.3: Energy conservation measures modelling approaches
Energy conservationmeasure Definition Modelling approachLighting upgrade Replacement of lumi-naires and installationof automatic lightingcontrols
Reduction in lightinggain and adjustment oflighting schedules toreflect occupancy profilepost interventionHeating controls Installation of local heat-ing controls (ie. thermo-static radiator valves)
Reduction in set pointtemperatures
Boiler replacement Replacement of existingboiler installation withnew
Increased boiler effi-ciency, alternative boilerefficiency curve, reducedpart-load ratioPipe and flange in-sulation Exposed pipe in plantroom replaced with insu-lated pipe
Change in construction ofpipe to insulated pipe
Draught stripping Installation of draughtstrips to windows anddoors and sealing ofbuilding penetrations
Reduction in air infiltra-tion rate
5.2.3 Hypothesis 4 - aggregate production costsHong’s [153] analysis of a large set of school DEC data identified the need todis-aggregate schools into two categories, primary (pupils aged 4 - 11) andsecondary (pupils aged 11 - 16/18). Consequently an archetype was selectedfor each of these two categories. While there is considerable diversity in theschool estate, school building in the UK has tended to occur in waves, drivenby the age of existing buildings but also by societal changes and changes inexpectations of education [154]. This suggests that it would be possible tobreak the primary and secondary school categories down further into “clus-ters" with fairly homogeneous characteristics. This approach has been used in
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housing stock modelling [114] where the aim has been to characterise an entireestate. Since the aim of this study is to consider impacts of increasing scalerather than across an entire estate, a single archetype was selected for eachof the two categories of schools. By limiting the study to 2 archetypes, theimpact of different forms of construction and different building geometries areexcluded from this study, which may have implications for the generalisabilityof conclusions. In particular, a more heterogeneous estate would result in amore balanced set of risks as different buildings would have different ECMs anddifferent failure modes. Figure 5.2.1 illustrates the ECMs on the cross-sectionof a primary school.
Figure 5.2.1: Energy conservation measures (ECMs) considered
Three alternative project scales were considered:
• small – 6 primary schools
• medium – 10 primary schools and 2 secondary schools
• large – 20 primary schools and 4 secondary schools
5.3 Building archetypes
London was selected as the location for the projects due to the existence of theGLA’s RE:FIT programme which means that a number of energy performancecontracts have already been undertaken in schools. There are 1630 primaryschools in London for which data is available, of these 52% have between 210and 420 pupils with a median of 384 [155] equating to two classes or forms ofentry (FE) in each year, each with a maximum of 30 pupils. As a result, theDepartment for Education (DfE)’s baseline design for a 2FE primary school
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was selected as the basis of a primary school exemplar [156]. The occupancydensity of this design is approximately 4 m2 per person, which is higher thanthe median of 5 m2 per person reported for schools in the Department forBusiness Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS)’s Building Energy EfficiencySurvey [152], reflecting the fact that the archetype has been designed for currenteducation practice.Much less information is available on secondary schools as they are morelikely to be Academies and thus exempt from the reporting requirements. TheBEIS data suggests 33% of secondary schools have pupil numbers in the 1000 to1499 range and a median occupancy level of 8m2 per person, which compareswith 6.2m2 per person for the archetype secondary school. Since the DfEbaseline designs were developed with the aim of reducing the overall floor areaof the school it is likely that the difference in area will be due to reductions incirculation spaces rather than reductions in teaching space, meaning that theimpact on overall energy consumption will be lower than the headline figuresuggests.
5.3.1 Modelling the archetype buildings
The two school archetypes were modelled in version 8.3.0 of EnergyPlus [145].A key advantage of using EnergyPlus is its editable input file which allowsautomatic generation of multiple input files using different parameter sets. Af-ter creating initial building models in in DesignBuilder, the input files weretagged by replacing parameter values with variable names. Matlab [120] wasused to generate sets of values for each variable parameter based on Sobol‘sampling as described in 5.4.2. A series of input files were created by succes-sively substituting the parameter value name tags in the base input file withthe sets of sampled values. EnergyPlus simulations were then executed with 6time-steps per hour for a full annual simulation using the UCL Legion high per-formance computing facility. The distributions from which variable parameterswere sampled are detailed in Appendix B. EnergyPlus contains a wide varietyof alternative sub-models for many different calculation types and the choice
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of sub-models has potentially significant implications for calculation results.Evaluation of the impact of each sub-model choice was beyond the scope of theresources available for this current study, with one exception which is discussedin section 5.3.4. Since the outputs of interest are annual consumption of gasand electricity, the implications of the choice of sub-models are likely to beless significant than for a finer-grained analysis.Legislative requirements mean that teaching time in schools is tightly de-fined, however, patterns of building occupation and use are poorly understoodoutside core school hours, for example, Burman’s [157] analysis of 5 secondaryschool buildings found 50% of energy was used outside of teaching hours. Op-erating schedules incorporate wide variations to reflect this.
5.3.2 Primary school energy model geometry and zoning
The DFE primary school archetype comprises 3 adjoining blocks, a single storeykitchen and plant block, which is adjacent to a double height assembly/gym hall,which is next to a 2 storey classroom block. The rendered DesignBuilder modelcan be seen in figure 5.3.1. To reduce model complexity, adjacent areas withequivalent orientation, functions and operational schedules are modelled assingle zones. This results in a total of 33 zones, the thermal mass of the missingpartitions was not included as this was not expected to have a significant effect.The ZoneVentilation:DesignFlowRate model is used with flow rates as detailedin appendix B.Ventilation is single-sided with trickle vents and opening windows used tobring untreated outside air into the building.
Figure 5.3.1: Primary school energy model
5.3. Building archetypes 1035.3.3 Secondary school energy model geometry and zoningThe procedure used to create the primary school energy model was replicatedto create the secondary school energy model. This design comprises a predom-inantly three-storey central block containing the largest volume spaces in theschool with two three-storey wings of classrooms and an adjacent 2.5 storeyheight sports hall block. The two teaching block wings and the main block havea double-loaded corridor format with a full height atrium in each of the threeprincipal circulation spaces. Ventilation is double-sided, with trickle vents andopening windows used to bring untreated outside air into the building fromthe external façade with vents in the corridor wall leading to atrium spaceswith vents at roof level. No mechanical assistance is provided and ventilationrelies on the stack effect. The ZoneVentilation:DesignFlowRate model is usedwith flow rates as detailed in 5.4. The secondary school model comprises atotal of 76 zones as a result of combining adjacent areas with similar functions,orientation and occupancy schedules into a single zone.
Figure 5.3.2: Secondary school energy model
5.3.4 Building systemsDisplay Energy Certificate (DEC) data presented in Hong [153] show that only1.2% of schools and seasonal use public buildings are electrically heated andthat of the non-electrically heated schools buildings 96% of primary schools and87% of secondary schools are characterised as being natural ventilated. The twoarchetype designs are thus modelled as having gas-fired boilers serving water-filled radiators with ventilation supplied through vents and opening windows.
5.3. Building archetypes 104
The layout of the heating system used in both archetypes is shown in figure5.3.3.Heat emitters are modelled using the ZoneHVAC:Baseboard:Convective:Waterobject; this ignores any radiative component of heat transfer. Using this objectresults in faster simulation runs as EnergyPlus does not need to calculate theradiative heat transfer to each surface in each time step. The complex geome-try of some spaces means that this simplification more than halves simulationtimes from approximately 30 minutes for a single secondary school model to 13minutes. This assumption was tested by using a categorical variable for calcu-lation method and including the impact of calculation method in the sensitivityanalysis.
Figure 5.3.3: Heating system layout for both building archetypes
5.3.5 Model validationThe case study models are based on template school designs and not actualbuildings, consequently they cannot be validated against measured data. Fig-ure 5.3.4 shows the set of comparisons of the normalised output from the modelvalidation runs against Hong’s DEC data [153] data. Since Hong’s data setincluded the actual energy consumption of the buildings it includes the effectsof operation and management on energy consumption and so is an appropriatecomparator. Hong’s data set contains a much higher number of data points forprimary schools than for secondary schools. Although comparison with Hong’sDisplay Energy Certificate data set is complicated by a number of outliers in
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in his data, figure 5.3.4 indicates that both archetype models represent a set ofbuildings within the expected range. For both building archetypes, electricityconsumption is more tightly clustered than the gas, this is more pronouncedfor the secondary school model. Figure 5.3.4 confirms that the archetype mod-els represent plausible sets of buildings within the school estate and are thussuitable for the purposes of this study. However, the overall study results needto be interpreted with caution given the over-weighting of high gas consumingbuildings with respect to the broader data set.
(a) Primary school
(b) Secondary school
Figure 5.3.4: Comparison with Hong’s DEC data set
The sensitivity analysis described in section 5.4.1 was also used to sense-check the underlying energy models. Interrogation of the sensitivity analysis
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results for plausible mechanisms driving the influence of particular parametersallowed the identification and correction of a number of modelling errors.
5.4 Dealing with uncertainty
As Monari and Strachan [158] highlight, building energy simulation (BES) mod-els are inherently complex: “BES models have complicated structures consist-ing of many in-built sub-models that attempt to represent the physical realityand large numbers of input parameters”. In particular, BES models are fun-damentally non-linear, comprising a number of different mechanisms for heattransfer, which means that in different locations in the input space, differentmechanisms may dominate; for example, window-opening regimes determinewhether heat loss from the building is predominantly due to conduction lossesthrough the building fabric, or ventilation losses. Booth et al. [114] add modeluncertainty to the aleatory and epistemic uncertainty categories identified byHelton [113] and discussed in section 4.2. This echoes the concerns raisedby Monari and Strachan [158] regarding the importance of the choice of sub-model within an overall BES. Reddy et al. [159] relate the concerns raisedby Oreskes et al. [115] to building energy simulations, noting that buildingenergy simulation models are inevitably under-determined, comprising as theydo many thousands of input parameters even for a simple building model. As aconsequence, BES of a complex, multi-zoned building will involve a very largenumber of potential variables, including some which will be multi-dimensionaldue to variation over time. The high-dimensionality of the input space for aBES as a result of the very large number of uncertain input parameters makesmodels computationally very demanding to evaluate over the full range of modelinputs. Global sensitivity analysis screening methods offer a means of reducingthe dimensionality of the model without sacrificing the accuracy of the results.In particular, the Elementary Effects method, originally formulated by Morris[160] has been extensively used within the BES field for screening purposes[161, 162, 74, 163, 164, for example]. This study follows these approaches
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using a modified version of Morris’s elementary effects method to identify themost influential parameters in the BES model allowing its dimensionality to bereduced when exploring the impact of energy conservation measures (ECMs).The screening process and its results are set out in the following sections.
5.4.1 Identifying potentially influential parametersA key constraint in any sensitivity analysis, even those used for screening pur-poses, is the computational burden of defining the uncertainties associated witheach variable parameter. Consequently, although not explicitly stated in theliterature, screening typically involves a preparatory qualitative phase basedon literature review. It should be noted that this phase necessarily sets thebounds for subsequent phases since a parameter can only be identified as influ-ential if it was not fixed and only the parameters which are explicitly selectedas variable will not be fixed. It is important to note that it is always possiblethat potentially influential parameters have been inadvertently excluded fromthe analysis at this preparatory stage.Since EPCs typically take place in a commercial setting where cost andtime pressures place significant constraints on the amount of information thatcan be collected about an existing building and its operation, it is anticipatedthat epistemic uncertainties will dominate the BES model.A long-list of variables was created from a review of the literature per-taining to the identification of significant variables in building energy models[162, 161, 165, 166].
• Fabric – thermal properties of the building fabric
• Systems – efficiency of the building systems
• Operation – temperatures and hours of operation, ventilation strategy
• Occupancy – numbers of occupants and hours of occupancy
All parameters are treated as univariate, that is fixed at the point at whichthe model is run. While some parameters such as occupancy levels are multi-
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dimensional in reality, the computational demands of modelling the temporalvariations are beyond the scope of this study. In a comparison of differing ap-proaches to parameterisation of occupancy effects, Ward et al. [167] found NCMdata resulted in an overestimation of midweek loads and an under-estimationof weekend loads in a university office building. However, these effects wouldbe expected to be significantly lower in a school environment where the occu-pancy schedule is more strictly defined. Further, Ward et al. note that whereaggregate data are required (as is the case in the current study), a determin-istic profile may be appropriate provided the full range of possible results isconsidered.Another category of parameter which could exhibit dynamic variation overtime is the performance of the installed energy conservation measures them-selves. While demand-side management programmes operating in the USAtypically make allowance for the persistence of savings over time, Hoffman etal. [168] found a wide divergence between values used and a lack of evidenceto support the selection of a particular value.Building geometry, orientation and location were identified as potentiallyimportant parameters but excluded as they are capable of being well defined,and thus make little contribution to the uncertainty around energy consumptionpre- and post retrofit. The impact of climate was tested with the inclusion ofa binary variable which allocated input data sets to one of two weather filesbased on the randomly sampled variable. Results for gas consumption werenormalised for heating degree days using the procedure set out by Hong [153,p. 113] since this is a standard contractual adjustment.Ranges and distributions for each parameter were identified from the lit-erature, appendix B sets out the individual parameters and the data sourcesfor each. Three types of probability distribution were used for the parametersin the study:
• Normal distributions were used for parameters where uncertainty is dom-inated by variation in physical characteristics and the spread is small rel-
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ative to value. For example, boiler efficiency, infiltration, lighting gains(post-retrofit)
• Triangular distributions were used for parameters where uncertainty wasdominated by lack of knowledge of existing installed components or pat-terns of use and the spread is large relative to value since using a normaldistribution would underweight extreme values and result in impossiblevalues. For example: lighting gains (pre-retrofit), equipment gains, on/offtimes for lighting, equipment, occupancy or heating schedules
• Uniform distributions were used for parameters where information con-cerning the distribution of parameter values was not available or theparameter is a user-defined setting and all values are assumed to beequally likely. For example, domestic hot water loop outlet temperature.
A number of simplifying assumptions were made, these are detailed inappendix B.A second binary variable was introduced to evaluate the choice of heatingmodel, simulation sets were assigned to either a convective only heating modelor to a radiant-convective model based on the randomly sampled variable.
5.4.2 Parameter screening
The Elementary Effects approach creates a series of sets of input parameterswhere each pair of sets differs in only one input parameter, consequently thevariation in model output between the sets of input parameters is only due tothe varied parameter. The Elementary Effect (EE) is the normalised differencein output resulting from the two sets of input parameters. A series of k+1sets of input parameters is required to give one estimate of EE for each inputparameter where k is the number of input parameters. Notation used throughoutfollows Campolongo et al. [169].
EEi = ∣∣∣∣∣y(x (u)i x (u)∼i )−y(x (v )i x (u)∼i )(x (u)i − x (v )i )
∣∣∣∣∣ (5.1)
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where:EEi is the elementary effect of the ith parametery(x (u)i x (u)∼i )−y(x (v )i x (u)∼i ) is the difference in output resulting from input vectors uand v of the output parameters where parameter i is the parameter being heldconstantx (u)i − x (v )i is the difference in the input vectors
The procedure is repeated a number of times to give a number of estimatesfor EE for each parameter. In his original work, Morris used the mean andthe standard deviation of the estimates for each parameter to characterisethe sensitivity of the model output to changes in that parameter. Two keyconcerns regarding the original Morris Method have been addressed in morerecent work. The first, the potential for the estimates of opposite sign to canceleach other out, resulting in an influential factor being incorrectly classified asnon-influential, was addressed by taking the mean of the absolute values ofmeasured variance, µ* [170]. Where
µi∗= 1n n∑j=1
∣∣∣EE ji ∣∣∣ (5.2)
The second concern, that the coarse search pattern proposed with the original“winding stairs” design leads to inadequate coverage of the input space isaddressed through the application of a radial sampling design [169] this is theform used in equation 5.1.
Sobol’ sequences were used to generate samples from the distributionU(0,1) for each parameter using the sobolset routine in Matlab based on [171].Sobol’ sequences were created to systematically fill the input space based onpreviously selected points and so are not strictly random numbers but havebeen demonstrated to provide better coverage of the input space than othersampling strategies such as random numbers or Latin Hypercube sampling,[172]. The procedure set out in [169] was used to generate 8500 samples
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for a radial sampling strategy for the primary school (100 estimates for eachvariable parameter) and 8800 for the secondary school model (100 estimatesfor each variable parameter). Each sample is mapped to the input space ofthe relevant parameter using the inverse of the cumulative probability densityfunction (CDF) for that parameter since the CDF is by definition a continuousfunction between zero and one.The original formulation of the Morris method uses a uniform distributionfor all variable parameters which would tend to over-weight extreme valuesleading to type I errors where non-influential parameters are identified asinfluential. In the modified Morris method used in this study, normal and trian-gular distributions were used in addition to uniform distributions, as discussedin section 5.4.1.The number of runs required to give good coverage of the input space wasassumed to be the number of estimates required for convergence multiplied bythe number of influential parameters. This result was then validated accordingto the procedure for screening validation set out by [173]: An additional set ofmodel inputs is generated, {y | X0 |} where the input parameters in X0 are fixedwhile the remaining parameters take the values defined in the initial samplingprocess. Empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs) are then calcu-lated from the conditional and unconditional model outputs and a two-sampleKolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic is used to estimate the discrepancy betweenthe two sets of outputs.
5.4.3 Screening results5.4.3.1 Primary school screening resultsGas consumption results were normalised according to heating degree days asset out in 5.3.5 above, since this is an industry standard adjustment. The outputof interest is the remaining variation after the adjustment. When sampling froma normal distribution, there is the potential for impossible values to be selectedwhich result in a failed run. Where the failed run forms the base parameter setfor a set of estimates, each run which is associated with that base parameter
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set must also be treated as a failed run. Failed runs are replaced with dummyvalues which are removed in the final calculations.
Figure 5.4.1: Primary School - elementary effects of each parameter on annual elec-tricity consumption
Figures 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 show the mean elementary effect for each param-eter, plotted against the standard deviation for each elementary effect. Whilethe elementary effect shows the relative sensitivity of the output to the inputparameter, the standard deviation shows which parameters are most stronglyinteractive. As this is semi-quantitative method, a graphical approach to iden-tifying the most influential parameters was preferred.The number of iterations required to reach a stable ranking of parame-ters gives a strong indication of the minimum number of samples required foradequate coverage of the input space. Figures 5.4.7 and 5.4.8 suggest thatapproximately 55 samples are required per varying parameter to achieve a sta-ble separation into sets of influential and non-influential parameters, the samenumber of iterations was used for the primary school model although figure5.4.3 indicates earlier convergence into two sets.
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Figure 5.4.2: Primary School - elementary effects of each parameter on annual gasconsumption
Screening results for gas consumption for the primary school presentedin figure 5.4.2 indicate that asphalt thermal conductivity is, unexpectedly, aninfluential parameter. Inspection of the individual estimates suggests that this isdue to a single pair of model results, the effect of which decreases as subsequentestimates are added. Repeating the sensitivity analysis does not repeat thisresult. However, the inclusion of asphalt thermal conductivity as an influentialparameter when it is not influential only has the effect of increasing the numberof model runs required.
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Figure 5.4.3: Primary school - effect of adding successive estimates of elementaryeffect on annual electricity consumption
Figure 5.4.4: Primary school - effect of adding successive estimates of elementaryeffect on annual gas consumption
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Since local cooling is included in practical and ICT areas in the secondaryschool the number of influential parameters identified for the annual electricityconsumption is higher than in the primary school model which contains nocooling. Figures 5.4.5 and 5.4.6 show the mean and standard deviation of theelementary effects for each parameter on annual electricity and gas consumptionrespectively, indicating a total of 25 influential parameters. Figures 5.4.7 and
Figure 5.4.5: Secondary School - elementary effects of each parameter on annualelectricity consumption
5.4.8 indicate that, as with the primary school model, about 55 samples pervarying parameter should result in adequate coverage of the input space.
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Figure 5.4.6: Secondary School -elementary effects of each parameter on annual gasconsumption
Figure 5.4.7: Secondary school - effect of adding successive estimates of elementaryeffect on annual electricity consumption
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Figure 5.4.8: Secondary school - effect of adding successive estimates of elementaryeffect on annual gas consumption
5.4.3.3 Validation of screening results
The screening process was undertaken to enable the dimensionality of themodels to be reduced without sacrificing the accuracy of the model output. Tovalidate the results of the screening process a set of samples with all parametersvarying was generated, this set was replicated to form a second set of samplesin which the non-influential samples were fixed at their mean values [161] Atwo-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test was selected to test the ‘goodness-of-fit’ of the two distributions of outputs. The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test has theadvantage of being non-parametric and by avoiding grouping samples there isno loss of information [174]. The two distributions were compared at the 5%level, meaning that a deviation between the two distributions of more than 5%would result in the the screening results being rejected. Cumulative distributionplots for model outputs for the reduced and full models are shown in figure 5.4.9.
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Table 5.4.1: Influential parameters for primary and secondary school models
Primary School Influential pa-rameters Secondary School Influential pa-rametersClassroom occupancy levels Toilet occupancy levelsClassroom equipment levels Classroom equipment levelsKitchen equipment levels ICT equipment levelsClassroom lighting levels Kitchen equipment levelsIntermittent heating set point Office equipment levelsRegular heating set point Practical equipment levelsGeneral occupancy schedule -fully occupied starts Classroom lighting levelsGeneral equipment on Office lighting levelsGeneral equipment off Hall lighting levelsGeneral lighting on Ancillary lighting levelsGeneral lighting off Intermittent heating set pointVentilation temperature Regular heating set pointInfiltration rate Regular heating set back temper-atureBoiler efficiency General occupancy schedule -fully occupied startsAsphalt thermal conductivity General occupancy schedule -partially occupied pm startsPlasterboard thickness General equipment onClassroom temp controlled purgeventilation rate General equipment offClassroom continuous base venti-lation rate General lighting onGeneral lighting offVentilation temperatureInfiltration rateBoiler efficiencyWindow air gapInsulation urea foam thermal con-ductivityGlass thicknessClassroom temp controlled purgeventilation rateClassroom continuous base venti-lation rate
(a) Primary school - electricity
(b) Primary school - gas
(c) Secondary school - electricity
(d) Secondary school - gas
Figure 5.4.9: Screening validation: comparison of reduced and full model results
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The screening validation shown in figure 5.4.9 shows good agreement be-tween the outputs for the full and reduced models with the exception of thesecondary school model gas consumption which fails the KS-test at the 5%level. Excluding weather variation from the results by repeating the analysiswith results of only one weather file shows good agreement and satisfies theKS-test as shown in figure 5.4.10.
Figure 5.4.10: Secondary school - reduced and full model comparison with weatherfile variation excluded
This result indicates that adjusting for temperature using the heating de-gree day adjustment described in section 5.3.5 above is inadequate to nor-malise the impact of weather variation on energy consumption. This is in linewith Kalamees et al.’s [76] assertions that windspeed and solar radiation willalso affect both heating and cooling energy and relative humidity will affectcooling energy. Since figure 5.4.9 indicates better agreement for electricityconsumption (which includes cooling energy) than for gas consumption (whichis dominated by heating energy), it is likely that the effect observed is due towindspeed, which would have a greater impact on infiltration in the 3-storeysecondary school building than than the 2-storey primary school building butfurther work would be necessary to verify this.
5.5. Energy prices 1205.5 Energy prices
Energy prices are based on the retail prices for services in the Department forBusiness, Energy and Industrial Strategy’s 2016 energy price projections [175]which is the latest set of projections available. As these projections represent3 unique trajectories, these were modelled as 3 separate scenarios. Theseprices exclude VAT but include Climate Change Levy. Standing charges wereexcluded from the analysis as they would be the same pre- and post-retrofit.Since monthly energy prices were required, it was assumed that a constantprice applied throughout the year, rising annually on 1st April.The price projections extend to 2035. In the event that a project has apayback period that extends beyond this, the model assumes no growth in fuelprices in real terms Although this is a crude assumption, the effect of changesin price post 2035 are likely to be very small due to the discount rate of 3.5%applied in the NPV calculations.
5.6 Summary
This chapter detailed the approach to developing two building archetypes towhich a range of energy conservation measures are applied in order to calculateenergy consumption pre- and post-retrofit. These energy savings are combinedwith utility prices to create distributions of production costs, which form inputsto the DSCF model described in chapter 4. Generating probability distributionsof energy savings for the two archetype buildings is a computationally intensiveprocess and this chapter also explained the sensitivity analysis process whichwas used to reduce model dimensionality to address this.
Chapter 6
The Impact of Transaction Costs onFinancial Returns
6.1 Overview
Transaction costs were identified as a key barrier to growth of the energyperformance contracting market by a number of commentators, as discussedin section 2.3.1. The first of the four research hypotheses set out in chapter3 related transaction costs to market competitiveness by stating that a morecompetitive market will result in lower transaction costs and thus increase theviability of EPC projects. This chapter begins by presenting the transactioncost data collected through interviews with a range of Clients and ESCOs. Thechallenges of data collection and limitations of the data are also discussed.The second part of this chapter discusses the influence on transaction costs onreturns for Clients and ESCOs and considers the evidence for the first researchhypothesis.
6.2 Collecting transaction cost data
Chapter 4 set out the approach to developing transaction cost inputs throughsemi-structured interviews with a range of clients and ESCOs. Before pre-senting the data collected during these interviews it is important to detail theprocurement context in which these data were collected.Nolden and Sorrell [19] highlight the emergence of public sector frame-
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works as a key feature of the UK Energy Performance Contracting market inresponse to the relatively onerous requirements of EU procurement legislation.In a framework procurement, a single process, compliant with EU procurementrules is undertaken to select a pool of providers. Individual Clients can thenselect providers from the framework for their specific projects without the needfor a full EU-compliant process. In RE:FIT this secondary selection process,carried individual projects, is termed a "mini-competition". Providers are ap-pointed to the framework for a fixed period and the framework procurement isrepeated at the end of each period. The RE:FIT framework is currently on its3rd iteration [21].
Initially, a single process was available for Clients selecting their pre-ferred ESCO through the RE:FIT framework: the target bid process. Underthis process bidders carried out high-level assessments of energy saving po-tential at the sites included in the procurement. The preferred supplier wasselected based on this information and subsequently carried out more detailedassessments of each site to develop Investment Grade Proposals (IGPs) whichwould be signed off by the client and form part of the contract documentation.Crucially, the energy savings within the more detailed IGPs were required tobe at least as high as those predicted in the competitive bidding phase. Ifthe energy savings in the IGPs were lower than those originally projected, theClient would have the right to reject the proposals and would have no liabil-ity for the costs the preferred supplier had incurred in developing them [129,schedule 2A, Clause 5.4]. Subsequently, a second process was developedas an alternative: the partner bid process. In this process bidders are notrequired to produce high level assessments of energy savings (although someexamples may be required to enable a technical evaluation to be undertaken)and a partner is selected earlier in the procurement process. Only the pre-ferred supplier will produce high level assessments of energy savings for eachsite and there is no fixed level of savings which must be delivered at the pointat which the preferred supplier is selected. The two different processes are
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shown diagrammatically in figure 6.2.1.
Figure 6.2.1: RE:FIT target and partner bid processes
These two different processes have important implications for transactioncosts: firstly, since selection of the preferred supplier takes place later in theprocess in the target bid approach, transaction costs for unsuccessful biddersare higher than in the partner bid approach. However, for the successful ESCO,transaction costs would in principal be the same as the same amount of work isultimately undertaken in each process. Secondly, although the client has lowerbargaining and decision costs in the partner bid approach, only evaluating
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high level assessments from a single bidder, policing and enforcement costs arelikely to be higher. This is because the guaranteed level of energy savings isdeveloped in competition in the target bid approach but post-competition in thepartner bid approach.
6.2.1 ESCO transaction costs
Section 4.6.2 sets out the process by which ESCOs were selected for inclusionin this study. The rationale for the data collection approach is detailed insection 4.6.3.1 and the interview schedule is contained in table 4.6.4. Interviewmaterials can be found in appendix C.Contact details were obtained for 14 of the 16 framework contractorsthrough industry contacts, recruitment by the framework manager and personalapproaches at industry events. Through this process, four potential participantsruled themselves out due to their lack of previous experience in the sector or alow-likelihood of participation in a schools project. The remaining 10 ESCOsall consented to participate in the research. However three of the interviewedESCOs declined to provide transaction cost data. This resulted in an overallresponse rate of 58% which compares favourably with the response rates for amuch larger study in the US conducted by Larsen et al. [52]. Relatively fewresponses were obtained from the construction/engineering/FM category so anadditional participant was recruited who represented an organisation who hadbeen involved in the previous RE:FIT framework but whose organisation hadmade a strategic decision not pursue inclusion on the current framework.All interviews were recorded with the consent of the interviewees; record-ings were annotated and coded using Nvivo [176]. However, since intervieweesparticipated in the study under condition of anonymity, no transcripts are in-cluded in this thesis (a sample of annotated excerpts are included in appendixG). To avoid biasing responses from interviewees and potentially influencingthe market in which all interviewees are currently direct competitors, interviewdata were not processed until all interviews had been completed. All intervie-wees provided numerical responses either in the form of minimum and maximum
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values for a particular category or a single value for each category. One or-ganisation provided values for each cost category expressed as a proportion ofestimated installation values for each project. However, the estimated installa-tion values were significantly higher than those provided by the quantity sur-veyor. The initial data provided by this organisation were rejected as outliersand replaced with recalculated data using the quantity surveyor’s estimatedinstallation values as the base for calculation.ESCOs were asked to provide four categories of cost information for eachof the six projects:
• bidding costs: the costs which a potential supplier incurs to win a con-tract. Bidding costs include all the costs which are incurred at risk in-cluding any design and survey costs
• development costs: the costs which are incurred by a supplier after se-lection by the client. Development costs include finance, legal and ad-ministrative costs but exclude design costs
• project management costs: the costs of delivering the installation andoperational phases
• gross margin: the excess of revenue from the contract divided by the costsof labour and materials required to perform the contract i.e. excludingoverheads.
This breakdown was used to make it easier for interviewees to work throughthe costs in recognisable stages, so as to increase the likelihood of accurateresponses. However, despite the descriptions provided, it is not possible to becertain that all costs provided represent exactly these categories. The threecost categories: bidding costs, project development costs and project manage-ment costs were expected to be strongly correlated, as a result of individualinterviewees taking different approaches to the allocation of costs across thethree phases. As a result, treating the three categories as independent inputs
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would understate the overall variation in ESCO transaction costs. Since thecorrelations are expected to differ across the respondents, the three cost cate-gories were summed to create base data from which samples could be drawn,as described below. The resulting samples for total ESCO cost were then pro-rated for the length of each phase. This introduces a timing effect since costsmay be being incurred earlier or later than would be the case in practice; how-ever, since the overall development period is only seven months, this effect isexpected to be negligible.
The small number of data points collected for transaction costs led to theneed for a bootstrapping approach to create a probability distribution fromwhich values could be selected. Anonymised raw data were reviewed withframework managers who are currently active in delivering projects using theRE:FIT framework. These reviews suggested that the upper and lower val-ues for each category were extreme values which would be possible but notlikely. Consequently a distribution which did not over-emphasise the extremeswas preferred. A triangular distribution was selected since this could be con-structed with the available data from minimum, maximum and median values.This approach was preferred to using a binomial distribution for which estima-tion of parameters would have been required.
Aggregated responses are shown in table 6.2.1; calculated values havebeen rounded to the nearest thousand pounds to reflect the precision withwhich ESCO responses were collected.
The resulting distributions for ESCO transaction costs are shown in figure6.2.2. Two effects are apparent from figure 6.2.2; firstly that there is much lessagreement about the transaction costs for the largest projects, and secondly,that the question order may have resulted in anchoring effects. Responses weresought to the projects in the same order in each interview (Project A to ProjectF). The resulting distributions suggest that responses to the second project ineach scale pair (Projects A and B, Projects C and D, etc.) may have been drivenby the response to the first.
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Table 6.2.1: Aggregated ESCO transaction cost results
Transaction costs MarginMin Max Median Min Max Median
Proje
ct
Prim
aries
Seco
ndari
es
ECM
set
A 6 0 1 £29,000 £69,000 £39,000 6% 25% 11%B 6 0 2 £34,000 £92,000 £49,000 5% 25% 12%C 10 2 1 £62,000 £220,000 £116,000 6% 20% 14%D 10 2 2 £72,000 £296,000 £143,000 6% 20% 13%E 20 4 1 £92,283 £462,000 £232,000 5% 20% 11%F 20 4 2 £151,000 £620,000 £253,000 5% 20% 13%
Figure 6.2.2: Distribution of ESCO transaction costs for each project
In contrast, the distribution of results for project margin shown in figure6.2.3 suggest a broader spread for the two smallest projects (A and B) than forthe other four projects. While the narrower spread of transaction costs mightbe indicative of a more competitive market for these projects, it seems morelikely that experienced ESCOs limit their transaction costs to fit the budgetthey believe will be available for the project. The wider spread of margin
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suggests that these projects are less competitive; the number of intervieweesindicating an interest in pursuing the projects provides some support for this(six for project A, 7 for B, C and D and eight for E and F).
Figure 6.2.3: Distribution of ESCO margin requirements for each project
6.2.2 Client transaction costsSection 4.6.3 explains how clients were selected for inclusion in the study.Details of the interview schedule can be found in table 4.6.3, client interviewmaterials are contained in appendix D. Two key issues arose in collectingdata for client transaction costs; the first related to the level of experience ofclients, each of whom had only procured a single EPC project; this was incontrast with the level of experience of ESCOs, each of whom had submittedseveral bids. In addition, a number of ESCOs described detailed governancearrangements requiring the expected cost of a project to be calculated as partof an approval to bid process. The second issue in relation to obtaining dataon client transaction costs is the overwhelming focus on external costs whenconsidering the cost of public sector procurement. The literature relating to
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public sector procurement costs shows little evidence of consideration of internalcosts, in particular staff time [177]. This was seen in an earlier study [2] whereclients found it difficult to provide estimates for transaction costs. To avoidadding unnecessary uncertainty, clients were asked to provide details of theperson-hours required for each stage of a project, as this reflected data in whichthey were expected to have more experience and confidence.
The four clients interviewed were at various stages in the process: twohad completed procurement and installation phases of their projects and werewell-established in the measurement and verification process while the othertwo had completed procurement phases but in one case the selected serviceprovider had withdrawn from the market prior to installation of ECMs and inthe second case, the project was approaching the installation phase. Figure6.2.4 illustrates the level of experience of each client respondent and the typeof procurement they had undertaken. The two respondents highlighted in redare those who provided estimates for the six case study projects, while thetwo shown in black provided details of their own transaction costs for similarprojects.
Responses are summarised in table 6.2.2, shown as the actual figuresquoted. The two responses for actual projects were allocated to a case studyproject based on number of sites. Apart from one respondent, who reportedincurring external costs due to a lack of internal resources, all respondents haddelivered their projects using only in-house resources. The external costs forrespondent two were converted to a time-budget using an hourly rate, to allowlike for like comparison.
The significant difference between the data provided by respondent onewho had undertaken a target bid procurement process and the other respon-dents suggests that the choice of procurement route has a material effect oncosts for the client. This suggestion is supported by the responses providedin the interviews where respondent four described a significant quality controland monitoring role for the client including a ‘clerk of works’ role and regular
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Figure 6.2.4: Level of experience and type of procurement undertaken
Table 6.2.2: Client person-hours required
Project Total hours prior to installation Annual hours from installation startR1 R2 R3 R4 R1 R2 R3 R4A 2793 2775 1125 750B 2793 2775 1125 975C 1092 2833 2793 2775 178 1125 1350D 1092 2833 2793 2775 178 1125 1500E 3119 2775 1125 1800F 3119 2775 1125 1900
site inspections. The same level of detail was not available for respondent one;however, interview data for two target bid procurements collected during thepilot study showed a clear instruction from the framework managers to reducelevels of due diligence and instead rely on the guarantee. As a result, it seemsclear that it is necessary to treat the two types of procurement separately andthe decision was taken to exclude the data from the target bid project. The
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increased policing and enforcement costs in the partner bid are incurred in or-der to replace the controls imposed by bidders submitting prices in competitionand it is assumed that the two processes are equally successful in controllingrent-seeking behaviour by the ESCOs. While confirming this assumption wouldrequire the collection of an additional data set and is considered to be beyondthe scope of the current study, it is in-line with predictions from the transactioncost literature. In particular, Bajari and Tadelis [178] highlight that Fixed-Pricecontracts, where design work is largely complete prior to contract signature,create incentives for cost reduction on the part of the contractor. These areaccompanied by the risk that quality may be compromised as a result. InCost-Plus contracts, appointment of the contractor occurs at an earlier stageof design development and an agreed mechanism exists for the calculation ofcosts. Bajari and Tadelis note a preference for Cost-Plus contracts on morecomplex projects in which design is likely to be less fully developed due to agreater number of unknowns. However, the greater incentives for quality needto be balanced against the need for greater administration. Since the EPCprojects considered in this study are straight-forward from a technical perspec-tive and the buildings in which they are installed are also relatively simple, thissuggests that the additional administrative burden of a cost-plus arrangement,exemplified by the partner-bid arrangement is likely to be unwarranted.
Although the responses did not reflect a variation in person-hours based onthe scale of the project, this was at odds with the types of activities describedin the interviews where there was a focus on information gathering and liaisonwith schools prior to commencement of the procurement process, these areactivities which would scale with the number of sites. This disparity betweenthe two types of data collected was addressed by increasing the range for thequantitative data to reflect the qualitative discussion of work involved. For thepartner bid approach the median of the three responses was assumed to formthe upper bound for smallest projects (A & B) with the lower bound assumedto be 20% lower and a uniform distribution was used to reflect the level of
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Table 6.2.3: Partner bid adjusted hours
Project Total hours prior to installation Annual hours from installation startMin Max Median Min Max MedianProjectA 2,227 2,784 2,506 750 1,125 938ProjectB 2,227 2,784 2,506 750 1,125 938ProjectC 2,775 2,833 2,793 1,125 1,350 1,238ProjectD 2,775 2,833 2,793 1,125 1,350 1,238ProjectE 2,775 3,119 2,947 1,125 1,800 1,463ProjectF 2,775 3,119 2,947 1,125 1,800 1,463
uncertainty in this distribution. For the medium scale projects (C & D) thecollected data were used to represent the minimum, maximum and median valuesof a triangular distribution. For the largest projects (E & F) the collected datawere again used to represent the minimum, maximum and median values of atriangular distribution as shown in figure 6.2.3.These time-budgets were converted to costs by applying an hourly ratecalculated based on a 37 hour working week with 27 days holiday and 8national bank holidays [179] using the method set out in Messenger et al.[180]. The annual salary range was taken from Inner London Borough payscales [181]. The starting point salary was taken as point 37 and the uppersalary limit was taken as point 46. These were based on advertisements in May2017 on a specialist local government jobs website [182] for a Sustainabilityand Regeneration Officer and for a Team Leader - Business Development &Environmental Efficiency. The total cost of employment was calculated byadding employer’s national insurance contributions and pension contributionsto the Local Government Pension Scheme based on the University of Bathemployee “on cost" calculator[183]. Calculated costs are shown rounded to thenearest thousand pounds in line with the approach taken for ESCO transactioncosts.
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Table 6.2.4: Partner bid client transaction costs
Project Total hours prior to installation Annual hours from installation startMin Max Median Min Max MedianProjectA £53,000 £83,000 £67,000 £18,000 £34,000 £25,000ProjectB £53,000 £83,000 £67,000 £18,000 £34,000 £25,000ProjectC £67,000 £84,000 £75,000 £27,000 £40,000 £33,000ProjectD £67,000 £84,000 £75,000 £27,000 £40,000 £33,000ProjectE £67,000 £93,000 £79,000 £27,000 £54,000 £39,000ProjectF £67,000 £93,000 £79,000 £27,000 £54,000 £39,000
6.2.3 Defining the client organisation
Thus far in this study the “Client” has been treated as a homogeneous entity;however, the school system in England and Wales has a “quasi-market” organ-isation [184], comprising a range of different types of schools each with differinggovernance arrangements. As illustrated in figure 6.2.5, central state funding isallocated to either Local Government or to an Academy Trust. Academy Trustsmay be responsible for one or more schools (known as a Multi-Academy Trustsor MATs).
Figure 6.2.5: Structure of funding arrangements for schools in England and Wales
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The MAT model presents a homogeneous organisational structure, sincea key driver for the establishment of MATs is the streamlining of financialresponsibilities [185]. In contrast, while a local authority may be responsi-ble for a large number of schools in a local area, most funding is delegatedto the individual schools, with responsibility for allocation of funding restingwith each school’s governing body [185]. As a result, for local authority con-trolled schools, while the initial Client is the local authority who enters intothe framework agreement with the ESCO, individual schools would enter intothe installation agreements with the ESCO. The performance guarantee is con-tained within the framework agreement, meaning that payment for any shortfallswould be made to the local authority and then passed to the schools. Sincethe Education Act (2002)[186] prohibits local authority controlled schools fromborrowing money, additional finance above the interest-free funding availablethrough the government backed Salix programme [187] must be procured bythe local authority. Individual schools are generally responsible for payment oftheir own utility bills but generally use a buying consortium which means thatall schools in the consortium would pay the same rates. Figure 6.2.6 illustratesthe different responsibilities of different constituent parts of the client. A resultof this lack of homogeneity is that different risks are borne by different partsof the client and a single client outcome has the potential to mask effects atan individual level. This is particularly the case for any energy performancerisk not covered by the performance guarantee, since this would be borne bythe individual school. Some of this risk might eventually be borne by the localauthority if it cannot be absorbed within the school budget [188].
6.3 The impact of transaction costs on returns
The framing of decisions about energy performance contracting as a choicebetween continuation of existing arrangements (“in-house”), or installation ofretrofit measures as part of an energy service (“outsourced”) set out in Chapter3 leads to a broader definition of transaction costs than the data collection,
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Figure 6.2.6: Local Authority contracting arrangements
bidding and negotiation costs detailed in sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. In thisframing, in-house transaction costs are assumed to be zero since the existingarrangements involve only the payment of utility bills, administrative costs ofwhich are assumed to be negligible. Transaction costs for the out-sourcedoption consist of the total payment to the contractor plus the client’s internalcosts.The radial elementary effects approach to sensitivity analysis described insection 5.4 was applied to the stochastic DSCF model to explore the relativeeffects of the different input parameters to the DSCF model on returns for clientsand contractors. In this setting, the elementary effects estimator of equation5.1 is replaced by Jansen’s estimator for total effects [189]:
STi = 12N N∑j=1 (f (A)j − f (A(i)B )j )2 (6.1)where:N is the total number of estimates per parameterf (A)j is the model output for the j th input vectorf (A(i)B )j is the model output for the j th input vector which only the ith parameter
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differs from (A)jFigures 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 show the sensitivity of client and ESCO returnsto transaction costs and other project inputs for each of the 6 projects. Blueand green shading is used for transaction cost parameters and yellow tonesare used for production cost related parameters.
Figure 6.3.1: Sensitivity of client financial returns to input parameters
Figure 6.3.2: Sensitivity of ESCO financial returns to input parameters
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The results shown in figures 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 indicate that although trans-action costs are influential (particularly installation costs in the case of theClient and ESCO margin in the case of the ESCO) it is the overall level ofenergy savings that has the greatest impact on returns for both ESCO andClient.
6.4 Competitiveness of projects in practice
A request was made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 [190] for detailsof projects procured between 2012 and 2017 using the RE:FIT framework:
• date of mini-competition launch
• date of selection of preferred supplier
• date of contract signature
• format of competition (target or partner bid)
• capital investment
• annual carbon savings
• annual electricity savings (kWh)
• annual gas savings (kWh)
Anonymised data for 34 projects were received in response. Data forannual electricity and gas savings were not available. Combined energy savingdata were provided instead. Following discussions with the data provider, thenumber of bidders for each project was also included in the data set. Whilethe data set is not sufficiently large to allow rigorous statistical analysis, anexploratory analysis was undertaken which affords an insight into the data.Figure 6.4.1 suggests that there is no strong relationship between thenumber of bidders for a project and the overall capital investment.Although data for transaction costs on the individual projects were notavailable, data were available on the bid format. As discussed in section 6.2,
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Figure 6.4.1: Capital investment and number of bidders
while transaction costs for the successful bidder would be the same under bothmodels, the costs for the unsuccessful bidders are potentially quite different,with the partner bid approach requiring less information to be provided duringthe competitive process. Figure 6.4.2 shows a clear tendency for higher numbersof bidders for partner bid projects than target bid projects, even though thedata in figure 6.4.1 suggests partner bid projects typically have lower capitalinvestment values. Since lower capital value is likely to indicate lower technicalcomplexity, this suggests that the selection of the procurement route is basedon a desire to increase numbers of bidders for projects rather than on theneed for a mechanism which allows greater design development post selection.The additional administrative burden such a mechanism requires [178] is notreported in project data.
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Figure 6.4.2: Cumulative distribution of bidders for partner and target bids
6.5 Support for hypothesis one
Sorrell [22] hypothesised that “Energy service contracting is more (less) likelyto be used in situations where ...the market for energy service contracts is more(less) competitive” as a result of lower transaction costs in a competitive market.Since lower transaction costs mean lower costs overall it is clear that in a likefor like comparison, projects with lower transaction costs are more likely to besuccessful. However, data obtained from the Client interviews and the Freedomof Information data suggest a more complex picture in which reduced trans-action costs for the bidding ESCOs are achieved at the expense of increasedClient transaction costs. This is because it is not overall transaction costs thatare a determinant of competitiveness but rather the level of transaction costsat risk for unsuccessful bidders. Reducing the level of information requiredas part of the competition results in lower transaction costs for unsuccessfulbidders and thus increases competition. However, while bidders may find re-duced requirements for detailed information attractive, there is an importanttrade-off for clients who incur greater policing and enforcement costs to ensurethat out-turn production costs are appropriate. Since data on Clients’ in-housetransaction costs are very limited, this effect is potentially unmeasured.
Chapter 7
The Impact of Measurement Choicesin Determining Savings
7.1 Overview
The second research hypothesis set out in chapter 3 relates the success of anEPC project to the ease of measuring energy savings. A well defined frame-work exists for energy performance contracting projects, the International Per-formance Measurement and Verification Protocol (IPMVP) [79] which sets outdifferent options for measuring energy savings. Sorrell [23] postulated, as setout in hypothesis two, that the easier (cheaper) measurement and verification(M&V) of energy savings is, the more suitable a project is for an energy per-formance contract. This chapter explores the impact of M&V approaches onproject outcomes by considering the different approaches offered under IPMVPand the likely costs associated with each option. The different risk exposuresunder each option are discussed and the implications of the different M&Vstrategies are modelled for two different sets of energy conservation measuresand a global sensitivity analysis is undertaken to determine the impact of thechoice of strategy on financial returns for clients and contractors.
7.2 Approach to measuring savings
Wang et al. [63] note that measuring savings is a more nuanced process thanis often assumed and identify four types of savings: predicted, guaranteed,
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measured and actual. The distinctions are important, particularly for the finaltwo categories which are often conflated. As can be seen from table 7.2.1, thedifferent IPMVP measurement options involve different measurements whichwould result in different values.Table 7.2.1: Actual vs measured savings for each M&V option
M&VOption Description [66] Actual vs Measured Initialcost [78] Ongoingcost [78]A • Savings calculatedseparately for eachmeasure• measurementstaken for some vari-ables• deemed (assumed)values used for othervariables
• effects on otherbuilding systems are notincluded• accuracy depends oninfluence of deemed vari-ables and accuracy ofdeemed value• only change in mea-sured variable is in-cluded
0.5 - 3 % 0.1 - 0.5%
B • savings calculatedseparately for eachitem• take measurementsof all variables
• effects on otherbuilding systems are notincluded• measurements mayencompass other effectseg. changes in pat-terns of use as well aschanges due to ECM
2 - 8% 0.5 - 3%
C • determine savingsusing utility bills • measurements mayencompass other effectseg. changes in pat-terns of use as well aschanges due to ECM
0.5 - 3% 0.5 - 3%
D • determine savingsusing a calibrated com-puter model
• accuracy depends onmodel assumptions• highly indeterminatemodels will have manyplausible calibrated set-tings and impact of ECMmay depend on which isselected [159]
2 - 8% 0.5 - 3%
Shonder and Avina [66] note that while using Option C allowed ESCOs topresent savings in the way that made most sense to their clients it also exposedthe ESCO to the risk of changes in the client’s patterns of consumption overtime. As a result, they report ESCO preferences shifting towards option A and
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D approaches to mitigate this risk. Shonder and Avina raise the concern thatin trying to reduce their risk, ESCO have “reduced the quality and appeal of... performance contracting.” Stetz et al. [191] expressed a similar concern“Since the purpose of M&V is to provide assurance that project savings exist,.improper and excessive reliance on stipulations may effectively nullify savingsguarantees."
7.3 ESCO approaches to M&V
As part of the interview process described in section 6.2 ESCOs were askedabout their preferred M&V approach. In total 11 ESCO interviews were un-dertaken, 2 ESCOs declined to provide cost data and provided only generalstatements in relation to their preferred approaches to measurement and veri-fication of savings for the case study projects. Appendix G contains transcribedexcerpts of the parts of each interview which were coded at the M&V node.
All ESCO interviewees indicated that choice of M&V strategy would bedictated by the range of ECMs installed rather than by the number of sites.However, two ESCOs also highlighted client requirements as a deciding factor.This was accompanied by concerns that client monitoring requirements mightentail additional cost which would reduce the available budget for interventions.The level of existing metering was also identified as a contributing factor indecisions about M&V methodologies.
Although ESCO responses agree with Shonder and Avina’s [66] contentionthat option A is preferred, only 4 of the interviewees explicitly addressed therisk of exposure to changes in client patterns of use as a driver for this po-sition. Respondents were more likely to frame the choice of M&V strategyas a decision about a balance between cost of monitoring and level of detail,suggesting a decision between options A and B since, as indicated in table7.2.1, costs would be expected to be similar for options A and C. Figure 7.3.1shows the response for each item. In discussing the ECM groupings presentedESCOs identified that decisions about M&V would be based on the category
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of ECM and categorised each ECM as either lighting or heating related. Forconsistency these categories are used in figure 7.3.1.
Figure 7.3.1: ESCO preferences for M&V approaches
Option D is primarily used for new construction where no baseline infor-mation is available and back-casting is required to create a notional baselinebuilding without the relevant energy conservation measures in order that theimpact of the measures can be assessed. Since the current study concernsretrofit of existing buildings rather than new construction it was anticipatedthat this option would be unlikely to be selected by ESCOs. This was borneout by the interview responses in which no respondents identified option D asa proposed approach.IPMVP [79] defines interactive effects as “Any energy effects occurringbeyond the notional measurement boundary” and advises parties “[f ]ind a wayto estimate the magnitude of these interactive effects in order to determinesavings. Alternatively they may be ignored as long as the M&V Plan includesdiscussion of each effect and its likely magnitude.” Interviewees were askedhow they would deal with interactive effects if using an option A or B approach.Three of the responses could not be clearly coded, three interviewees indicatedthat interactive effects would be explicitly calculated and three stated that theywould not be addressed.
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The impact of different measurement boundaries was tested for the twoarchetype buildings by using the reduced-parameter energy model describedin section 5.2.3 to model the energy consumption before and after retrofit. Vari-able parameters were kept constant between the pre and post retrofit modelsunless they were affected by the set of ECMs applied, resulting in pairs of preand post retrofit models. This approach means that the distribution of energysavings that result is due to the uncertainties in patterns of use underlyingthe baseline energy consumption and not due to changes in patterns of usebetween the pre and post retrofit models. Details of the ECMs included ineach set can be found in section 5.2.2. Changes in patterns of behaviour dueto ECM installation were incorporated where the nature of the ECM made thisinevitable, for example, changes to lighting and heating schedules followinginstallation of new controls.
7.4.1 Electricity savings
Electricity savings were calculated in three ways, as set out in table 5.2.2. Theresulting energy savings, given by the difference between a pair of pre andpost retrofit runs are shown in figure 7.4.1 for the first set of ECMs, plottedagainst the baseline lighting hours. In the naturally ventilated primary schoolarchetype, the lighting energy saving and the whole facility electricity savingare almost identical (in figure 7.4.1 this means primary school lighting energymaps directly on to, and covers primary school whole facility lighting energy).Reducing lighting energy affects the heating system which must compensatefor reduced waste heat in the building, the resulting increase in electricalpower consumption for pumps etc in the heating system accounts for the smalldifference between the two figures. A correlation between baseline lightinghours and energy savings can be seen (R2 = 0.33).The secondary school archetype is partially mechanically ventilated,meaning that in addition to the impact on the heating system which is called onto replace waste heat during the heating periods, there is a synergistic impact
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on the cooling systems as the need to off-set waste heat during cooling periodsis significantly reduced. This results in higher savings measured at the wholefacility level than at the lighting circuit level. As a result the correlation be-tween baseline lighting hours and lighting energy savings is higher (R2 = 0.65)than that for the whole facility electricity savings (R2 = 0.50).
Figure 7.4.1: Primary and Secondary school electricity savings - ECM set 1
Similar results can be observed for the second set of ECMs in figure 7.4.2with R2 = 0.37 for the primary school and R2 = 0.51 and R2 = 0.61 for sec-ondary school whole facility electricity consumption and lighting energy re-spectively.
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Figure 7.4.2: Primary and Secondary school electricity savings - ECM set 2
Plotting the cumulative distribution of electricity savings for the twoarchetypes under the same two sets of ECMs as shown in figure 7.4.3 illustratesthe near-perfect agreement between lighting energy and whole building elec-tricity savings for the primary school. There is a systematic difference betweenthe two measurements in the secondary school model due to the existing ofcooling equipment in some areas which experiences a synergistic reduction inconsumption when waste heat in the building is reduced. The contrast betweenthe single deterministic value and the broad spread of values derived from thewhole building or lighting energy outputs is stark.
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(a) Primary school - ECM set 1
(b) Primary school - ECM set 2
(c) Secondary school - ECM set 1
(d) Secondary school - ECM set 2
Figure 7.4.3: Cumulative distributions of electricity savings
7.4. Measured savings for different M&V options 1487.4.2 Gas savingsThe calculation approach for electricity savings was applied to calculating gassavings. However, in contrast with measuring electricity savings, the measure-ment of gas savings associated with a particular ECM is significantly morechallenging due to the interactions of a wide range of heat loss mechanisms.For some ECMs, no measurement is thought to be possible and a purely deemedapproach was suggested under option A. For the purposes of comparison, a op-tion B approach was investigated by installing heat meters to measure boileroutput. Although heat meters are commonly used in biomass fuel heating sys-tems they are not commonly used in other types of heating system.The distributions of gas savings for the first ECM set are shown in figure7.4.4, since the ECMs installed do not affect the hours of heating, these areheld constant in all the model evaluations. Gas savings are plotted againstbaseline lighting hours instead.
Figure 7.4.4: Primary and Secondary school electricity savings - ECM set 1
In order to derive the input energy savings from the metered heat outputused to test option B in the second set of ECMs it is necessary to adjustthe output to take account of the boiler efficiency. This is done using theassumed boiler efficiency pre and post retrofit. Although these figures are bothimprecise, they would not result in the systematic gap between whole facility
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gas consumption and the heat meter output shown in figure 7.4.5, instead thisgap is due to the overestimation of boiler efficiency which results if the actualpart load operating profile is not taken into account. In order to correct for thisit would be necessary to measure the part-load ratio of each boiler at eachtime-step. Since the heating hours are affected by the ECMs in the second setthey are treated as a variable parameter and gas consumption is shown plottedagainst baseline heating hours in figure 7.4.5.
Figure 7.4.5: Primary and Secondary school gas savings - ECM set 2
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(a) Primary school - ECM set 1
(b) Primary school - ECM set 2
(c) Secondary school - ECM set 1
(d) Secondary school - ECM set 2
Figure 7.4.6: Cumulative distributions of gas savings
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Table 7.4.1 shows the savings which result using each measurement optionfor the two building archetypes and sets of ECMs. It can be seen in all casesthat there is relatively close agreement between the mean savings calculatedusing options B & C and the option A deemed value for electricity savings. Thestandard deviations are small compared with the mean values suggesting thatthe choice of M&V option may not make a significant difference to outcomes.In contrast, gas savings are significantly more volatile, particularly for the firstECM set, which includes only one intended measure, heating controls, but isalso affected by the interaction with the lighting upgrade measure. Savings forthe second ECM set are still much more volatile than electricity savings but thelarger set of measures results in a portfolio effect with a smaller distribution ofsavings than the first set.
In each of the cases presented in table 7.4.1, the value of savings “mea-sured" using IPMVP option A is identical to the level of predicted savings. Thisis because the measurement is limited to a test of the “potential to perform”[191], in other words, the test is met if the correctly specified ECM is installed,but its performance in operation is not measured. While it can be argued thatthe measured savings for option B and C are slightly higher for electricitythan the option A savings and thus that option A represents a reasonable ap-proximation of the mean, the more important issue is that under this approachthe performance of the ECM is not actually guaranteed, only its specification.This is significant since similar protection is likely to exist under the terms ofan underlying installation contract and the additional contractual layer thatthe performance guarantee represents is likely to increase costs in two ways:firstly, directly by increasing negotiating costs. Secondly, this procurementmodel effectively restricts the market of available suppliers to those with suffi-cient covenant strength to provide a performance guarantee, even if there are,in practice, no additional risks under the guarantee.
In the preceding discussion, the whole facility change in energy consump-tion has been treated as synonymous with the actual savings as a result of the
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Table 7.4.1: Savings values for each M&V option
Case Predictedsavings Mean measured savings (std. dev)Option A Option B Option C
Prima
rysc
hool ECM1Electricity 42.46% 42.46% 44.96%(5.16%) 45.15%(4.96%)ECM1Gas 8.6% 8.6% n/a 4.23%(39.91%)ECM2Electricity 42.38% 42.38% 44.90%(5.10%) 44.88%(5.10%)ECM2Gas 28.82% 28.82% 17.97%(23.83%) 38.04%(23.88%)
Seco
ndary
schoo
l ECM1Electricity 37.72% 37.72% 29.87%(4.15%) 35.76%(4.23%)ECM1Gas 8.70% 8.70% n/a 3.76%(31.52%)ECM2Electricity 37.85% 37.85% 31.62%(4.17%) 37.33%(4.31%)ECM2Gas 27.79% 27.79% 20.30%(19.61%) 39.13%(19.87%)
installation of the ECMs. In practice, as highlighted by Shonder and Avina[66] the change in whole facility energy consumption will encompass a range offactors which are unrelated to the installed ECMs. Wang et al. [192] demon-strated that while variations in weather resulted in changes of between 4 and6% in energy consumption in a commercial office building in a range of UScities, the variation in energy consumption due to occupancy patterns and be-haviours was much greater, with poor practice exemplars consuming more thandouble that of best practice modes of operation.
The sensitivity analysis of the energy models reported in section 5.4.3 wasrevisited to consider how much influence different categories of building param-eter have on the building energy consumption. In contrast with the analysisof section 5.4.3, where the aim was to identify the most influential parameters,the aim here is to calculate the proportion of uncertainty due to different cate-gories of input. The input parameters were assigned to 8 categories (equipment,fabric, geometry, occupancy, operation, systems, weather, model) and Jansen’sestimator for STi calculated for each category as described in section 6.1. The
7.4. Measured savings for different M&V options 153
resulting category sensitivities are shown in figure 7.4.7 which illustrates thecategories of input which make the largest contributions to uncertainty in theelectricity and gas consumption of the primary and secondary schools respec-tively. Operational parameters eg. boiler hours of operation and lighting hoursare the most influential category for all outputs except electricity consumptionin the primary school where they are the second most important category af-ter building systems. These results are consistent with those from Wang etal. [192]. A consequence of this is that use of an Option C M&V approachexposes the ESCO to significant fluctuations in energy consumption caused bychanging patterns of use. Where these patterns are within the ESCO’s controland can be monitored (e.g. installation of occupancy sensing to control lightingoperation, or introduction of a Building Management System) this may be ap-propriate risk transfer if adequate monitoring data is available pre-interventionto identify usage patterns. Where usage patterns pre-intervention are uncer-tain, this risk remains significant. This result mirrors those of Ginestet andMarchio [81] who note that “planned orders have to be respected in order tomake [option A] usable.”
Figure 7.4.7: Sensitivity of energy models to different categories of inputs
Shonder and Avina’s [66] characterisation of Option C as exposing theESCO to the risk of change patterns of use reflects a broader simplification
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of IPMVP [79] commonly used within the industry, implying that option C isbased on whole facility energy meters alone. As Kumar et al. [193] highlight,“estimated versus actual energy savings information will only be useful if theactual energy savings numbers are verified based on the measurement of thoseperformance and operational parameters that are highly variable in nature.”Despite the view of some ESCOs expressed in interviews that an IPMVP optionB approach would offer protection, the same qualification is true of most retrofitisolation measures as well. In the examples modelled here, the isolation of theparticular ECM (for example, lighting circuit) made no difference to the exposureof the ESCO to the risk of changes in patterns of use and occupation, the closematch between the cumulative distributions for the two different sets of savingsshown in figure 7.4.3 is a demonstration of this.
7.5 Sensitivity of project outcomes to M&V optionchoice
The sensitivity analysis runs presented in section 6.3 allow the contribution ofthe input parameters variance to the output variance to be considered. M&Voption was treated as a discrete variable and samples generated using Sobol’sequences as detailed in section 5.4.2, samples were transformed to the inputspace by banding (0≤ x < 0.33,0.33≤ x < 0.66,0.66≤ x ≤ 1). The impact ofM&V choice can then be evaluated across the full input space. Figure 6.3.2(reproduced here as figure 7.5.1 for ease of reference) shows that the choiceof M&V option is second only to the level of energy savings in significance forthe ESCO. Figure 6.3.1 (reproduced here as figure 7.5.2 for ease of reference)shows that although the choice of M&V option is less influential for clientreturns than for ESCO returns, it is one of the top 4 factors for each project. Asmight be expected, the relative influence of M&V option is closely related tothe volatility of energy savings, the more volatile the energy savings, the mostsignificant the choice of option.
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Figure 7.5.1: Sensitivity of ESCO returns to variance in input parameters
Figure 7.5.2: Sensitivity of Client returns to variance in input parameters
7.6 Support for hypothesis 2
Sorrell’s [23] hypothesis that projects for which it is easiest to measure energysavings are most suited to out-sourcing through an energy performance con-tract prompted an exploration of the impacts of measurement and verificationstrategy on returns for Clients and ESCOs. However, the interview results
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presented in section 7.3 suggest that the ease or difficulty of measurement isrelated to the type of ECMs involved, making it unlikely that measurementease (or difficulty) will be the determining factor in the success or failure of aproject. A more detailed analysis of M&V approaches supports this. The re-sults presented in this chapter suggest that ESCO monitoring and verificationstrategy preferences are largely driven by a desire to minimise risk exposure.This is a valid concern for ESCOs for two key reasons:
• ESCO returns are very sensitive to the choice of M&V strategy
• Gas savings are highly sensitive to operational factors which are likelyto be beyond the control of the ESCO.
For clients, the choice of strategy has a smaller effect on overall projectreturns, this is largely due to the fact that even on an under-performing project,the client will be receiving some savings. Nonetheless, the sensitivity analysisresults indicate clear value for the client in transferring risk to the ESCO.For most projects with a fixed budget, there is a choice to be made betweeninvesting in additional monitoring and investing in additional energy savings,this means additional monitoring is likely to be unattractive for both clientsand ESCOs. In addition, for additional monitoring to provide benefit, highlyvariable performance and operational parameters affecting savings must also bemeasured, more finely grained sub-metering alone will not provide this detail.While building management systems are capable of providing much of the detailrequired in the examples modelled here, an equivalent level of detail is alsorequired for the baseline period.
Chapter 8
The Impact of Project Scale andScope
8.1 Overview
Chapter 3 identified two further dimensions of Energy Performance Contractingprojects which were expected to impact on the success of projects, in additionto transaction costs (discussed in chapter 6) and the ease of measuring savings(discussed in chapter chapter 7): their scale and scope. Sorrell [23] contrastedan ESCO for whom the provision of energy services is a core business under-taken for multiple clients and a client for whom energy services represent onlya small part of business activities. Based on this, he identified three prin-ciple reasons why an ESCO would be able to deliver economies of scale incomparison with a single client.
• a greater ability to employ specialist resources by spreading the costsacross a range of projects
• access to volume discounts through bulk purchasing
• standardisation and cost comparison between projects.
As a result, he proposed that the greater the scope of a project (the greater therange of energy services included in it) the more likely it was to be viable. Healso proposed that the larger the overall savings the more likely a project would
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be to be viable. These hypotheses were echoed by the ESCO interviewees,several of whom spoke of two principle features of an attractive project: thatit should either be a single site with very high energy consumption or a largenumber of very similar sites in which identical ECMs could be installed.This chapter extends the evaluation of the hypothetical cases to explorethe impact that project scale and scope have on financial returns for clients andcontractors.
8.2 Evidence for the impact of project scale andscope
Sorrell [22] suggested that a lower value threshold would exist below whichtransaction costs would out-weigh potential savings. In later work, Noldenand Sorrell reported interviewees reporting a minimum annual utility spend of£500,000 [19] although they note that smaller companies might have a lowerthreshold for contract size. Pätäri et al. [83] found similar concerns amongstFinnish market participants regarding the scale of projects but suggested thatthese could be overcome by bundling smaller projects.A number of the ESCOs interviewed commented on the minimum scale ofproject they thought necessary for viability, only one of these provided a valuefor the threshold (£1 million of installation costs). All ESCOs were asked onlyto provide transaction cost data for the case study projects that they wouldconsider bidding for. The ESCO providing the threshold value indicated thatthey would not be prepared to bid for any of the projects. Although two otherESCOs also declined to provide cost data, they gave their reasons for doing soas concerns about commercial confidentiality. A second ESCO indicated thatthey would only bid for the two largest projects. These results match thoseof Nolden and Sorrell [19] and suggest that while there may be a minimumthreshold, it is a subjective assessment for the individual ESCO.The scale of projects is considered using different measures - Nolden andSorrell [19] suggest a minimum threshold based on total baseline utility bills,
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Goldman et al. [28] reported that the average project size was £150 -200MJ/m2/annum (indexed and converted to pounds sterling) and one of the ES-COs described a limit based on installation costs. It should be noted that bynormalising energy savings with respect to floor area, Goldman et al.’s [28]measure is more accurately characterised as a measure of project scope sinceit measures the energy savings intensity rather than the size of the project.
8.3 Formulation of case study projects
Six case study projects were defined, based on the two underlying projectarchetypes, to allow pairwise comparison of project scale and scope. Threeseparate project scales were defined to cover the bulk of the range identifiedabove and two separate scopes were defined, ECM sets 1 (lighting upgradeand heating controls) and 2 (lighting upgrade, heating controls, draught strip-ping, plant room insulation, boiler upgrade). As discussed in section 5.2.2,the validity of the scopes was verified with reference to RE:FIT project dataand triangulated in client and ESCO interviews. Table 8.3.1 shows the projectdetails according to the metrics identified above.
Table 8.3.1: Case study projects by measures of scale
Project Baseline Utility bill(£) Annual en-ergy savings (MJ/m2/annum)
Installation costs (£)
A 126,000 91 204,000B 126,000 137 325,000C 395,000 102 608,000D 395,000 294 964,000E 791,000 10 1,216,000F 791,000 29 1,928,000
Comparison with the metrics identified in section 8.2 suggests that ProjectsA and B can be categorised as small in scale(below installation cost and utilitybill thresholds) and E and F are large in scale (above the installation cost andutility bill thresholds identified), with projects C and D sitting closer to thethresholds.
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Using Goldman et al.’s [28] energy savings intensity measure, projects A,C and E can be categorised as small in scope (falling below the lower end ofthe proposed range) and D and F as large (in excess of the upper end of therange). Project B is less clearly categorised since it is based only on the lessintensively serviced primary school archetype and although clearly greater inscope than project A it is below the lower end of Goldman et al.’s range. Forthe purposes of this study it is included in the classification of larger scopeprojects.
8.4 Balance of transaction and production costs
Sorrell’s [23] hypothesis of increasing project viability with scale was based onan assumption of increasing returns to scale. Interview responses from Clientsand Contractors suggest that this may not be the case as the cost of developingbaseline information is the most significant element of procurement costs andthis was expected to scale with both the number of sites and the number ofECMs. Comparing the ratio of transaction costs to production costs for Clientand ESCO for each project as shown in figure 8.4.1, suggests mixed results.For ECM set 1 this effect is small for the ESCO but for the clients the effect ofa change in scale from small to medium is much greater. For ECM set 2, bothclient and ESCO show a large shift for a change in scale from small to mediumbut little change for a shift to medium to large.
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Figure 8.4.1: Ratio of transaction costs to production costs
8.5 Calculating financial returns
Ye and Tiong [116] categorised the wide range of methods that exist for evalu-ating the financial impacts of investment as:
• Methods based on return e.g. payback, rates of return, Net Present Value(NPV)
• Methods based on risk e.g. credit agency rating systems
• Methods based on risk and return e.g. Capital Asset Pricing Model, meanvariance, utility theory, cumulative distribution theory.
The NPV-at-risk method was proposed, which has the advantage of takinginto account both financing risks and project-specific uncertainties, as wellconsidering the time value of money and establishing clear decision criteria.The distribution of NPVs over the range of project uncertainties is calculatedusing the weighted average cost of capital to determine the discount rate.Project risk can be measured by the proportion of the distribution which doesnot meet this threshold. Ye and Tiong [116] demonstrated the benefits of theirNPV-at-risk method with a case study. Their approach was selected as the
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most appropriate method for this study since it allows stochastic uncertaintiesto be accommodated, thus combining a consideration of sectorial risks throughthe choice of discount rate and project specific uncertainties through stochasticvariation. Another key attraction of the approach is that the NPV approach isthe primary criterion by which government action can be justified [104]. As anextension of the classical NPV approach, the NPV-at-risk method should beeasily understood by stakeholders familiar with the classical NPV approach.Although the NPV-at-risk approach overcomes a key limitation of the NPVapproach with a transparent approach to assessing risk, it remains subject tothe criticism that it “makes the false assumption that the investment is eitherreversible or that it cannot be delayed” [194]. In this study, the underlyingassumption is that there is a significant opportunity cost to foregoing con-sumption and consequently the lost option value is zero. This is considered avalid assumption for small public sector projects, competing for scarce funding.The NPV-at-risk method also makes two critical assumptions: the discountrate (discussed in section 4.7.2) and project term. Project term is particularlysignificant for this study since clients will continue to benefit from energysavings beyond the project guarantee period. As a result Ye and Tiong’s methodis extended to show the impact of the project term over which the NPV isevaluated, this is consistent with government guidance which suggests thatcosts and benefits should be evaluated over the useful life of the assets [104].In contrast to the Client, the ESCO’s involvement in the project ends at theexpiry of the guarantee period, as there are no cash-flows to or from the ESCOfollowing end of the guarantee period, the term over which the project is evalu-ated has no impact provided it includes the full guarantee period. Accordingly,ESCO returns are evaluated over a single project term - 9 years.
8.6 ESCO risk and reward
The resulting NPV distributions and risk levels are shown in figure 8.6.1 andsummarised in table 8.6.1. In each case, the at-risk threshold was taken to be
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an NPV of zero based on equations (3.4) and (3.5) which define the minimumthreshold for a project to be viability as a net zero income for both client andESCO.
(a) ECM set 1
(b) ECM set 2
Figure 8.6.1: Distribution of ESCO returns for the two ECM sets
The results shown in table 8.6.1 highlight the relatively high risk levelsfor the projects in comparison with the decision threshold of 5% proposed by Yeand Tiong [116]. This should not be taken as suggesting that the projects would
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Table 8.6.1: Proportion of NPV at risk for ESCO in each project
Project ECM set NPV-at-risk:ESCO (9 years) Coefficient ofVariance Mean return (£)A 1 32.35% 24.99 1,000C 1 41.05% 13.40 7,000E 1 47.05% 17.42 -9,000B 2 19.50% 1.25 23,000D 2 32.35% 3.41 30,000F 2 32.35% 2.46 74,000
automatically be rejected since this value appears to have been selected basedon its similarity to the 95% confidence interval rather than on any empiricalevidence of decision thresholds in practice. In addition, Ye and Tiong’s [116]case study is of a single very large power station project where a projectfailure could have a very significant impact on the contractor’s balance sheet.For much smaller projects, ESCOs would be expected to take a less risk averseapproach since the ability to enter into multiple different projects with differentrisk profiles would allow risks to be balanced across a portfolio of projects.Nonetheless, even with a significantly relaxed threshold of 20%, only project Bwould meet the decision criterion for ESCO investment.It is also clear from figure 8.6.1 that for both ECM sets, the ESCO risk ofa negative return is increased with increasing project scale. However, this ispotentially counter-balanced by the greater spread of results as project scaleincreases meaning that larger positive returns are also possible.Mills et al. [35] propose using the coefficient of variance (standard devia-tion of a set of results divided by the mean) to compare uncertainties of returnsfrom different investments. This highlights the difference between the two setsof ECMs with the two-ECM set (set 1) being relatively unattractive due tohigh volatility and low returns; in contrast the volatility of the largest set ofECMs (ECM set 2) is an order of magnitude lower and returns are significantlyhigher.Increasing scope and increasing scale would both be expected to reduceproject volatility [35] due to the portfolio effect since the energy savings for
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individual buildings and ECMs are assumed to be independent and uncorre-lated. It is clear from 8.6.2 that the portfolio effects of increasing project scaleare not sufficient to offset the lack of diversity within the ECM set and that thebalance of risk and reward for the ESCO is much improved by increasing thenumber of ECMs considered. Both ESCO and Client results are very strongly
Figure 8.6.2: ESCO risk vs reward
influenced by energy savings. However, for ESCOs, this is an asymmetric risk,since they do not benefit from excess savings but only suffer penalties if thesavings are below the threshold. Since the impact of the uncertainty in energysavings is greater than the impact of the uncertainty in transaction costs asshown previously in figure 6.3.2, increasing project scale increases the energysavings and thus the potential for a negative return.The hypothetical project approach used in this study may have some influ-ence on these conclusions. In practice, real school estates might be expectedto be more diverse than the hypothetical project groupings explored in thisstudy meaning that the results here may under-estimate the spread of actualresults. However, since this study is constrained to explore aleatory and epis-temic uncertainties associated with the ECMs applied and not failures or errorsin installation, the effects of a group of installation measures installed at thesame time, by the same contractor are effectively already accounted for in the
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framing of the study.
8.6.1 Client risk and rewardAs noted previously, the impacts for clients are strongly influenced by theproject term over which the NPV is evaluated, increasing term reduces risks.The risk of an unviable project is highest for the smallest scale projects andthe smallest scope, with returns increasing as either project scale or scopeincreases. However, while the volatility of returns is lower than for the ESCOs,the pattern across the projects is less clear with the medium scale projects (Cand D) having the highest coefficients of variance.
Table 8.6.2: Proportion of NPV at risk for Client in each project
Project ECM set NPV-at-risk 9 yrs(15 yrs) Coefficient of Vari-ance 9 yrs (15 yrs) Mean return (£) 9yrs (15 yrs)A 1 73.20% (19.50%) 1.80 (1.23) -50,000 (116,000)C 1 58.75% (7.70%) 8.46 (0.78) -27,000 (459,000)E 1 43.65% (1.45%) 4.87 (0.52) 77,000 (1,049,000)B 2 62.30% (9.30%) 3.42 (0.80) -33,000 (219,000)D 2 45.75% (1.15%) 5.37 (0.55) 58,000 (827,000)F 2 40.15% (0.10%) 2.80 (0.47) 205,000(1,764,000)
In contrast with ESCO results, increasing project scale and scope havesimilar impacts on reducing risks and increasing returns.
8.7 Changing risk allocation
The risk of an viable project for is likely to be unacceptably high for the ESCObased on the results in 8.6.1, where only project B appears to achieve even a20% threshold. This makes it necessary to explore the impact of transferringrisk from client to ESCO to determine if a more balanced risk profile canbe achieved. The sensitivity analysis results presented previously in 6.3.2suggest that the ESCO results are sensitive to M&V approach. TransferringM&V option risk means fixing option A as the chosen M&V option. In effectthis choice places all energy savings risks with the client since as detailed insection 7.4.2 “measured” savings will be identical to guaranteed savings using
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(a) ECM set 1
(b) ECM set 2
Figure 8.6.3: Distribution of Client returns for the two ECM sets
this approach. Tables 8.7.1 and 8.7.2 repeat the analysis of tables 8.6.1 and8.6.2 with the M&V option fixed at Option A.
8.7.1 Effect of changing risk allocation on ESCO returns
The effect on ESCO returns is dramatic as can be seen in figure 8.7.1 and sum-marised in table 8.7.1 below. Fixing the M&V option transfers all energy sav-
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(a) ECM set 1 with Option A M&V
(b) ECM set 2 with Option A M&V
Figure 8.7.1: ESCO returns with M&V fixed at Option A
ings risk to the client ensuring that ESCO returns are always positive. Projectvolatility (measured by coefficient of variance) is also significantly reduced andclear division between the two project scopes is no longer seen.
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Table 8.7.1: Impact of fixing M&V option on ESCO returns
Project ECM set NPV-at-risk:ESCO (9 years) Coefficient of Vari-ance Mean return (£)A 1 0 0.30 27,000C 1 0 0.28 85,000E 1 0 0.24 146,000B 2 0 0.32 43,000D 2 0 0.26 117,000F 2 0 0.26 246,000
8.7.2 Effect of changing risk allocation on Client returns
Transferring all energy savings risk to the Client would be expected to have anegative impact on Client returns. Figure 8.7.2 demonstrates this with meanreturns for all projects being negative over 9 years. Project volatilities arebroadly similar, the exception is for Project F which has a dramatically in-creased coefficient of variance, however, this results from a mean return whichis relatively close to zero rather than from an intrinsic increase in volatility.However, for all projects, the position improves significantly when the evalua-tion period is extended. Viewed over the longer evaluation period, the increasein risk for the client and reduction in returns may be considered acceptablesince a project will only be viable if both parties expect to at least break even.For the first ECM set, however, this conclusion is less likely with a mean for-gone return of between 15% and 20%. For the second ECM set, this conclusionis perhaps more palatable with a mean forgone return of between 8% and 11%.
Table 8.7.2: Client returns with fixed M&V Option
Project ECM set NPV-at-risk 9 yrs(15 yrs) Coefficient of Vari-ance 9 yrs (15 yrs) Mean return (£) 9yrs (15 yrs)A 1 80.60% (27.80%) 1.26 ( 1.61) -75,000 (93,000)C 1 71.20% (13.70%) 2.06 (0.96) -114,000 (375,000)E 1 61.00% (3.10%) 5.52 (0.61) -37,000 (893,000)B 2 68.85% (11.35%) 2.34 (0.90) -52,000 (200,000)D 2 57.30% (3.75%) 8.63(6.44) -114,000 (744,000)F 2 52.30% (0.70%) 43.65 (0.52) 13,000(1,571,000)
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(a) ECM set 1 with Option A M&V
(b) ECM set 2 with Option A M&V
Figure 8.7.2: Distribution of Client returns with M&V fixed at Option A
Table 8.7.3: Impact of fixing M&V option on Client returns
Project ECM set ∆ NPV-at-risk ∆ CV ∆ Mean return9 yrs (15 yrs) 9 yrs (15 yrs) 9 yrs (15 yrs)A 1 7.40% (8.30%) -0.54 ( 0.38) -50.46%(-19.23%)C 1 12.45% (6.00%) -6.39 (0.18) -321.15% (-18.37%)E 1 17.35% (1.65%) 0.65 (0.09) -189.51%(-14.81%)B 2 6.55% (2.05%) -1.07 (0.09) -59.05%(-8.54%)D 2 11.55% (2.60%) 3.26 (0.09) -163.87%(-10.08%)F 2 12.15% (0.60%) 40.85 (0.05) -93.83%(-10.98%)
8.8. Support for hypotheses three and four 1718.7.3 Comparison with traditional procurement approaches
The existence of an intermediate procurement option was noted in section 3.4.In this scenario, the client undertakes a traditional procurement exercise forthe installation of the ECMs. Since no performance guarantee is required, theset of potential installers is larger and alternative procurement frameworks canbe used. ECMs might also be procured individually rather than aggregatedinto a single project as in the EPC option. As a result, transaction costsfor contractors and clients have the potential to be very different to thosewhich result from an EPC procurement, making a direct comparison impossiblewithout the collection of considerable additional data. Although unknown, sincethe pool of contractors is larger, the financial risk to the contractor the sameor smaller and the procurement process need only test the works element ofthe project, transaction costs would be expected to be lower for a traditionalprocurement than for an EPC approach and thus a transaction cost premium ispaid for an EPC procurement.
It follows that for an EPC approach to be worthwhile, the likely expectedbenefit of the performance guarantee must be greater than the EPC transactioncost premium. The results presented in table 8.7.3 which highlight the financialreturn forgone if the performance guarantee is removed provide this detail. Thedifference in mean return being the benefit derived from the EPC and settingan upper limit for the transaction cost premium paid for the EPC route.
8.8 Support for hypotheses three and four
Chapter 3 drew on Sorrell’s [23] earlier work to establish the hypotheses thatprojects with a larger scope of energy savings would be more likely to be viablethan those with a smaller scope (hypothesis three), and that large projectswould be more likely to be viable than small (hypothesis four). The resultsin this chapter built on the results of the previous two chapters to test thesehypotheses.
8.8. Support for hypotheses three and four 1728.8.1 Impact of project scope
According to Sorrell [23], increased project scope means greater energy savingsand consequently, greater returns. This effect is borne out by these results withthe pairs of projects at each scale option showing greater returns for the largerECM set (set 2). While the portfolio effect is typically considered at a projectlevel [35], it also applies at the level of an individual site where the inclusionof a larger number of ECMs allows for balancing of surpluses and shortfalls inenergy savings achieved by individual ECMs. As a result, project volatility islower for the larger ECM set at scale option.
8.8.2 Impact of project scale
Sorrell hypothesised that ESCOs would bring benefits of economies of scale toproject and that this would be more pronounced for larger scale projects. Thedata collected for this project suggests that this effect is not great. Interviewresults suggest that survey costs are a significant element of transaction costsand the ratios of transaction costs to production costs are broadly consistentacross the projects studied.A more significant driver for the impact of project scale comes from theportfolio effect [35], in this study it is assumed that the results for each ECM oneach site are independent and uncorrelated. Consequently, increasing projectscale results in increasing diversity and reduced volatility as ECMs and projectswith lower returns are balanced out by those with higher returns. In practice,there may be some correlation between the results of the same ECMs, installedby the same ESCO on different buildings. This would mean a reduced benefitfrom increasing project scale as it would not increase diversity to the sameextent. While the results for Client returns provide support for hypothesis four,those for the ESCO do not: for both project scopes, increasing project scaleresults in increasing risk of an unviable project. This is due to the asymmetry ofthe energy risk sharing mechanism in the RE:FIT contract studied here coupledwith the complexity of the governance arrangements. ESCO returns are onlynegatively impacted by energy savings as there is no sharing of excess savings
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and surplus savings on one site cannot be used to off-set those on another. This,coupled with the dominant effect of energy savings on ESCO returns, meansthat as project scale increases, so do energy savings and consequently so doesthe probability of savings shortfalls. It seems likely that a symmetric sharingmechanism would remove this effect but further work would be necessary toexplore this.The risk balancing effects of increasing project scope are greater than thoseof project scale in the projects investigated here. For Clients and especiallyfor ESCOs, increasing project scope is more likely to result in a viable projectthan increasing project scale.
8.9 Suitability of the case study projects for EPCs
Viewed over the longer term, the prospects of a successful outcome for the Clientin each of the projects is very good as highlighted by figure 8.6.3. However, forESCOs, the prospect of a negative outcome due to overall project uncertaintiesis likely to be unacceptably high. As figure 8.6.1 shows, increasing projectscale exacerbates the situation. Although increasing project scope reduces theprospect of negative returns, this is unlikely enough to be make projects moreattractive. Three possible options to address this issue are:
• Reduce uncertainty - as discussed in section 7.6, additional could beused to target the most significant uncertainties, this monitoring wouldneed to be focused on those aspects which are responsible for the largestuncertainties. This additional monitoring comes at a cost and would alsoneed to be applied to the baseline conditions which could create a delayin project delivery while data was collected.
• Reduce risk transfer - restricting measurement and verification to OptionA means limiting the ESCO’s risk to that arising from the failure of anECM, consequently, in the absence of equipment failure ESCO returnsare always positive as shown in figure 8.7.1. Although long term Clientreturns are reduced by between 8 and 19%, they remain positive. How-
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ever, although this analysis suggests that this change in risk allocationis a viable option, it is only part of the picture. Selecting Option A limitsthe risk taken by the ESCO to that undertaken in a standard installa-tion contract. As discussed in section 7.4.2, an EPC will, in principle,be more expensive than a standard installation contract and the marginssuggested by ESCOs for the EPC contracts in the range of 5 - 20% mayalso be higher. Unless there is a substantial difference in risk transfer be-tween an EPC and a standard installation contract, the EPC representspoor value for the Client.
• Alternative contractual mechanisms - the high level of risk for the ESCOis partly driven by the combination of an asymmetric guarantee mech-anism and the complexity of control in the client organisation. Sincethe guarantee is applied at the level of the individual school (neces-sary since the school is responsible for the utility bill) and the ESCOdoes not share in any excess savings, there is no possibility of balancingunder-performance on one site with over-performance on another. Allow-ing calculation of the guarantee at a project level or introducing somesharing of excess savings at the site level would off-set this and reducethe potential for negative ESCO returns.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Recommendationsfor Future Work
9.1 Overview
The analysis of the existing literature relating to energy performance contractsset out in Chapter 2 established the significance of energy performance con-tracting as a mechanism for increasing energy efficiency investment. However,it was also clear from this review, that despite global interest in EPC, mostcommentators agreed that markets worldwide had failed to achieve their po-tential and a range of reasons were proposed to explore this. The bulk ofthe literature on EPCs has focused on market-level factors: however, even injurisdictions such as the UK, with a favourable procurement environment andactive government support, market growth still lags behind expectations. Theaim of this study has been to explore how the elements of an individual projectcontribute to its potential for success in an attempt to understand how projectsmight be structured to make them more likely to be successful for both Clientand contractor (ESCO) and thus increase the attractiveness of the market.
Since the decision to procure an energy performance contract can beframed as an outsourcing decision, Chapter 3 considered alternative theoreticalframeworks which have been proposed to explain governance structures. Trans-action cost economics was selected as the most suitable approach for exploring
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alternative project structures. Sorrell’s [22] work pointed to 4 key hypothesesabout how project structure would affect project viability:
• Hypothesis 1Market competitiveness - a more competitive market will result in lowertransaction costs and thus increase the viability of EPC projects
• Hypothesis 2Task complexity - the easier it is to measure and verify changes in energyconsumption the more likely a project is to be viable
• Hypothesis 3Technical potential for production cost savings - an EPC project is morelikely to be viable when the range of energy conservation measures in-cluded is large
• Hypothesis 4Aggregate production costs - increasing the size of a project by increasingthe number of facilities included in it increases the likelihood of viability.
Chapters 4 and 5 detailed the modelling framework used to test these hy-potheses and how data for transaction costs and production costs were gatheredand developed. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present the results for transaction costs,production costs and finally for overall financial returns for both Client andESCO and discuss the implications that these results have for the 4 researchhypotheses. This concluding chapter draws these results together to set outthe key findings of this study. The overarching limitations of the current studyare also considered with consequent suggestions for future work.
9.2 Hypothesis 1 - market competitiveness
The first hypothesis proposed that a more competitive market would result inlower transaction costs. However, the results presented in chapter 6 did notprovide strong support for this hypothesis. Real world transaction cost data
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from procured projects was not available: however, data on project scale andnumber of bidders was. This data showed no relationship between project scaleand the number of bidders. The transaction cost data collected from ESCOson the hypothetical case study projects showed that the smaller projects wereless popular than the medium and large projects. However, the projects werestill attractive to 6 of the 8 ESCOs who provided transaction cost data. Theratio of transaction costs to production costs was higher on these projects forboth ESCOs and Clients, although this was mainly due to higher installationcosts. Margins were not significantly different between the different projects.As a result, it can be concluded that within the relatively narrow market sectorconsidered here, the competitiveness of different projects is relatively similarand there is little impact on transaction costs as a result.
There was clear evidence that the hypothesis had been interpreted inreverse in procurement: reducing transaction costs would lead to increasedcompetition for projects. Procurers had evidence of projects where procurementhad been attempted twice, once in a format with relative high costs at risk tobidders resulting in little market interest, and subsequently in a format withreduced costs at risk which resulted in a larger number of bidders. However,it was clear from the results of client interviews that the lower cost-at-riskapproach led to a much lower level of cost information being tested in compe-tition. As a consequence, clients incurred increased policing and enforcementcosts meaning that the overall level of transaction costs to the project may wellnot have been reduced.
9.3 Hypothesis 2 - task complexity
The difference in production costs between the do-nothing option and the EPCoption is the result of the energy savings arising from the implemented energyconservation measures. Chapter 7 explored the range of energy savings whichresulted from each project and considered the different approaches to measuringthe energy savings. The second hypothesis stated that the projects would be
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more likely to be successful when it was easier to measure energy savings asthis would reduce the complexity of the contracts required. Evidence from theliterature agreed with interview results which suggested that savings are gen-erally measured either on a whole building basis or using spot measurements.The level of performance risk passed to the ESCO by these two approaches isvery different and sensitivity analysis results demonstrated a significant impacton ESCO returns. The level of impact on Client returns is also significant butto a lesser degree.
Measurement approaches based on ongoing measurement of the retrofitimpact or energy modelling are less popular due to their higher cost. Furthersensitivity analysis of the energy modelling results highlighted the importanceof measuring the parameters which allow responsibility for energy consumptionto be allocated between the parties. The importance of the set of operationalparameters such as temperature set points, hours of operation etc. was clear.Although the three measurement approaches considered gave different results,none allowed a detailed understanding of responsibility for energy consump-tion, allocating all responsibility to one or other of the parties. Given thesignificance of the approach to measuring savings, it was concluded that theease of measuring savings is likely to be critical to the success of a projectbut that the hypothesis might be better expressed as the “ the easier it is tomeasure each party’s responsibility for energy consumption, the more likely aproject is to be successful”. However, to achieve this allocation of responsibil-ity, new measurement approaches are needed. A key element of this is a betterunderstanding of occupancy-related factors. While school building occupancymay be seen as superficially well defined, in practice buildings are in use formany more hours that the formal school day. For example, a recent analysisof 5 UK school buildings revealed around 50% of electrical energy was usedoutside the school day [195]. The work being undertaken to develop occupancymodelling techniques as part of IEA Annex 66, [196, 197][for example] offers thepotential for better understanding of baseline occupancy parameters. However,
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such additional monitoring will, inevitably, entail additional costs which mayhave the potential to affect project viability.
9.4 Hypothesis 3 - Technical potential for produc-tion cost savings
Hypothesis three proposed that an EPC project is more likely to be viable whenthe range of energy conservation measures included is large. This hypothesiswas tested by comparing two different project scopes at a range of differentproject scales. The results presented in tables 8.6.1 and 8.6.2 clearly demon-strate the reduction in volatility for the both ESCO and Client returns whichresults from the inclusion of additional ECMs in the second ECM set (ProjectsB, D and F).
9.5 Hypothesis 4 - Aggregate production costs
Hypothesis four suggested that increasing project scale would increase theviability by increasing potential for production cost savings. Similar reasoningwas applied by Pätäri et. al [83] who suggested bundling smaller projects tomake them more attractive to the market. Although the results presented intable 8.6.2 support this hypothesis, those shown in table 8.6.1 do not. Thisappears to be due to two interlinked factors - the governance structure meansthat guarantee performance is evaluated at the level of the individual school andthe asymmetric sharing mechanism means that there are no surpluses from over-performing sites to off-set shortfalls on under-performing ones. Consequently,increasing scale can only increase risks of negative returns for the ESCO.
9.6 Overall viability of projects
Transaction and production cost results were combined in Chapter 8 to explorethe overall impact on financial returns for Clients and ESCOs. While thelonger term outcomes for Clients had a high probability of being positive, forESCOs the possibility of a negative return was very high. ESCO returns were
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dramatically improved when the bulk of performance risk was removed. Clientreturns were reduced as a result but an additional deleterious effect is the over-payment which the Client has in effect made for a level of protection which isnot, in fact delivered through the contract.
9.7 Implications for policy makers and project stake-holders
The International Energy Agency’s 2016 Energy Efficiency Market Report [198]suggests a global market for ESCO activities of $24 bn in 2015. While thefigure for EPC projects as defined in chapter 2 will be lower than this, it is clearthat a substantial volume of EPC projects are undertaken worldwide each year.Since only a third of estimated potential energy efficiency projects have beenundertaken to date [198], the bulk of research effort has focussed on how theseactivities can be expanded, rather than on the outcomes of the projects actuallyundertaken. This is a particularly important gap in the UK context since ithas not been filled by detailed government guidance. General procurementguidance is available in the form of the Treasury’s Green Book [104] whichsets out guidelines for appraisal and evaluation in central government but thisguidance is necessarily broad in nature and relates to large central governmentprocurements rather than the smaller exercises undertaken by local governmentin an EPC context.
The clear emphasis of the Green Book guidance is on exploring all pos-sible possible procurement options and clearly identifying the potential costs,benefits and risks associated with each. In this study, by undertaking detailedmodelling of a carefully specified range of hypothetical projects, together withanalysis of existing project data, a number of new insights have been gained.These insights enable the implications of different options (such as the choicebetween target and partner bids) to be seen more clearly contributing to moreeffect review of options prior to procurement commencement.
9.7. Implications for policy makers and project stakeholders 1819.7.1 Procurement approaches
For ESCOs selecting bidding opportunities, bidding costs at risk are a signifi-cant factor and reducing design requirements at bid stage will have a significantimpact. As highlighted by Bajari and Tadelis [178], although this approach canbe beneficial for complex projects which cannot be fully specified due to theircomplexity, it increases administrative burdens for clients. However, the RE:FITproject data reviewed suggests that the partner bid approach, with its reducedrequirement for upfront design, is more likely to be used on smaller projects.For these projects the burden of additional policing and enforcement costs canbe significant.
9.7.2 Structure of the guarantee
The asymmetric sharing mechanism in guaranteed savings contracts such asthe RE:FIT contract studied here, coupled with the governance arrangementswhich result from bundling a series of independent bill-payers together, resultsin projects with high probabilities of negative returns for ESCOs. This factoris likely to result in reduced market interest over the longer term. This isa more significant issue for projects with smaller numbers of measures sincethere is less scope for balancing effects. This suggests that a performancecontract is ill-suited to projects with very small numbers of measures and thatunless a mechanism exists to allow the ESCO to spread its risk across a bundleof projects, bundling will simply increase risks. Such a mechanism could beachieved either by introducing a shared savings approach, allowing the ESCOto benefit from surplus savings, or by assessing the guarantee at a projectlevel. Of these two possibilities, the former is likely to be more workable inpractice since it maintains the clear separation between distinct organisationseach responsible for their own budget.A further potential advantage of a shared savings approach is the changein the balance of incentives. The guaranteed-savings contract is a fixed pricecontract which creates the incentive for cost reduction by the ESCO in anattempt to maximise their returns [178]. A consequence of this is the potential
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for dilution of quality in order to achieve a reduction in costs. Although theperformance guarantee is intended to provide protection for this, the potentialfor the guarantee to be watered down and to provide less protection than theclient expects is high as highlighted in chapter 7. In contrast, a shared savingsmodel in which the ESCO benefits from potential surplus savings, creates anincentive to maximise savings and increases the incentive to accurately measuresavings.
9.7.3 Alternative procurement approachesFrom the perspective of the client, the value of an EPC procurement lies inthe risk transfer to the ESCO. As highlighted in section 8.7.3, a conventionalprocurement is likely to be less expensive than an EPC, hence an EPC is anappropriate route only if the increased procurement costs (the "EPC premium")are expected to be lower than the financial benefit of the risk transfer. Thissuggests that even for projects where the NPV at risk is acceptable to clients,the EPC premium must be lower than the forgone benefit of the risk transfer.For projects E, D and F which achieve an NPV at risk of less than 5% over a15 year evaluation period, the value of the risk transfer ranges from £83,000to 193,000 based on the change in mean return over the 15 year period.
9.7.4 Insights from sensitivity analysisGlobal sensitivity analysis has played an important role in this study, allowingthe factors which have the greatest impact on model outcomes to be highlighted.As a result, important considerations for the design of energy performanceprojects were highlighted:
• identifying the factors which contribute most to uncertainty in energysavings would permit additional investment in monitoring to be targetedat the areas where it would have most effect.
• the dominant effect of energy savings uncertainty on returns highlights theneed to improve baseline data collection and also suggests how evaluationcriteria could be targeted at areas in bidder responses which make the
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biggest difference to overall client outcomes. A key example of this is theESCO’s margin, which has a limited impact on Client returns in compar-ison with projected energy savings. For procuring organisations taskedwith obtaining best value for money raised through taxation, weightingevaluation criteria in favour of bidders with lower stated on-costs is highlyattractive. This is compounded by a drive to reduce the burden on biddersin the procurement phase which is likely to lead to less emphasis on theprojected energy savings.
• the relative influence of procurement and transaction costs on overalloutcomes suggests that the investment of additional transaction costs toimprove baseline data would be beneficial since this would allow theoverall project uncertainty to be reduced. As this would benefit ESCO aswell as the Client, it may also have a beneficial impact on the number ofbidders.
9.8 Principal limitations of this study and sugges-tions for further work
Any modelling study is an exercise in simplification and its results must be readin that light. The key simplifying assumptions made have been highlighted andjustified in each section and are not repeated here. Instead, this section focuseson those assumptions and simplification which potentially have greater impactsand which cannot be easily tested without significant additional work.
9.8.1 Underlying building archetypesThis study was based on two building archetypes and 5 energy conservationmeasures, care was taken to define building fabric parameters to cover a widerange of potential building types. However, only one arrangement of build-ing systems was used for each archetype and since sensitivity analysis resultssuggest these are influential parameters this may have resulted in an under-statement of the diversity of energy savings possible. A similar comment can
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be made about the use of a single set of geometric inputs for each archetype:for example Victorian and Edwardian school buildings are common in Londonwith floor to ceiling heights in excess of 4m. In future, it would be desirable toextend the current study to include a wider range of building archetypes.
9.8.2 Stochastic modelling
While baseline energy models are selected stochastically for this study in orderto develop a distribution of energy consumption profiles, the models themselvesare static. The considerable research effort currently underway to couple en-ergy models with stochastic occupancy models offers the prospect of extendingthis work in future. However, such approaches are dependent on the validityof the underlying occupancy profile data and detailed data which currentlydoes not exist would be required on occupancy profiles in schools to take thisforwards.
9.8.3 Alternative contractual models
The results contained in this thesis are based on a single contractual modeland its risk sharing options. While this is the primary mechanism throughwhich energy performance contracts are procured in the UK schools sector, itis far from the only framework in use in the public sector. There are a rangeof different frameworks in use in the UK public sector [19], of these two are ofparticular interest due to the distinctly different guarantee mechanisms used:
• Carbon and Energy Fund (CEF) [199] - the CEF framework was devel-oped for use within the UK health sector and the form of contract hasits origins in NHS standard form drafting for Private Finance Initiativecontracts. The performance guarantee takes the form of a shared savingsguarantee with as savings pool created from surplus savings which is usedto off-set shortfalls in subsequent years. Unlike the RE:FIT contract mod-elled in this study, which also allows some off-setting to take place, theCEF sharing mechanism allows for the savings pool to be shared betweenthe client and ESCO once it passes a certain threshold.
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• Non-domestic energy efficiency (NDEE) framework [200] - the NDEEframework was launched in 2016 and has more than one form of contract,the guaranteed savings framework is of interest since it is unlike theRE:FIT framework in which the ESCO receives payment for installationon completion of installation and the penalty for missing the performancetarget is directly proportional to the shortfall. The NDEE uses a retentionmechanism instead in which energy savings are tested after a full yearof operation, if savings are not achieved and rectification is not possible,the entire retention amount would be forfeited regardless of the scale ofshortfall. As the NDEE programme is in its early stages, M&V had notbeen undertaken at the time of interview.
These mechanisms entail very different risk profiles for ESCOs and clients,which would be expected to impact on transaction costs. In future it would beimportant to extend the results of the current study by collecting additionaltransaction cost data to explore whether the results would remain consistentwhen the alternative guarantee mechanisms are employed.
9.8.4 Alternative measures of performance
Traditionally, energy performance contracts have focused on reductions in util-ity bills. However, as Demand Side Reduction strategies increase, it will beimportant to understand how the monetisation of reductions in consumption, inparticular, during mandated time periods can be incorporated within the exist-ing EPC frameworks. In this way, measures of performance might shift fromannual energy consumption to number of hours in which consumption exceededa specified target. A key challenge of extending the study in this directionis the impact of the change in granularity of timescale required for energyconsumption and the challenges that this poses for BES.
9.8.5 Exploration of other industry sectors
The methods used in this study to explore the impact of a performance guaranteein the UK schools sector, have the potential to be extended to other sectors
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as well. An obvious initial extension would be to undertake a similar study fora hospital project but the application is not necessarily limited to the publicsector. There are many other areas where similar analysis to this could be usedto unlock the "golden triangle" of negative-cost efficiency and CO2 savings. Theportion of figure 9.8.1 [201] below the horizontal axis indicates the large numberof industrial processes with currently un-realised potential for energy efficiencyprojects with positive financial returns. Currently, these improvements are notbeing made, owing to internal competition for capital and perceived risk of nonperformance. EPCs have the potential to unlock investment in energy efficiencyin these sectors but to do so will require careful structuring of projects to avoidthe pitfalls identified in this study.
Figure 9.8.1: Potential for energy efficient investment in iron and steel, chemical andcement industries (reproduced with permission from the authors)
9.9 Summary
Despite the limitations detailed in section 9.8 above, this study presents a de-tailed examination of the application of a particular form of energy performancecontract to a specific set of projects. The form of contract is in widespread usecurrently and the projects tested in this study are typical of those being un-dertaken using this form of contract. The results of this study suggest that
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• not all of these projects are well-suited to this form of procurement. Inparticular, this study highlights the importance of having a wider rangeof energy efficiency measures
• more effective monitoring methods are needed focused on the collectionof data which facilitates the allocation of responsibilities between theparties.
• reducing costs for competing bidders results in less market testing ofprices which requires Clients to increase spending on policing and en-forcement costs
• bundling smaller projects together cannot reduce risks for the ESCOunless there is a mechanism for balancing returns between individualprojects.
Appendix A
DSCF Model code location
The DSCF model code has been uploaded to a private github repository:https://github.com/Papachama/Thesis-model-codePlease contact the author to request access.
Appendix B
Variable Parameters
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesCirculation occu-pancy levels people/m
2 triangular 7.56E-02 9.45E-02 8.50E-02 [202] based on pupil capacity andpupil:teacher ratio max is1314 people, assume minis 20% lower due to lackof surplus spaces, maximumoccupancy takes place for10 mins each hour in realitybut spread over whole hourfor modelling purposesClassroom occu-pancy levels people/m
2 triangular 2.55E-01 5.82E-01 4.18E-02 [202] london average is 21 pupilsper class with pupil:teacherof 10.5. Max is 30 with2 adults, assume symmetricminimumHall occupancylevels people/m
2 triangular 2.22E-01 4.44E-01 3.33E-01 [203] assembly hall/dual functionfor upper band, lower bandfrom dining assume full oc-cupancy is 20% of time
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesICT occupancylevels people/m
2 triangular 2.33E-01 5.33E-01 3.83E-01 [202] see classroom occupancynotesKitchen occu-pancy levels people/m
2 triangular 7.86E-02 2.03E-01 141E-01 [204] assumed 1000 meals(scaled for primary school)and 6am to 2pm workinghoursOffice occupancylevels people/m
2 triangular 6.64E-02 1.11E-01 8.85E-02 [205] London occupancy densityis 11.3m2 per person as-sume min/max of 25%Practical occu-pancy levels people/m
2 triangular 1.75E-01 4.00E-01 2.88E-01 [202] london average is 21 pupilsper class with pupil:teacherof 10.5. Max is 30 with2 adults, assume symmetricminimumToilet occupancylevels people/m
2 triangular 2.65E-01 3.60E-01 3.10E-01 [206] minimum and maximumtaken from layoutsClassroom equip-ment levels W/m
2 triangular 8.00E+00 1.20E+01 1.0E+01 [207, table6.2]
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesICT equipmentlevels W/m
2 triangular 2.10E+01 4.10E+01 3.10E+01 [208] Variation from [209]
Kitchen equip-ment levels W/m
2 triangular 3.9E+02 1.11E+03 7.49E+01 [153, table8.6]Office equipmentlevels W/m
2 triangular 1.00E+01 1.60E+01 1.3E+01 [210, table12.2] range is based on occu-pancy densityPractical equip-ment levels W/m
2 triangular 2.10E+01 4.10E+01 3.10E+01 [208] ICT values used due to lackof dataclassroom lightinglevels W/m
2 triangular 1.20E+01 2.10E+01 1.65E+01000[207, table6.2], [149,p. 15]
minimum value taken fromCIBSE guide A, maximumvalue taken from Philipsoffice lighting lev-els W/m
2 triangular 8.0E+00 1.370E+01 1.09E+01 [149, p.35] minimum value taken fromCIBSE guide A, maximumvalue taken from Philipshall lighting levels W/m2 triangular 1.20E+01 1.30E+01 1.25E+01 [149, p.27], [207,table 6.2]
193
Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source Notesancillary lightinglevels W/m
2 triangular 8.00E+00 1.00E+01 9.00E00 [149, p.31], [207,table 6.2]intermittent heat-ing set point
oC triangular 1.60E+01 2.40E+01 1.90E+01 [209], [207,table 1.5] CIBSE guidance is 19 - 21regular heatingset point
oC normal 1.30E+00 2.06E+01 [211]
kitchen heatingset point
oC triangular 1.50E+01 1.80E+01 1.65E+01 [207, table6.2] General building areas -kitchens usedintermittent heat-ing set back tem-perature
% triangular 9.60E+00 1.44E+01 1.20E+01 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 20% bandregular heat-ing set backtemperature
% triangular 9.60E+00 1.44E+01 1.20E+01 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 20% bandkitchen heat-ing set backtemperature
% triangular 9.60E+00 1.44E+01 1.20E+01 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 20% band
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source Notesgeneral occupancyschedule - par-tially occupiedstarts am
time triangular 5.00E+00 7.00E+00 6.00E+00 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 1hr band
general occupancyschedule -fully oc-cupied starts
time triangular 7.00E+00 9.00E+00 8.00E+00 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 1hr bandgeneral occupancyschedule - par-tially occupied pmstarts
time triangular 1.50E+01 1.70E+01 1.60E+01 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 1hr band
general occupancyschedule - par-tially occupied pmends
time triangular 1.70E+01 1.90E+01 1.80E+01 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 1hr band
Kitchen occu-pancy schedule -on
time triangular 6.00E+00 8.00E+00 7.00E+00 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 1hr band
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source Noteskitchen occupancyschedule - off time triangular 1.40E+01 1.60E+01 1.50E+01 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 1hr bandgeneral equipmenton time triangular 7.00E+00 9.00E+00 8.00E+00 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 1hr bandgeneral equipmentoff time triangular 1.50E+01 1.70E+01 1.60E+01 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 1hr bandkitchen equipmenton time triangular 6.00E+00 8.00E+00 7.00E+00 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 1hr bandkitchen equipmentoff time triangular 1.40E+01 1.60E+01 1.50E+01 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 1hr bandgeneral lightingon time triangular 6.00E+00 7.00E+00 6.00E+00 based on partial occupancytimes
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source Notesgeneral lightingoff time triangular 1.70E+01 1.90E+01 1.80E+01 based on partial occupancytimeskitchen lighting on time triangular 6.00E+00 8.00E+00 7.00E+00 based on occupancy timeskitchen lighting off time triangular 1.40E+01 1.6+01 1.50E+01 based on occupancy timesgeneral heating on time triangular 3.00E+00 5.00E+00 4.00E+00 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 1hr bandgeneral heating off time triangular 1.60E+01 1.80E+01 1.70E+00 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 1hr bandkitchen heating on time triangular 6.00E+00 8.00E+00 7.00E+00 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 1hr bandkitchen heating off time triangular 1.30E+01 1.50E+01 1.4E+01 [212] National CalculationMethodology value takenas mean with 1hr bandventilation tem-perature
oC normal 1.80E+00 2.05E+01 [213]
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source Notesinfiltration rate ach-1 triangular 3.50E-01 9.00E-01 6.25E-01 [207, table4.21] min is average Part L (2002)value and max is peak leakyvalueboiler water outlettemperature
oC uniform 6.00E+01 9.50E+01 7.75E+01 Estimate to test parameter
boiler part loadratio fraction uniform 2.00E-01 6.00E-01 4.00E-01 estimate to test parameterboiler efficiency % normal 2.5E-02 7.80E-01 [214]dhw design loopexit temp
oC uniform 5.00E+01 7.00E+01 6.00E+01 estimate to test variable
dhw loop designtemp difference
oC uniform 3.00E+00 7.00E+00 5.00E+00 estimate to test variable
window air gap m triangular 6.00E-03 2.00E-02 1.30E-02 estimate to test parameterglass thermal con-ductivity W/mK triangular 6.04E-01 5.75E+00 1.29E+00 [215, tableA18],[207,table3.23]
Minimum value from Mac-Donald. Subsequent re-view identified upper valueas unrealistically high, seenotes below.
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source Notesinsulation ureafoam thermalconductivity
W/mK triangular 3.20E-02 1.80E-01 1.06E-01 [215, ta-ble A22],[207]
Minimum value from Mac-Donald. Subsequent re-view identified upper valueas unrealistically high, seenotes below.cast concrete ther-mal conductivity W/mK triangular 1.14E+00 2.22E+00 1.68E+00 [215, tableA15] Minimum and maximum at± 1 st.devscreed thermalconductivity W/mK triangular 4.46E-01 1.13E+00 07.87E-01 [215, tableA30] Minimum and maximum at± 1 st.devlinoleum thermalconductivity W/mK triangular 1.70E-01 3.50E-01 2.60E-01 [216] Minimum and maximum setto ±50%asphalt thermalconductivity W/mK triangular 7.42E-01 1.36E+00 1.05E+00 [215, tableA4] Minimum and maximum at± 1 st.devfibreboard thermalconductivity W/mK triangular 3.00E-02 9.00E-02 6.00E-02 [216] Minimum and maximum setto ±50%
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source Notesextrudedpolystyrenethermal conduc-tivity
W/mK triangular 3.20E-02 7.60E-02 5.40E-02 [215, tableA22] Minimum and maximum at± 1 st.dev
plasterboard ther-mal conductivity W/mK triangular 4.10E-02 3.41E-01 1.91E-01 [215, tableA26] Minimum and maximum at± 1 st.devbrickwork thermalconductivity W/mK triangular 5.28E-01 1.05E+00 7.89E-01 [215, tableA8] Minimum and maximum at± 1 st.devblockwork thermalconductivity W/mK triangular 6.79E-01 1.17E+00 9.22E-01 [215, tableA5] Minimum and maximum at± 1 st.devplastering thermalconductivity W/mK triangular 2.82E-01 7.86E-01 5.34E-01 [215, tableA27] Minimum and maximum at± 1 st.devoak thermal con-ductivity W/mK triangular 1.09E-01 1.93E-01 1.51E-01 [215, tableA35] Minimum and maximum at± 1 st.devCast concretelightweight ther-mal conductivity
W/mK triangular 1.69E-01 4.57E-01 3.13E-01 [215, tableA14] Minimum and maximum at± 1 st.dev
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesCast concretelightweight thick-ness
m triangular 7.50E-02 1.25E-01 0.1000 Minimum and maximum at±1 st.dev
glass thickness m triangular 5.00E-03 7.00E-03 6.00E-03 Minimum and maximum at±25% of default valueinsulation ureafoam thickness m triangular 1.23E-01 1.43E-01 1.33E-01 Minimum and maximum at±25% of default valuecast concretethickness m triangular 9.00E-02 1.10E-01 1.00E-01 Minimum and maximum at±25% of default valuescreed thickness m triangular 6.50E-02 7.50E-02 7.00E-02 Minimum and maximum at±25% of default value. De-fault value confirmed withreference to BS 8204-2:2003+A2:2011. Screeds,bases and in situ floorings[217]
201
Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source Noteslinoleum thickness m triangular 2.50E-02 3.50E-02 3.00E-02 Minimum and maximum at±25% of default value. De-fault values subsequentlyidentified as unrealistic incomparison with BS EN686:2011 - Resilient floorcoverings [218]. See notesbelow for details.asphalt thickness m triangular 1.70E-02 2.10E-02 1.90E-02 Minimum and maximum at±25% of default value.fibreboard thick-ness m triangular 1.10E-02 1.50E-02 1.30E-02 Minimum and maximum at±25% of default valueextrudedpolystyrenethickness
m triangular 4.30E-02 5.30E-02 4.80E-02 Minimum and maximum at±25% of default value
plasterboardthickness m triangular 2.30E-02 2.70E-02 2.50E-02 Minimum and maximum at±25% of default value
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source Notesbrickwork thick-ness m triangular 9.50E-02 1.03E-01 1.00E-01 Minimum and maximum at±25% of default valueblockwork thick-ness m triangular 9.50E-02 1.03E-01 1.00E-01 Minimum and maximum at±25% of default valueplastering thick-ness m triangular 1.00E-02 2.00E-02 1.50E-02 Minimum and maximum at±25% of default valueoak thickness m triangular 3.00E-02 4.00E-02 3.50E-02 Minimum and maximum at±25% of default valuemetabolic gainsgeneral W normal 1.15E+02 1.70E+02 2.75E+01 1.42E+02 [215, fig.4.6]metabolic gainscorridor W normal 2.00E+02 2.25E+02 1.25E+01 2.12E+02 [215, fig.4.6]metabolic gainssport W normal 3.25E+02 4.25E+02 5.0E+01 3.75E+02 [215, fig.4.6]Classroom tempcontrolled purgeventilation rate
ach-1 triangular 1.33E+00 9.27E+00 5.51E+00 [219, table2] cases 6 & 7 - purge venti-lation, less base ventilation
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesClassroom contin-uous base ventila-tion rate
ach-1 triangular 0.00E+00 4.87E+00 2.43E+00 [219, table1] cases 6 & 7
Orientation deg uniform 0.00E+00 3.59E+02 1.80E+02
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General Assumptions:
• Plant room and stores are unoccupied
• No equipment assumed in circulation areas
• Hall equipment excluded as very low
• Plant equipment included in HVAC
• No equipment in stores
• no equipment assumed in toilets as hand dryers only possible source
• Catering gas consumption is excluded - Hong suggests a median valueof 2.3% for catering gas consumption suggesting that this effect would besmall [153]
• Lift electricity consumption is excluded. Hong shows negligible energyconsumption due to lift use. This is likely due to very infrequent use oflifts for the transport of building users who are unable to use the stairs
• it is assumed that rooms are well-enough insulated and distant fromhigh temperature radiant heat sources for the difference between air andoperative temperatures to be small.
• Where reported standard deviation is greater than 25% of the reportedmean, minimum and maximum values have been fixed at ± 1 standarddeviation in order to avoid sampling impossible values.
• No shading is including in modelling. However, orientation is included asa variable. This variable was not found to be one of the most influentialand thus further investigation of shading/transmission effects was deemedunnecessary.
• Thermal mass of partitions which are not included due to combining ofrooms into zones has been excluded since this would have little impacton annual energy consumption which is the output of interest.
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The original ranges modelled for three parameter values were found to beunrealistic on subsequent review: glass thermal conductivity, linoleum thick-ness and urea foam insulation thermal conductivity. Sensitivity analysis wasrepeated with revised parameter ranges. This indicated that these parame-ters remained non-influential. The distributions of annual electricity and gasconsumption were compared for three sets of 1000 runs for both primary andsecondary school, parameter values were sampled from their distributions ifinfluential or fixed at their base value if non-influential using the proceduredetailed in section 5.4.9: set A contained new values for the three correctedparameters, fixed at the base value, set B contained new parameter values,sampled from their distributions and set C contained the original parametervalues, fixed at the base value. A 2-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was usedto compare the resulting distributions. This confirmed that the differences be-tween the three sets of distributions for each utility and building were notstatistically significant and thus that updating these three parameter rangeswould not affect the results.
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ESCO Interview Materials
The	impacts	of	project	scale,	scope	and	
risk	allocation	on	financial	returns	for	
clients	and	contractors	in	Energy	
Performance	Contracts	- a	stochastic	
modelling	analysis
Pamela	Fennell	
Energy	Institute
University	College	London
Pamela.fennell.13@ucl.ac.uk
Pipework	insulation
Lighting	upgrade
Air	tightness	seals
Heating	controls
Boiler	replacement
Primary	schools
Secondary	schools
This	project	is	based	on	6	case	studies	which	
include	different	numbers	of	schools,	both	
primary	and	secondary	and	different	ranges	of	
technologies.
Some	definitions
• Bidding	Costs	- the	costs	which	a	potential	supplier	
incurs	to	win	a	contract.		Bidding	costs	include	all	the	
costs	which	are	incurred	at	risk	including	any	design	and	
survey	costs
• Development	Costs	- the	costs	which	are	incurred	by	a	
supplier	after	selection	by	the	client.		Development	costs	
include	finance,	legal	and	administrative	costs	but	
exclude	design	costs
• Project	Management	Costs	– the	costs	of	delivering	the	
installation	and	operational	phases
• Gross	Margin	– the	excess	of	revenue	from	the	contact	
divided	by	the	costs	of	labour	and	materials	required	to	
perform	the	contract	i.e.	excluding	overheads
6	Primary	
schools Project		A
Lighting	upgrade
Heating	controls
Bidding	 Development	 Project	Management Gross	Margin
Project		B
6	Primary	
schools
Pipework	insulation
Lighting	upgrade
Air	tightness	seals
Heating	controls
Boiler	replacement
Bidding	 Development	 Project	Management Gross	Margin
10	Primary	schools
2	Secondary	schools Project		C
Lighting	upgrade
Heating	controls
Bidding	 Development	 Project	Management Gross	Margin
Project		D
10	Primary	schools
2	Secondary	schools
Pipework	insulation
Lighting	upgrade
Air	tightness	seals
Heating	controls
Boiler	replacement
20	Primary	schools
4	Secondary	schools Project		E
Lighting	upgrade
Heating	controls
Bidding	 Development	 Project	Management Gross	Margin
Pipework	insulation
Lighting	upgrade
Air	tightness	seals
Heating	controls
Boiler	replacement
Project		F
20	Primary	schools
4	Secondary	schools
Bidding	 Development	 Project	Management Gross	Margin
Which	measurement	and	verification	strategy	do	you	think	
would	be	most	appropriate	for	these	2	groups	of	technologies?
Change in	whole	building	
electricity	and	gas	
consumption
Change in	metered	
energy	(sub-meters	
measured	over	time)
Calibrated computer	
model
Spot	measurements	for	
proof	of	installation
Lighting	upgrade
Heating	controls
Pipework	insulation
Lighting	upgrade
Air	tightness	seals
Heating	controls
Boiler	replacement
Appendix D
Client Interview Materials
The	impacts	of	project	scale,	scope	and	
risk	allocation	on	financial	returns	for	
clients	and	contractors	in	Energy	
Performance	Contracts	- a	stochastic	
modelling	analysis
Pamela	Fennell	
Energy	Institute
University	College	London
Pamela.fennell.13@ucl.ac.uk
Pipework	insulation
Lighting	upgrade
Air	tightness	seals
Heating	controls
Boiler	replacement
Primary	schools
Secondary	schools
This	project	is	based	on	6	case	studies	which	
include	different	numbers	of	schools,	both	
primary	and	secondary	and	different	ranges	of	
technologies.
Some	definitions
• Pre-procurement	time		– man-hours	preparing	
documentation	for	bidders	and	securing	commitment	of	
schools
• Bid	phase	time		– man-hours	between	launch	and	
selection	of	preferred	supplier
• Installation	phase	time	– man-hours	during	the	
installation	phase
• Guarantee	period	time – man-hours	during	the	
guarantee	period
• External	costs	– fees	paid	to	3rd parties	for	support	
services	e.g.	lawyers,	survey	costs,	M&V	costs
Lighting	upgrade
Heating	controls
Project	A
6	Primary	schools
Pre-procurement Bid Phase Installation Guarantee Period
Internal	time
External	costs
Pipework	insulation
Lighting	upgrade
Air	tightness	seals
Heating	controls
Boiler	replacement
Project	B
Pre-procurement Bid Phase Installation Guarantee Period
Internal	time
External	costs
6	Primary	schools
Lighting	upgrade
Heating	controls
Project	C
10	Primary	schools
2	Secondary	schools
Pre-procurement Bid Phase Installation Guarantee Period
Internal	time
External	costs
Pipework	insulation
Lighting	upgrade
Air	tightness	seals
Heating	controls
Boiler	replacement
Project	D
10	Primary	schools
2	Secondary	schools
Pre-procurement Bid Phase Installation Guarantee Period
Internal	time
External	costs
Lighting	upgrade
Heating	controls
Project		E
20	Primary	schools
4	Secondary	schools
Pre-procurement Bid Phase Installation Guarantee Period
Internal	time
External	costs
Pipework	insulation
Lighting	upgrade
Air	tightness	seals
Heating	controls
Boiler	replacement
Project		F
20	Primary	schools
4	Secondary	schools
Pre-procurement Bid Phase Installation Guarantee Period
Internal	time
External	costs
Which	measurement	and	verification	strategy	do	you	think	
would	be	most	appropriate	for	these	2	groups	of	technologies?
Change in	whole	building	
electricity	and	gas	
consumption
Change in	metered	
energy	(sub-meters	
measured	over	time)
Calibrated computer	
model
Spot	measurements	for	
proof	of	installation
Lighting	upgrade
Heating	controls
Pipework	insulation
Lighting	upgrade
Air	tightness	seals
Heating	controls
Boiler	replacement
Appendix E
Parameter Values and RangesPost-Intervention
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source Notesclassroom lightinglevels W/m
2 triangular 4.28 4.52 4.40 [220, table3]office lighting lev-els W/m
2 triangular 5.25 5.55 5.40 [220, table3]hall lighting levels W/m2 triangular 5.54 5.86 5.70 [220, table3]ancillary lightinglevels W/m
2 triangular 3.01 3.19 3.10 [220, table3]intermittent heat-ing set point
oC triangular 19.00 21.00 20.00 [221]
regular heatingset point
oC triangular 19.00 21.00 20.00 [221]
general lightingon time triangular 5.00 7.00 6.00 tied to occupancy variablegeneral lightingoff time triangular 17.00 19.00 18.00 tied to occupancy variablekitchen lighting on time triangular 6.00 8.00 7.00 tied to occupancy variablekitchen lighting off time triangular 14.00 16.00 15.00 tied to occupancy variable
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source Notesgeneral heating on time triangular 5.00 7.00 6.00 tied to occupancy variablegeneral heating off time triangular 17.00 19.00 18.00 tied to occupancy variablekitchen heating on time triangular 6.00 8.00 7.00 tied to occupancy variablekitchen heating off time triangular 14.00 16.00 15.00 tied to occupancy variableinfiltration rate ach-1 triangular 3.50E-01 7.00E-01 5.25E-01 [207, table4.21] min is average Part L (2002)value and max is peak leakyvalueboiler part loadratio fraction uniform 1.90E-01 2.70E-01 1.00E-01 [222]boiler efficiency % normal 1.1E-02 9.40E-01 [63]
Appendix F
ECM Installation Costs
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1. Introduction 
This short report summarises analysis to support research on the commercial viability of EPC 
projects. A range of costs has been provided for the installation of energy conservation measures 
into a theoretical primary and secondary school using an energy performance contract. 
The scenarios are based on two buildings modelled by UCL. The energy conservation measures 
costed are: 
 Valve and Flange Insulation- New thermal jackets and pipe insulation 
 BMS Upgrade - New sensors, recalibration of set points and operating hours 
 Boiler replacement - New modulating condensing gas boilers 
 Fabric Improvements - Sealing of junction of walls and roof, sealing around windows, 
sealing of extracts 
 BMS replacement - Basic BMS installed with lighting and heating controls 
 Lighting Upgrade  
‒ Option 1 – Lamp replacement - T8 fluorescent lamps replaced with T8 LED lamps and  
HF electronic ballasts 
‒ Option 2 – Luminaire replacement Luminaires and 58W T8 fluorescent lamps 
replaced with T8 LED lamps and  HF electronic ballasts 
The costs provided in this report are drawn from between 3 and 12 contractor quotes for similar 
work and also Currie & Brown’s own cost consulting teams who maintain benchmark prices for 
fabric, HVAC and other building costs.  
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2. Primary School 
The theoretical primary school modelled is a 1970’s two storey building with a total area of 
2,134m
2
. The Tables 2.1 and 2.2 and the graphs in Figure 2.1 show the estimated cost ranges for 
each modelled energy conservation measure inclusive of purchase, installation, strip out of 
existing and preliminaries. 
Table 2.1 Cost of various ECM’s per m2 for a primary school 
 
 ECM Cost (£/m2) 
 Low Med High 
BMS Upgrade £         0.77 £         0.94 £         1.17 
Boiler replacement (2*80kW) £         7.17 £         7.97 £         8.76 
Fabric improvements £         0.50 £         1.50 £         3.00 
BMS replacement £       21.00 £       23.00 £       25.00 
Lighting Upgrade - option 1 £         3.00 £         5.00 £         7.00 
Lighting Upgrade - option 2 £       12.00 £       15.00 £       18.00 
 
Table 2.2 Cost of various ECM’s for a primary school 
 
 ECM Cost (£ total) 
 Low Med High 
BMS Upgrade £1,650 £2,000 £2,500 
Boiler replacement (2*80kW) £15,300 £17,000 £18,700 
Fabric improvements £1,100 £3,200 £6,400 
BMS replacement £44,800 £49,100 £53,350 
Lighting Upgrade - option 1 £6,400 £10,700 £14,950 
Lighting Upgrade - option 2 £25,600 £32,000 £38,400 
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Figure 2.1 Graphs of cost range for each ECM for a primary school 
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3. Secondary School 
The theoretical secondary school modelled is a 1970’s two storey building with a total area of 
8,411m
2
. The Tables 3.1 and 3.2 and the graphs in Figure 3.1 show the estimated cost ranges for 
each modelled energy conservation measure inclusive of purchase, installation, strip out of 
existing and preliminaries. 
Table 3.1 Cost of various ECM’s per m2 for a secondary school 
 
 ECM Cost (£/m2) 
 Low Med High 
Valve and Flange Insulation  £         0.06   £         0.11   £         0.14  
BMS Upgrade £         0.77 £         0.94 £         1.17 
Boiler replacement £         6.80 £         7.50 £         8.30 
Fabric improvements £         0.50 £         1.50 £         3.00 
BMS replacement £       21.00 £       23.00 £       25.00 
Lighting Upgrade - option 1 £         3.00 £         5.00 £         7.00 
Lighting Upgrade - option 2 £       12.00 £       15.00 £       18.00 
 
Table 3.2 Cost of various ECM’s for a secondary school 
 
 ECM Cost (£ total) 
 Low Med High 
Valve and Flange Insulation  £500   £950   £1,200  
BMS Upgrade  £6,503   £7,883   £9,854  
Boiler replacement  £57,150   £63,500   £69,850  
Fabric improvements  £4,206   £12,617   £25,233  
BMS replacement  £176,631   £193,453   £210,275  
Lighting Upgrade - option 1  £25,233   £42,055   £58,877  
Lighting Upgrade - option 2  £113,549   £126,165   £151,398  
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Figure 3.1 Graphs of cost range for each ECM - secondary school 
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Appendix G
ESCO M&V Responses
This appendix contains confidential information which is not for publication.This content is included for examiners only.
Appendix H
DSCF Parameter Values andRanges
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesFixed InputsSalix loan term years 8 [125]Discount rate % 3.5 section 4.7.2Stochastic Inputs - CommonGuarantee buffer % uniform 0 10 5 section 4.7.3Inflation index % uniform 1.5 2.5 2 table 4.5.1Loan rate % uniform 1.5 2.5 2 [126]Primary school in-stallation costs -ECM set 1
£ uniform 27,300 40,900 34,000 appendix F
Secondary schoolinstallation costs -ECM set 1
£ uniform 120,100 161,300 143,000 appendix F
Primary school in-stallation costs -ECM set 2
£ uniform 43,700 66,000 54,200 appendix F
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesSecondary schoolinstallation costs -ECM set 2
£ uniform 181,900 257,600 211,100 appendix F
Stochastic Inputs - Project AClient transactioncosts £ triangular 53,400 83,000 67,400 section 6.2.2ESCO transactioncosts £ triangular 28,900 69,100 39,300 section 6.2.1Client projectmanagement costs £ triangular 18,000 35,500 25,200 section 6.2.2ESCO Margin % uniform 6 25 13 section 6.2.1Stochastic Inputs - Project BClient transactioncosts £ triangular 53,400 83,000 67,400 section 6.2.2ESCO transactioncosts £ triangular 34,000 92,300 49,100 section 6.2.1Client projectmanagement costs £ triangular 18,000 33,600 25,200 section 6.2.2
244
Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesESCO Margin % uniform 5 25 13 section 6.2.1Stochastic Inputs - Project CClient transactioncosts £ triangular 66,600 84,500 75,100 section 6.2.2ESCO transactioncosts £ triangular 61,500 220,200 115,700 section 6.2.1Client projectmanagement costs £ triangular 27,000 40,200 33,300 section 6.2.2ESCO Margin % uniform 6 25 14 section 6.2.1Stochastic Inputs - Project DClient transactioncosts £ triangular 66,600 84,500 75,100 section 6.2.2ESCO transactioncosts £ triangular 72,000 296,400 143,000 section 6.2.1Client projectmanagement costs £ triangular 27,000 40,200 33,300 section 6.2.2ESCO Margin % uniform 5 20 14 section 6.2.1Stochastic Inputs - Project E
245
Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesClient transactioncosts £ triangular 66,000 93,000 79,300 section 6.2.2ESCO transactioncosts £ triangular 92,300 462,000 232,000 ection 6.2.1Client projectmanagement costs £ triangular 27,000 53,700 39,300 section 6.2.2ESCO Margin % uniform 6 20 13 section 6.2.1Stochastic Inputs - Project FClient transactioncosts £ triangular 66,600 93,000 79,300 section 6.2.2ESCO transactioncosts £ triangular 150,900 620,000 252,900 section 6.2.1Client projectmanagement costs £ triangular 27,000 53,700 39,300 section 6.2.2ESCO Margin % uniform 5 20 16 section 6.2.1Energy Savings - ECM set 1
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesExpected annualelectricity saving- primary school
J 1.56E11 Calculated
Expected annualgas saving -primary school
J 3.79E10 Calculated
Expected annualelectricity saving -secondary school
J 5.79E11 Calculated
Expected annualgas saving -secondary school
J 4.02E10 Calculated
Option A annualelectricity saving -primary school
J 1.56E11 calculated
Option B annualelectricity saving -primary school
J 8.03E10 2.64E11 3.28E10 1.56E11 summary statistics forEnergyPlus models
247
Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesOption C annualelectricity saving -primary school
J 8.04E10 2.64E11 3.28E10 1.66E11 summary statistics forEnergyPlus models
Option A annualgas saving - pri-mary school
J 3.79E10 calculated
Option B annualgas saving - pri-mary school
J 3.79E10 calculated
Option C annualgas saving - pri-mary school
J -1.27E12 1.65E12 3.98E11 5.45E10 summary statistics forEnergyPlus models
Option A annualelectricity saving -secondary school
J 5.79E11 calculated
Option B annualelectricity saving -secondary school
J 2.61E11 7.12E11 8.46E10 4.61E11 summary statistics forEnergyPlus models
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesOption C annualelectricity saving -secondary school
J 2.61E11 8.48E11 9.45E10 5.52E11 summary statistics forEnergyPlus models
Option A annualgas saving - sec-ondary school
J 4.02E11 calculated
Option B annualgas saving - sec-ondary school
J 4.02E11 calculated
Option C annualgas saving - sec-ondary school
J -4.97E12 5.89E12 1.55E12 4.74E11 summary statistics forEnergyPlus models
Energy Savings - ECM set 2Expected annualelectricity saving- primary school
J 1.56E11 Calculated
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesExpected annualgas saving -primary school
J 1.37E11 Calculated
Expected annualelectricity saving -secondary school
J 5.79E11 Calculated
Expected annualgas saving -secondary school
J 1.45E12 Calculated
Option A annualelectricity saving -primary school
J 1.56E11 calculated
Option B annualelectricity saving -primary school
J 8.49E10 2.73E11 3.18E10 1.66E11 summary statistics forEnergyPlus models
Option C annualelectricity saving -primary school
J 8.46E10 2.73E11 3.18E10 1.66E11 summary statistics forEnergyPlus models
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesOption A annualgas saving - pri-mary school
J 1.37E11 calculated
Option B annualgas saving - pri-mary school
J -5.43E11 1.60E12 3.08E11 2.69E11 summary statistics forEnergyPlus models
Option C annualgas saving - pri-mary school
J -4.95E11E12 2.00E12 3.92E11 4.92E11 summary statistics forEnergyPlus models
Option A annualelectricity saving -secondary school
J 5.79E11 calculated
Option B annualelectricity saving -secondary school
J 2.32E11 7.89E11 8.65E10 4.86E11 summary statistics forEnergyPlus models
Option C annualelectricity saving -secondary school
J 2.61E11 9.07E11 9.58E10 5.74E11 summary statistics forEnergyPlus models
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Variable Units Distribution min max σ µ Source NotesOption A annualgas saving - sec-ondary school
J 1.45E12 calculated
Option B annualgas saving - sec-ondary school
J -2.82E12 5.89E12 1.19E12 1.25E12 summary statistics forEnergyPlus models
Option C annualgas saving - sec-ondary school
J -2.55E12 7.63E12 1.50E12 2.23E12 summary statistics forEnergyPlus models
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